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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines Shanghai’s urbanisation by applying Henri Lefebvre’s theories of 
the production of space and everyday life. A review of Lefebvre’s theories indicates that 
each mode of production produces its own space. Capitalism is perpetuated by 
producing new space and commodifying everyday life. Applying Lefebvre’s 
regressive-progressive method as a methodological framework, this thesis periodises 
Shanghai’s history to the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, ‘socialist reform era’ and 
‘post-socialist reform era’. The Shanghai World Exposition 2010 was chosen as a case 
study to exemplify how urbanisation shaped urban experience. Empirical data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews. This thesis argues that Shanghai 
developed a ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’. The state redefined its 
distributive role to act as both a regulator and a market player, and manipulated its 
regulatory power to generate revenue from land commodification. The state thus 
accelerated urbanisation by relocating residents to new towns. Inhabitants’ daily 
routines were rearranged. Lefebvre envisaged an urban revolution to occur when 
urbanisation is complete. But my data illustrates that civil resistance is not widely 
supported because urbanisation has generally improved living quality. This thesis 
concludes by examining the possibility of Shanghai’s resuming its status as the site of 
modernisation and the critique of modernity.  
 
 
Keywords:  
 
Shanghai, Henri Lefebvre, the production of space, urbanisation, World Expo, everyday 
life, urban China, mode of production, Chinese modernity, Chinese modernisation. 
 
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
 
First of all, I give my deepest gratitude to my parents. They supported my study, even 
though they did not exactly know what I did during this unexpectedly long period of 
study. I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to my girlfriend, Sze, for her love 
and support. In Birmingham, which Jane Austen regarded as ‘not a place to promise 
much’, life would be extremely hard without her as a companion.  
 
I greatly appreciate all those who helped me in data collection, in particular  
Universitas 21 for sponsoring part of the travel expenses of my fieldwork. I should also 
thank my fellows at the Department of Sociology, for our memories in the Sociology 
House. I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Lynn and Chris at Birmingham, Iris 
and Darrel at Manchester for generously providing Sze and me accommodations. 
 
Last but not least, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisors, 
Mairtin Mac an Ghaill and Ross Abbinnett. Without their supervision and 
encouragement, I would have already given up on writing my thesis a long time ago.  
 
  
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................... iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................. iv 
 
LIST OF CHARTS ...................................................................................................... viii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ ix 
 
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................... x 
 
NOTES ON ROMANISATION AND TRANSLATION .......................................... xiv 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
 
1.1  Background of this Study ......................................................................... 1 
 
1.2  The Theoretical Concern .......................................................................... 4 
 
1.3  The Methodological Concern and Execution Process .............................. 6 
 
1.4  Research Questions and Significance ....................................................... 8 
 
1.5  Organisation of Chapters ........................................................................ 10 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN THE MODERN WORLD ............................ 14 
 
2.1  The (Re)Production of (Social) Space .................................................... 17 
2.1.1  Spatial Triad ........................................................................................... 19 
2.1.2  The History of Space .............................................................................. 24 
2.1.3  The Survival of Capitalism ..................................................................... 29 
2.1.4  The State Mode of Production ................................................................ 32 
 
2.2  Urban Experience and Urban Revolution ............................................... 35 
2.2.1  Everyday Life in Modern Society .......................................................... 36 
2.2.2  Social Space and Social Time ................................................................ 39 
2.2.3  Urban Problematic and Urban Revolution ............................................. 42 
2.2.4  Moments and the Right to the City ......................................................... 46 
 
2.3  The Spatial Turn and Critique ................................................................ 50 
2.3.1  The Spatial Turn ..................................................................................... 51 
2.3.2  A Critique ............................................................................................... 54 
 
v 
 
2.4  The Studies of Urban China ................................................................... 56 
2.4.1  The Great Urban Transformation ........................................................... 56 
2.4.2  Theorising Urban Transformation .......................................................... 58 
 
2.5  Conclusion: A Lefebvrian Analysis of Chinese Urbanisation ............... 61 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES ................................................................................. 67 
 
3.1  Regressive-progressive Method ............................................................. 70 
3.1.1  Space as Concrete Abstraction ............................................................... 71 
3.1.2  Regressive-progressive Method as a Social-historical Method .............. 73 
 
3.2  Research Questions and Methodology ................................................... 77 
3.2.1  Research Questions ................................................................................ 78 
3.2.2  Data Collection Methods ........................................................................ 79 
 
3.3  Methodological Issues and the Executive Process ................................. 82 
3.3.1  Secondary Data Analysis ........................................................................ 82 
3.3.2  Semi-structured Interview ...................................................................... 83 
3.3.3  Execution Process ................................................................................... 86 
3.3.4  Autobiographical Reflexivity ................................................................. 90 
 
3.4  The Empirical and The Theoretical ........................................................ 92 
3.4.1  Regressive-progressive Method as a Theoretical-empirical Method ..... 93 
3.4.2  The Application of the Regressive-progressive Method ........................ 94 
 
3.5  Conclusion: A Dialectical Method Uniting Content and Form .............. 96 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  
A SPATIAL HISTORY OF SHANGHAI .................................................................. 98 
 
4.1  A Gateway to Modernity: 1843-1949 ................................................... 102 
4.1.1  From a Market Town to a Cosmopolitan City ...................................... 103 
4.1.2  Spatial Practice: The World Expo of Architectures .............................. 107 
4.1.3  The Emergence of New Social Classes ................................................. 111 
4.1.4  The Emergence of a New Urban Culture ............................................. 114 
4.1.5  Contradictions in the Capitalist City .................................................... 117 
4.1.6  Industrialisation and the Nationalist City ............................................. 120 
 
4.2  The Aversion of Urban Culture: 1949-1978 ......................................... 123 
4.2.1  The Production of Socialist Space ........................................................ 125 
4.2.2  Industrialisation without Urbanisation ................................................. 128 
4.2.3  The Danwei and Organised Social Lives ............................................. 132 
4.2.4  Eradicating Class Differences? ............................................................. 134 
 
4.3  A Post-socialist City or Global City: 1979-Now .................................. 137 
4.3.1  Daily Lives in Post-reform China ......................................................... 137 
vi 
 
4.3.2  Post-socialist City/Global City: a Question to be Answered ................ 139 
4.3.3  Political Economy and Space ............................................................... 140 
 
4.4  Conclusion: Two Meanings of ‘Modern’ ............................................. 141 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN SHANGHAI ................................................. 147 
 
5.1  State-led/-participation Mode of Production ........................................ 152 
5.1.1  The Bureaucratic Structure of the Shanghai Expo ............................... 152 
5.1.2  The Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises ..................................... 156 
5.1.3  The Corporatisation of the World Expo Group .................................... 160 
5.1.4  Land Commodification ......................................................................... 162 
5.1.5  Dual Role of the State to Unify ‘Socialism’ and ‘Capitalism’ ............. 166 
 
5.2  Spatial Practice of Shanghai ................................................................. 169 
5.2.1  The Puxi/Pudong Divide ...................................................................... 170 
5.2.2  Spatial Practice in Puxi ......................................................................... 172 
5.2.3  Spatial Practice in Pudong .................................................................... 175 
 
5.3  The Representation of Space ................................................................ 179 
5.3.1  ‘The City Makes Life Better’ ............................................................... 180 
5.3.2  The Shanghai Expo as a Substitute for Political Campaigns ............... 182 
5.3.3  The Realisation of a ‘Century-old Dream’ ........................................... 184 
5.3.4  Surpassing the West and the ‘China Model’ ........................................ 187 
5.3.5  The Reproduction of the Mode of Production ...................................... 188 
 
5.4  Conclusion: Rebuilding Shanghai ........................................................ 191 
 
CHAPTER SIX:  
URBAN EXPERIENCE, IMAGINATION AND RESISTANCE .......................... 195 
 
6.1  Spatial Arrangement and the Lived Space ........................................... 201 
6.1.1  The Reorganisation of the Social Clock ............................................... 202 
6.1.2  The Demolition of the Linong .............................................................. 203 
6.1.3  Alienation in New Towns and Industrial Parks .................................... 206 
6.1.4  Commuting as a Repetitive Experience ............................................... 211 
 
6.2  Imagination of the City and the Shanghai Expo ................................... 214 
6.2.1  Modern Lifestyle as a Divide ............................................................... 215 
6.2.2  Redrawing the Relationship between the State and the People ............ 219 
6.2.3  The Shanghai Expo as the Participation in the Country’s  ........................ 
 Development ......................................................................................... 222 
 
6.3  Resistance: The Possibilities and Limits .............................................. 224 
6.3.1  Relocating Residents away from the City Centre ................................. 225 
6.3.2  Resistance from the Civil Society ........................................................ 228 
6.3.3  The Individualisation of Social Problems ............................................ 230 
vii 
 
6.3.4  The Rationalisation of Social Inequalities ............................................ 233 
6.3.5  Depoliticisation and the Politicised Everyday Life .............................. 235 
 
6.4  Conclusion: The Possibility of an Urban Revolution ........................... 237 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN:  
WORLD EXPO AND CHINESE MODERNITY ................................................... 243 
 
7.1  Modernity and Modernism ................................................................... 247 
7.1.1  Modernity and Modernism as Antitheses ............................................. 248 
7.1.2  Modernity and Abstract Space .............................................................. 252 
7.1.3  Modernity and Everyday Life in the Modern World ............................ 254 
 
7.2  The World Expo and Modernity ........................................................... 256 
7.2.1  Exhibiting Progress and Prosperity ...................................................... 257 
7.2.2  Exhibiting a Modern Life ..................................................................... 260 
7.2.3  Exhibiting a Modern City ..................................................................... 263 
7.2.4  World Fair is Unfair .............................................................................. 265 
 
7.3  Shanghai, China’s Capital of Modernity .............................................. 267 
7.3.1  Chinese Modernity as a Western Confrontation ................................... 268 
7.3.2  Encountering Modernity at World Expos ............................................. 272 
7.3.3  Chinese Modernity as an Antithesis ..................................................... 275 
7.3.4  The City Spirits ..................................................................................... 277 
 
7.4  Conclusion: Shanghai as an Antithesis of Chinese Modernity ............. 280 
 
APPENDIX I:  
DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS OF THE RESPONDENTS ........................ 285 
 
APPENDIX II:  
INTERVIEW GUIDE ................................................................................................ 286 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 288 
Materials in English .............................................................................................. 288 
Materials in Other Languages............................................................................... 314 
 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF CHARTS  
 
Figure 2.1: Spatial triad .................................................................................................. 21 
Figure 2.2: Periodisation of urbanisation ....................................................................... 27 
Figure 2.3: Spatial-temporal diagram of the history of space ........................................ 44 
Figure 3.1: Space-time diagram ..................................................................................... 72 
Figure 4.1: Sketch map of Shanghai (19th Century) .................................................... 105 
Figure 4.2: Shanghai’s Spatial History ......................................................................... 143 
Figure 5.1: Organisation Chart of the Shanghai Expo .................................................. 155 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
 
  
BIE Bureau International des Expositions  
(Bureau of International Exhibitions) 
 
CPC The Communist Party of China 
 
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference  
 
EXPO Bureau Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination 
 
EXPO Land Shanghai World Expo Land Holding Corporation 
 
PCF  Parti Communiste Française 
(The French Communist Party) 
 
PRC The People’s Republic of China  
 
SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission 
 
Shanghai Expo The Shanghai 2010 World Exposition  
(Expo 2010 Shanghai China) 
 
SMP State Mode of Production  
(le Mode de Production Étatique) 
 
SOE State-owned Enterprise 
 
World Expo Group Shanghai World Expo (Group) Company Limited 
 
 
 
  
x 
 
GLOSSARY  
 
 
 
English Chinese 
  
bu zheteng 
 
不折騰 
Bureau of the Shanghai World Expo Coordination 
 
上海世博會事務協調局 
chaiqian  拆遷 
China Pavilion (‘Crown of the Orient’) 
 
中國館（「東方之冠」） 
City, Makes Life Better (chengshi, rang shenghou 
geng meihao) 
 
城市，讓生活更美好 
Comprehensive national strength (chunghe guoli) 
 
綜合國力 
danwei (Gongzuo danwei) 
 
單位（工作單位） 
Daotai  
 
道台 
Dianshizhai Pictorial 
 
點石齋畫報 
dongqian 
 
動遷 
Fabi (Fiat money) 法幣 
 
gongren xinchuen 
 
工人新邨 
Grasping the big, letting go of the small 
 
抓大放小 
Greater Shanghai Plan 
 
大上海計劃 
Guo Songtu 
 
郭嵩燾 
gudao shiqi (isolated island period) 
 
孤島時期 
guojin mintui 
 
國進民退 
hong 
 
行 
Hukou (Household Registration System) 
 
戶口（戶口制度） 
jiedao banshichu 
 
街道辦事處 
jingji zhuyi 經濟主義 
xi 
 
 
linong (longtang) 
 
里弄（弄堂） 
Lu Shi’e 
 
陸士諤 
maiban 
 
買辦 
modeng  
 
摩登 
Nanyang Encouraging Industry Exposition 
(Nanking South Sea Exhibition; Nanyang 
quanye hui) 
 
南洋勸業會 
ningyao Puxi yijianfang, buyao Pudong yitaofang 
(A single room in Puxi is better than a whole 
apartment in Pudong) 
 
寧要浦西一間房，不要浦東一
套房 
nonzhuangfei 
 
農轉非 
‘One New City and Nine New Towns’ 
 
「一城九鎮」 
Promotion of red revolutionary songs anti-mafia 
campaign (changhong dahei) 
 
唱红打黑 
qipao  
 
旗袍 
Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival 
(Qingming Shanghe Tu) 
 
《清明上河圖》 
Sanlin Expo Homeland 
 
三林世博家園 
shang zhi jiao, xia zhi jiao 
 
上只角、下只角 
Shanghai 2010 World Exposition Executive 
Committee 
 
2010 年上海世博會執行委員會
 
Shanghai 2010 World Exposition National 
Organising Committee 
 
2010 年上海世博會組織委員會
 
Shanghai Chengtou Corporation 
 
上海市城市建設投資開發總公
司 
 
Shanghai Eastbest International (Group) Company 
Limited 
 
上海東浩國際服務貿易（集團）
有限公司 
Shanghai International Trade Centre Company 
Limited 
 
上海國際貿易中心有限公司 
xii 
 
Shanghai Land Regulations 
 
《上海英美法租界地皮章程》 
Shanghai Land (Group) Company Limited  
 
上海地產（集團）有限公司 
Shanghai Land Reserve Centre 
 
上海市土地儲備中心 
Shanghai Media & Entertainment Group 
 
上海文化及影視集團 
Shanghai Municipal People’s Government 
(Shanghai Municipality) 
 
上海市人民政府 
Shanghai Municipal State-owned Assets 
Administrative Office 
 
上海市國有資產監督及管理委
員會（上海市國資委） 
Shanghai Planning, Land and Resources 
Administrative Bureau 
 
上海市規劃和國資源管理局 
Shanghai World Expo Land Holding Corporation 
(EXPO Land) 
 
上海世博土地控股有限公司 
Shanghai World Expo Land Reserve Centre 
 
上海世博土地儲備中心 
Shanghai World Expo (Group) Company Limited 
(World Expo Group) 
 
上海世博（集團）有限公司 
shengshi 
 
盛世 
shidaiqu  
 
時代曲 
shikumen 
 
石庫門 
shinian hedong, shinian hexi 
 
十年河東，十年河西 
Small Swords (Xiaodaohui) 小刀會 
State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) 
 
國有資產監督及管理委員會 
Ten-mile-long foreign zone (shili yanchang) 十里洋牆 
The Expo Centre 
 
世博中心 
The Orient International (Holding) Company 
Limited 
 
東方國際（集團）有限公司 
The pitiful people must have some aspects hateful 
(ke lin ren zi you qi kelin zhi chu) 
 
可憐人自有其可憐之處 
xiii 
 
The Shanghai 2010 World Exposition 
 
中國 2010 年上海世界博覽會 
Theme Development Department of Bureau of 
Shanghai World Expo Coordination  
 
上海世博局主題演繹部 
Theme Pavilion 
 
主題館 
ti-yong 
 
體用 
Up the Mountains, Down to the Villages 
 
上山下鄉 
Urban notables (shenshang) 
 
紳商 
wenwei 
 
維穩 
World Expo of Architectures (wangguo jianzhu 
bolang) 
 
萬國建築博覽 
xiandai 
 
現代 
xiandia hua 
 
現代化 
xiaoqu (small district) 
 
小區 
Zhang Deyi 
 
張德彝 
zhizui jinmi (extravagant and dissipated life) 
 
紙醉金迷 
 
  
xiv 
 
 
NOTES ON ROMANISATION AND TRANSLATION  
 
 
Hanyu Pinyin romanisation was used in this thesis for Chinese terms, which was 
highlighted in the form of italic type. For a few exceptions that original conventional 
romanisation was used, hanyu pinyin romanisation will be provided in bracket (e.g., 
Peking [Beijing]). A list of the romanised terms and names and their corresponding 
Chinese characters was provided in Glossary. 
 
English sources were referenced whenever possible. If English version is unavailable, 
translation is mine. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   Background of this Study  
 
This thesis examines the urbanisation of Shanghai and the urban experience of its 
inhabitants by engaging with the theories of Henri Lefebvre. Between May and 
October 2010, Shanghai hosted the 2010 World Exposition (Expo 2010 Shanghai 
China; the Shanghai Expo). The theme of the Shanghai Expo was ‘Better City, Better 
Life’, which set out to encourage reflection on ways ‘to improve the city’s role as a 
living place’, as well as ‘to harmonize the relationships between urban and rural areas, 
and between cities and nature’ (Huang, 2007, p.65). The Shanghai Expo itself was 
also an urbanisation project, which provided an ideal opportunity to scrutinise the 
urbanisation of Shanghai. In preparation for this international event, large-scale 
infrastructure development projects were carried out in different regions of the city. 
The Expo Site was located in the southern part of the city between Lupu Bridge and 
Nanpu Bridge, which spreads around both banks of the Huangpu River. It is 5.28km2 
in size, including supporting facilities in the vicinity. Temporary and permanent 
pavilions were constructed for local and overseas participants. Spatial transformation 
also took place outside the Expo Site. For instance, five new underground lines of 
Shanghai Metro were constructed. The Shanghai-Nanjing Intercity Rail Transit and 
Shanghai-Hangzhou Intercity Rail Transit were completed before the opening of the 
Expo. The Da Pu Road Tunnel, the first tunnel crossing the Huangpu River was 
refurbished; the South Xizang Road Tunnel was constructed and opened for public 
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use after the Expo. Roads in various regions of the city were also renovated. In 2008 
alone, more than 1,400 roads, which constituted 26% of total roads of the city or 36% 
of city centre’s roads, were refurbished (ibid, pp.45-63).  
 
The organisation of the Shanghai Expo speeded up the urbanisation of Shanghai. 
During the last two decades, the municipal government also carried out various plans 
to (re)develop the urban centre and the suburb (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, 
pp.327-328). It involved the demolition of more than 38 million square metres of old 
buildings and the relocation of over 2.7 million residents in Shanghai (Laurans, 2005, 
p.4). The massive scale of urbanisation was not restricted to Shanghai. In 1980, only 
19.6% of China’s population lived in an urban region (Zhang, 2002, p.480). However, 
in 2011, the urban population exceeded the rural population for the first time in the 
Chinese history (Rong and Zhang, 2012). Urbanisation in China is nevertheless an 
unequal and exploitative process. Social stratification became significant in the city 
(Chen and Sun, 2006, p.520). For instance, the Gini Coefficient of Pudong (i.e. a 
statistical analysis on income inequality) increased from 0.37 to 0.45 between 1994 
and 2004, indicating that the problem of income inequality worsened (Sassen, 2009, 
p.7).  
 
Even though social problems, such as income disparity and pollution, are not 
negligible, some proclaim that China now enjoys a ‘flourishing period’ (shengshi) 
(Geng, 2011). As indicated by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), China replaced 
Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010 (Barboza, 2011). Particularly at 
a time when Western countries are suffering from a global financial crisis, the 
economic power of China is valued as it can serve to catalyse global economic growth. 
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China’s political economic system has been bolstered by an uninterrupted period of 
growth that has been sustained by strong state intervention (Zheng, 2011, pp.100-103). 
Amid such a background, it is not surprising that the Shanghai Expo was regarded by 
the state as a display of its ‘comprehensive national strength’ (chunghe guoli) (Xiao 
Li and Yang, 2010), as well as the achievement a ‘century-old dream’ overtaking the 
West (Wen, 2009). 
 
The World Expo is more than an industrial exhibition: early World Expos were often 
projected as exemplary of the modernisation of the host countries. The organisation of 
the Shanghai Expo also provided an opportunity to reflect on the modernisation and 
urbanisation of China. Since ‘opening-up’ for foreign trade in the mid-nineteenth 
century, Shanghai has functioned as China’s capital of modernity. It imported Western 
thoughts, lifestyle, economic and social systems into China. In the 1920s, Shanghai 
was regarded as ‘the Paris of the Orient’ or ‘the New York of the West’ for its 
cosmopolitanism and economic importance (Lee, 1999a, p.37; Wasserstrom, 2009, 
p.129). Shanghai’s urbanism and involvement in global capitalism were then 
concluded by the Socialist regime between the 1950s and the 1970s (Abbas, 2000, 
p.776). Since Western civilisations were usually regarded as the yardstick of 
modernity project of China (Lee, 1999b, p.45), how can we characterise the 
modernity of China when the ‘century-old dream’ overtaking the West is 
accomplished? Shanghai had a history of adopting capitalism and socialism. How 
would the capitalist and socialist pasts shape the mode of production in Shanghai now? 
The Shanghai Expo had speeded up urbanisation of the city. What are the urban 
experiences of inhabitants of Shanghai amid the transformation of urban landscape? 
Do we observe a revival of cosmopolitanism in Shanghai? This study addresses these 
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questions by examining the urbanisation of Shanghai and urban experience of its 
inhabitants today. Since Shanghai pioneered the modernisation of China and is now 
regarded as the ‘head of the dragon’ of the economic expansion (Li, 2009, p.27), the 
experience of the urbanisation of Shanghai also helps understand the urbanisation of 
China as a whole.  
 
1.2   The Theoretical Concern  
 
This study applies Henri Lefebvre’s (1901-1991) theories of the production of space 
and, to a lesser extent, his discussion of everyday life, to critically examine the issues 
above. In the English world, Lefebvre emerged as a prominent interpreter of Karl 
Marx (Gottdiener, 1993, p.129). Since the availability of the English version of The 
Production of Space (1991[1974]), he has established himself as an authority on urban 
space and established a legacy with his contribution to the ‘spatial turn’ in the social 
sciences and humanities (Aronowitz, 2007, p.133). He contributed to an 
understanding of urbanisation by establishing a theoretical framework to identify the 
dialectical relationship between the mode of production and the social relations of 
production.  
 
However, Lefebvre’s theoretical concern is more than a study of urban space; rather 
he makes a major contribution to examining the perpetuation of capitalism in the 
modern world. He argued for a new reading of Marx, after the socialist revolution did 
not occur in most advanced societies (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.91). In order to 
achieve this purpose, he complicated Marxist theory by proposing the following new 
terms: the urban problematic, social time and social space, state mode of production, 
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as well as everyday life (Lefebvre, 1988, p.7). In short, Lefebvre argued that ‘each 
mode of production has its own particular space’ (1991[1974], p.46) and capitalism 
survived its internal contradictions ‘by occupying space, [and] by producing a space’ 
(1976[1973], p.21). A particular mode of production will produce a particular spatial 
arrangement in the city and shape the urban experience of its inhabitants. Such a 
spatial arrangement will, in turn, facilitate the reproduction of the relations of 
production and thus the mode of production. In particular, Lefebvre proposed a spatial 
triad as a heuristic tool to examine the dialectical relationship between perceived 
space (spatial practice; i.e. spatial arrangement of the city), conceived space 
(representations of space, i.e. the missions of the state or experts on the planning of 
space) and lived space (representational space, i.e. the expressions of the daily life of 
individuals) (Merrifield, 1993, p.173).  
 
Alongside the production of space, another major academic contribution made by 
Lefebvre is the theorisation of everyday life. However, until the late 1990s, 
Lefebvrian analysis was mainly studied in the fields of political economy and cultural 
studies (Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et al., 2012, p.116). Only since the 
publication of English version of the trilogy, Critique of Everyday Life, in the last 
decade, has his work on everyday life and the implications on the theorisation of the 
production of space received wider acknowledgement (Aronowitz, 2007, pp.133-135). 
However, interpreting Lefebvre from a single disciplinary perspective would ‘risk 
losing sight of the complex whole’ (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.766). In this thesis, I 
argue that his projects on space and everyday life shared the common objective of 
examining how capitalism shaped the daily life (work and non-work) of people in the 
modern world. In particular, his ideas on festival, moment, the urban revolution and 
6 
the right to the city should be interpreted together in order to examine the survival of 
capitalist modernity.  
 
1.3   The Methodological Concern and Execution Process   
 
Urban sociology has a tradition of empiricism (Flanagan, 2010, p.269). For instance, 
Robert E. Park conducted descriptive empirical studies to identify ‘laws’ of causal 
relationships in cities (Park, 2005[1936], p.1). Although Lefebvre rejected the 
application of a positivist approach in conducting social research (2009[1940], 
pp.11-12), he acknowledged the importance of data collection techniques (2003[1953], 
p.117). As a part of his project to recast Marx, Lefebvre proposed the 
regressive-progressive method to examine space by reinventing dialectical 
materialism (Stanek, 2008c, p.7). In short, he argued that social space should be 
examined by vertical complexity (i.e. the historicity of space) and horizontal 
complexity (i.e. the conditions of the community at a certain period of historic time). 
The regressive-progressive method provides ‘a general framework, a conception of 
the overall process’ to investigate social space, so that various data collection 
techniques can be employed (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], p.117).  
 
This study has applied such a methodological framework. On the one hand, the 
vertical complexity of space is addressed by periodising Shanghai’s history of space 
(from the ‘opening up’ to the Reform). On the other hand, the Shanghai Expo is 
conceived as a case study for examining horizontal complexity. Data were collected 
using different techniques and sources. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with 13 inhabitants from Shanghai between October 2009 and October 2010 on about 
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their imagination, experience and perception of residing in Shanghai. Secondary data 
regarding the Shanghai Expo and the urbanisation of Shanghai in general were also 
gathered from various sources and interpreted.  
 
There are two major reasons for applying a Lefebvrian framework to examine the 
urbanisation of Shanghai in this study. First, Lefebvre provided a holistic approach in 
theoretically linking spatial arrangement, urban experience and history. Such a 
‘unitary theory of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.11) is useful in examining the 
social space of Shanghai. Shanghai’s spatial history is complicated: it emerged as the 
first modern city of China (Lee, 1999b, p.6) but its urban development and 
cosmopolitan urban culture was abruptly ended by the Socialist regime (Abbas, 2000, 
p.776). In the last two decades, Shanghai redeveloped as the ‘head of dragon’ of the 
economic expansion (Li, 2009, p.27). How did the state produce new space? How did 
the inhabitants contextualise their daily lives when living with such massive 
urbanisation? How can we understand the relationship between the political economy 
of China, spatial changes and the experience of the inhabitants? The application of a 
Lefebvrian framework has enabled we to answer these questions holistically. In fact, 
Lefebvre showed his interest in commenting on China. For instance, he concluded his 
book The Production of Space by comparing ‘the Chinese road’ to socialism and the 
Soviet Model (1991[1974], p.421). In Everyday Life in the Modern World, he 
examined the ‘Cultural Revolution’ as a Marxian concept and called for a reflection of 
the modern life in France (1971[1968], see Chapter 5). In De l’État: De Hegel à Mao 
par Staline, he briefly examined the Maoism to help illustrate the nature of a modern 
state (1988[1976], see Chapter 15). These writings provided useful resources for us to 
examine the nature of the Socialist regime and its persistent influence today.  
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A further reason for applying a Lefebvrian framework is its methodological flexibility. 
Urbanisation is a complicated issue that concerns spatial transformation, urban 
experience, history, political economy and cultural representations. Most importantly, 
this method provides general guidelines to examine the complexities of space. The 
openness of the regressive-progressive method has enabled this study to employ a 
verity of data collection methods, and to collect information from diverse sources to 
examine the urbanisation of Shanghai and understand the experience of its 
inhabitants.  
 
1.4   Research Questions and Significance  
 
The general objective of this study can be summarised as an investigation of the 
urbanisation of Shanghai and the experience of its inhabitants after three decades of 
the Reform. This is broken down into three analytical themes. The first delineates the 
current mode of production in Shanghai. Since China launched the reform measures 
of market liberalisation in 1978, there has been a state/market debate on the political 
economy of China, i.e. whether China is going to completely transform from a 
socialist mode of production to a capitalist one or not. By illustrating the organisation 
of the Shanghai Expo, this study examines the political economy of Shanghai today 
and proposes the term ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’ to characterise the 
current mode of production. It argues that the state manipulates its power as a market 
regulator to favour its activities in the market. This study contributes to the 
state/market debate by challenging the assumption that the Reform leads to a 
complete transition from a planned economy to a market-led one.  
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The second analytical theme describes and explains the changes in spatial 
arrangement in Shanghai and its impact on the experience of the inhabitants. Lefebvre 
argued that each mode of production has its own space and shapes the everyday life of 
inhabitants in the city. In last two decades, the urban landscape of Shanghai has been 
transformed, together with its mode of production and the experience of its 
inhabitants. So, how did the state manipulate the Shanghai Expo to accelerate the 
huge scale of urbanisation? What were the urban experiences of Shanghai’s 
inhabitants during the organisation of the Shanghai Expo? How did the inhabitants 
contextualise their daily lives when living with such a massive scale of urbanisation? 
How can we understand the relationship between the political economy of China, 
spatial changes and the experience of its inhabitants? By applying a Lefebvrian 
framework, this study contributes to new knowledge by illustrating how the 
state-led/-participation mode of production produced a favourable spatial arrangement 
and shaped the daily experience of individuals.  
 
The third analytical theme is the evaluation of modernity of China. Since the 
mid-nineteenth century, China began to search for modernity within the context of 
confrontation with Western countries. Western civilisation was regarded as the 
yardstick of such a modernisation project, where Shanghai played an important role in 
importing Western ideas and explored the possibility of a Chinese version of 
modernity (Lee, 1999b, p.45). Amid the economic expansion of China in recent years, 
some Chinese scholars proposed the discourses of ‘China Model’ and ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ (e.g., Huang, 2011; Zheng, 2011). It was argued that China has already 
established a comprehensive system of political economy and fundamentally 
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challenged the application of neoliberal capitalism in China (Huang, 2011, p.24). 
Moreover, it suggested that a Western model was not applicable to the Chinese 
context and that Chinese society had become an alternative form of modernity (Zheng, 
2011, pp.86-94). So, what is the nature of modernity of China? Does modernity in 
China only mean ‘surpassing the West’? While the Shanghai Expo is regarded as a 
modernity project, its political and economic organisation provides us with an ideal 
entry point to reconsider the nature of the modernity of China, as well as the role of 
Shanghai to ‘China’s capital of modernity’, i.e. the city introducing the Western 
concept of modernity to China and exploring the possibility a Chinese version of 
modernity.  
 
1.5   Organisation of Chapters  
 
Alongside the present introductory chapter, there are six other chapters in this thesis. 
In order to develop a theoretical framework for this study, Chapter Two critically 
introduces Lefebvre’s theories on urban space and urban experience. First, it evaluates 
Lefebvre’s theorisation of the production of space, particularly drawing upon his ideas 
of the spatial triad, the history of space and the state mode of production. Second, it 
discusses Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life. I argue that Lefebvre’s examination of 
the everyday life should be understood together with his theory of the production of 
space, especially the ideas on the urban revolution and the right to the city. The 
chapter pinpoints the major criticisms of Lefebvre’s theoretical framework, by 
critically introducing the critiques of David Harvey and Manuel Castells. This chapter 
ends with a brief review of some current studies on the urbanisation of China and a 
reflection on the applicability of a Lefebvrian analysis in a Chinese context.  
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As discussed above, Lefebvre developed the regressive-progressive method to 
examine the complexities of space. Chapter Three firstly addresses the relevant 
methodological issues for this study. Then, I elaborate the study’s research questions, 
how the Lefebvrian methodological framework was applied and the data collection 
process. In short, this is a Lefebvrian study of the production of urban space in 
Shanghai and the experience of its inhabitants. The Shanghai Expo is presented as a 
case study. Data was collected in order to construct the Shanghai Expo as exemplary 
of the experience of modernisation/urbanisation of China. 
 
Based on the above theoretical and methodological framework, I will set out the 
study’s research findings in Chapters Four to Seven. Chapter Four provides a 
historical background of the urbanisation of Shanghai by applying a Lefebvrian 
framework, i.e. to periodise Shanghai’s spatial history by modes of production. Rather 
than outlining the chronology of the city, this chapter focuses on identifying the 
dialectical relationship between spatial arrangement, daily life and social relations of 
production. It also draws on the major sociological, historical and cultural studies of 
Shanghai. In particular, I elaborate the ideas of Leo Lee on two different connotations 
of ‘modern’ in Chinese, i.e. ‘modeng’ or ‘xiandai’ (Lee, 1999b, p.5), to understand the 
modes of production before and after the establishment of the socialist regime.  
 
By mainly referring to the Shanghai Expo as a case study, Chapter Five scrutinises the 
mode of production of Shanghai today. In short, it argues that Shanghai entered a 
phase of ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’, thus enabling the state to 
maintain both a regulatory role and to participate in market activities. First, this 
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chapter outlines the features of this mode of production, in which land 
commodification played a vital role as the key driving force of Shanghai’s economic 
expansion and urbanisation. Lefebvre argued that each mode of production produces 
its own space (1991[1974], p.46). The second purpose of Chapter Five is therefore to 
delineate how new social space is produced by applying Lefebvre’s spatial triad. It 
argues that the spatial practice of Shanghai can be summarised by the Puxi/Pudong 
divide, where two regions exhibit different trajectories of urbanisation, as well as the 
different kinds of imagination that were manifested by the inhabitants. Finally, this 
chapter addresses the representation of space. I argue that the state employed several 
strategies to re-establish the relationship between the state and the people, as well as 
to provide the ideological justification for the Shanghai Expo and for urbanisation in 
general.  
 
Chapter Six draws on the primary data from the in-depth interviews to examine how 
the urban experiences of Shanghai’s inhabitants (i.e. representational space) are 
shaped by the state-led/-participation mode of production. Their experiences are 
described and thematised in connection with the new spatial arrangement in the city. 
As I discuss in Chapter Two, Lefebvre’s theories of the production of space and 
everyday life should be studied together. Thus, this chapter also addresses civil 
resistance in Shanghai and the possibility of an urban revolution by breaking up the 
everyday life.  
 
Building on discussions in the previous chapters, this thesis concludes with a 
reflection on the modernity of China in Chapter Seven. It elaborates Lefebvre’s idea 
of modernity (i.e. establishing modernity and modernism as antitheses) (Lefebvre, 
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1995[1962], pp.1-2) and applies this to examine the nature of the World Expo and 
Chinese modernisation. Shanghai is China’s capital of modernity. Not only because 
Shanghai is where China explores new thoughts, a new social system and everyday 
life, but also where it provides critiques of the direct replication of Western modernity 
in China. Only the former feature is propagandised under the state-led/-participation 
mode of production. Thus, I conclude this thesis by calling for the revival of 
Shanghai’s role as a critique of modernity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN THE MODERN WORLD 
 
In order to understand the modern world, it is necessary not only to retain some of 
Marx’s essential concepts but also to add new ones: the everyday, the urban, social 
time and space, the tendency towards a state-oriented mode of production. 
‐ Henri Lefebvre (1988, p.7) 
 
 
As an agricultural country transforming into ‘the World’s Factory’ and as a socialist 
inward-looking country transforming to one of the world’s largest recipients of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the urbanisation of China has attracted much 
attention from the academy, the media and policy makers. Profound changes in the 
urban landscape, social lives, governance structure, and social inequalities have 
occurred since the Reform in 1978. In response, a number of questions emerge: as 
urbanisation concerns different aspects of society, we must determine which aspects 
should be explained in researching urbanisation in China. So, how can we examine 
the complexity of the urbanisation of China? How can the urbanisation of China be 
theorised? Is Western theory applicable to understanding the ‘national circumstances’ 
of China?  
 
In this thesis, my theoretical framework is primarily informed by Lefebvre’s theory of 
the production of space, and, to a lesser extent, his theory of everyday life. Lefebvre 
set out to postulate a ‘unitary theory of space’ (1991[1974], p.11); such a holistic 
approach is particularly useful for understanding urban China in which almost every 
aspect of society has experienced significant changes. By theorising the production of 
space and its impact on everyday life, he provided a comprehensive account of the 
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relationships between the mode of production, urban experience, spatial arrangement, 
urban culture and social relations of production (Elden, 2004c, pp.17-18; Merrifield, 
2006, pp.xi-xiii).  
 
As a prolific writer, Lefebvre published more than sixty-six books and numerous 
articles (Smith, 2003, p.xxii). He wrote extensively on a wide range of subjects, which 
included modernity, literacy criticism, rural sociology, the body, sexuality, violence, 
postmodernity, music, the arts, etc. (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.763). This chapter 
does not attempt to offer a complete review of Lefebvre’s academic life. For the 
purpose of providing a theoretical framework to examine the urban transformation of 
China, this literature review will focus on (1) Lefebvre’s theorisation of space and 
mode of production, and (2) the discussion of urban experience and the possibility of 
urban revolution.  
 
Firstly, Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space will be reviewed by focussing on 
the following key terms: social space, spatial triad, mode of production, history of 
space, contradictions and relations of production. Lefebvre (1988, p.77) argued that 
Marxism is ‘an instrument of research and discovery’, thus his theory of space is a 
Marxist analysis. On the one hand, I argue that Lefebvre’s discussion of space is a 
theoretical and political ‘discovery’ of the ‘urban problematic’ and the emergence of, 
what Lefebvre referred to as, the State Mode of Production (SMP) after the Second 
World War. On the other hand, it is also a reinvention of the Marxist understanding of 
the historical development of the mode of production (Smith, 2003, p.xi). By 
periodising the history of space, Lefebvre has supplied historical materialism with a 
spatial dimension, and explained the reason why capitalism managed to survive 
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through its internal contradictions in modern society.  
 
Secondly, after introducing Lefebvre’s theory on space, I examine Lefebvre’s 
discussion of urban experience and urban revolution. By proposing the concept of 
‘everyday life’ (or ‘the everyday’), Lefebvre argued that the logic of the capitalist 
mode of production has invaded all aspects of the modern world. Alongside the 
workplace, alienation has extended to everyday life such that what he called the 
‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ has been produced (Lefebvre, 
1971[1968], p.60). While Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life is usually either misread 
or regarded as a separate project from space, I will argue that Lefebvre’s theory of 
everyday life should be interpreted together with his theory of space, i.e. everyday life 
is constituted within the construction of urban experience, and the ‘break’ from 
everyday life opens the possibility of an urban revolution. In last two decades, there 
has been a ‘spatial turn’ in the Anglo-American academic world, in which the 
importance of space has been highlighted amid a global scale of urbanisation (Allweil, 
2010, p.2; Withers, 2009, p.641). Together with Michel Foucault, Lefebvre was one of 
the most influential scholars contributing to the ‘spatial turn’ and regarded as a 
postmodern thinker (Shields, 1999, p.viii). Harvey has remarked that ‘[w]e owe the 
idea that command over space is a fundamental and all pervasive source of social 
power in and over everyday life to the persistent voice of Henri Lefebvre’ (1989, 
p.226). Lefebvre’s critical position against capitalism and his proposition of 
articulating everyday life, physical space, representation, political economy, the state 
and globalisation have opened up the possibility of understanding the nature of urban 
society and capitalism on a world scale (Brenner and Elden, 2009, p.786; Gardiner, 
2004, pp.52-53; Smith, 2003, pp.xiv-xv). The third purpose of this chapter is therefore 
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to briefly discuss the influence and critiques of Lefebvre’s theory of space.  
 
Following this, the urban transformation of China in recent decades will be briefly 
outlined. Since Shanghai is the regional focus of this thesis, an elaborated review of 
the history of the urbanisation of Shanghai is provided in Chapter Four. This chapter 
does not completely review Chinese urbanisation. Therefore, I will introduce some 
key studies and theories examining the complexity of the urbanisation of China, in 
which engagement with Lefebvre in analysing the urbanisation of China has been all 
too rare. Several questions emerge here. Is Lefebvre’s theory of space applicable to 
China? How can a Lefebvrian analysis open up the possibility of understanding the 
great transformation of China? How can Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life contribute 
to examine the urban experience of the inhabitants of Shanghai? How can Lefebvre’s 
‘unitary theory of space’ be helpful in examining the urbanisation of China as a 
totality? Before attempting to answer these empirical and theoretical questions in 
future chapters, this chapter will conclude by evaluating the applicability of a 
Lefebvrian framework in examining urbanisation in a Chinese context.  
 
2.1   The (Re)Production of (Social) Space 
 
Before the availability of the English version of The Production of Space, Lefebvre 
was better known for his interpretation of Marx in France and the English world. He 
was appreciated as ‘by far the best interpreter of Marx in France’ (Poster, 1975, p.55) 
and even ‘a Marx for our time’ (Gottdiener, 1993, p.129). Before being expelled by 
the Parti Communiste Française (French Communist Party; PCF) in 1956, he was its 
leading intellectual (Trebitsch, 1991, p.x). Nevertheless, Lefebvre rejected any 
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dogmatic or reductionist reading of Marxism (Elden, 2004c, p.22).1 In The Sociology 
of Marx, he even began the book by questioning the relevance of Marx in the modern 
world, i.e. ‘whether today we must study Marx as we study Plato, or rather whether 
Marx’s work retains a contemporary value and significance’ (Lefebvre, 1982[1968], 
p.vii). Lefebvre’s answer is affirmative. He found Marxism pertinent, in spite of the 
fact that ‘Marxism has become boring’ and ‘a disappointment’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], 
pp.84-85).  
 
For Lefebvre, Marxism needs to be reinvented so as to provide a plausible analysis to 
understand the modern world.2 Since the 1940s, Lefebvre began his project to ‘recast 
Marx’s thought’ (Merrifield, 2002, p.79). In this section, I will argue that Lefebvre has 
developed the Marxist project by pointing out the significance of the production of 
space in the development of the mode of production. By including the spatial 
dimension, Lefebvre then attempted to supplement the Marxist conception of the 
mode of production and illustrated how capitalism managed its contradictions in the 
post-war period. His conceptual triad of the production of social space (i.e. the spatial 
triad), which is an application of dialectics in examining the complexity of space, will 
be introduced first. Then I will discuss how Lefebvre historicised space and examined 
the perpetuation of the relations of production. Finally, I will discuss the impact on 
space under what he called the State Mode of Production (SMP), which Lefebvre 
regarded as an emerging ‘new state form’ in the modern world.  
                                                      
1 Lefebvre was expelled by the PCF for his objection to Stalinism. Then, he was involved in the 
Situational International and the student movement in Paris in 1968. His interpretation of Marx and his 
development of a theory of space could therefore not be isolated from his political involvement 
(Brenner and Elden, 2001, pp.763-764). For Lefebvre’s biography, refer to Michel Trebitsch’s prefaces 
for the English version of Critique of Everyday Life (2005, 2002, 1991). 
2 Lefebvre took dialectics as a starting point that by putting an argument in a non-dogmatic approach, 
theories could be dialectically pushed forward. Space is the dimension that he deliberately introduced 
to delineate the complexity of urbanisation and to push forward the theorisation of city. In other words, 
the process of theorisation itself is viewed by him as a dialectical process that reality could be recreated 
by the ‘movement of thought’ (Lefebvre, 2009[1940], p.15). 
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2.1.1  Spatial Triad  
 
The Production of Space is ‘a theoretical summation’ of Lefebvre’s exploration of 
space and his fieldwork research in rural and urban areas (from the 1940s to the 1970s) 
(Elden, 2006, p.192). Lefebvre began the book by rejecting the Cartesian view of 
taking space with ‘a strictly geometrical meaning’ (1991[1974], p.1). He argued that 
space should be analysed by three dimensions, which are ‘the physical’, ‘the mental’ 
and ‘the social’ (ibid, pp.4-5). By constructing this heuristic tool, what he called the 
‘spatial triad’, Lefebvre tried to outline a theoretical triad to examine the dialectical 
relationship between physical space, social space (or ‘the lived’), and mental space as 
they are constituted in the city (Merrifield, 1993, p.173). There are three ‘moments’ in 
the conceptual triad, namely spatial practice (l’espace perçu; also referred to as ‘the 
perceived’ and ‘physical space’), representations of space (l’espace conçu; or ‘the 
conceived’ or ‘ mental space’) and representational space (l’espace vécu; or ‘spaces of 
representation’, ‘the lived’ or ‘social space’) (Elden, 2007, p.110)3. Each moment 
established a dialectical relationship with the other two that altogether defined social 
space, and could not be epistemologically understood individually (Lefebvre, 
1991[1974], pp.33, 38-42). Though Lefebvre provided several seemingly quite 
different definitions to the three moments of the spatial triad, the meanings of the 
terms can be summarised as follows:4 
 
Spatial practice (the perceived; physical space): the 
                                                      
3 Lynn Stewart (1995, p.610) argued that the English translation ‘representational space’ is preferred 
over ‘space of representation’. It is because the former translation is less confusing and closer to the 
French. 
4 For a succinct summary of the interpretations of the spatial triad by various scholars including Elden, 
Gregory, Harvey, Shields, Soja, etc., see Wang (2009, p.24).  
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physical/built environment, which represents the overall spatial 
arrangement of the city. It is defined by the mode of production 
and facilitates the reproduction of that mode of production.  
 
The representations of space (the conceived; mental space): the 
dominant ideology upheld by the state, and the ‘conceptualised 
space’ of ‘spatial experts’ such as the technocrats, scientists and 
urban planners. It represents the hegemony of the dominant class 
(in maintaining their dominance, and being mode of production 
specific), defining the social meanings of spatial practice and the 
relations of production and individuals’ social action according 
to the spatial arrangement.  
 
Representational space (Spaces of representation; the lived; 
social space): the space concerns the experience of inhabitants 
that are mediated through cultural representation. It is linked to 
images, signs, symbols, art pieces or even academic studies (e.g., 
anthropological studies) that describe the human experience in 
the social space.  
 
The dialectical relationships between these three elements in the spatial triad are 
represented in the diagram on the next page.5  
                                                      
5 This figure is constructed by reinventing the ‘eye of power’ of Gregory (1994, p.121) and applying 
some terms of Harvey’s spatial grid (1989, pp.218-222). Gregory’s conceptual map has essentially 
captured the dialectical relationships between spatial practice, the representation of space and 
representational space, especially explaining how the capitalistic logic is transformed to social relations 
in everyday life through commodification and bureaucratisation. However, it failed to account for the 
dialectical relationship between the representation of space and representational space, which is 
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Figure 2.1: Spatial triad 
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Lefebvre argued that social space cannot be analysed merely as the natural 
environment (e.g., climate, geographical location) and history, but rather as it is 
produced and reproduced by the mode of production (Gottdiener, 1993, p.132). 
Lefebvre argued that his theory of the production of space can be summarised by the 
proposition: ‘([s]ocial) space is a (social) product.’ (1991[1974], p.26) and the spatial 
triad was constructed as a conceptual apparatus for examining the complexity of how 
new (social) space is produced. As is discussed later, Lefebvre exemplified his idea of 
urban revolution and the right to the city with reference to Paris (1996[1968], 
pp.75-79). So I take Paris in the nineteenth century as an example to briefly illustrate 
                                                                                                                                                           
essential to the Lefebvrian trialectical analysis. The ‘eye’ also only looked at the mode of production as 
neoliberal capitalism at a certain moment in the history of space, but the temporal dimension of the 
production of space has not been taken into account.  
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how the spatial triad can be applied to analyse space. In Chapters Five to Seven, I also 
apply the spatial triad to examine the production of space in Shanghai, and argue that 
Shanghai today shares some similarities with Haussmann’s Paris.  
 
Lefebvre argued that ‘each mode of production has its own particular space. The shift 
from one mode of production to another must entail the production of a new space’ 
(1991[1974], p.46). As industrial capitalism became the dominant form of the mode 
of production, the spatial arrangement of Paris needed to be transformed accordingly 
to serve its role as an industrial city. Factories were built and spaces for commercial 
activities, such as arcades and markets became the spatial practice of Paris. In other 
words, new social space was produced. Lefebvre also emphasised that the mode of 
production produces new (social) space, and that social space also facilitates the 
development of that mode of production. The ‘spatial experts’ (e.g., planners, 
technocrats, administrators) have played a role in producing such favourable spatial 
arrangements (representations of space). 6  When Georges-Eugène Haussmann 
implemented his plan to rebuild Paris in the 1860s, roads and railway networks were 
built to connect the capital with other provinces. An effective transportation system 
was essential for production, as well as delivering commodities for consumption. 
Paris was also envisioned as a space of consumption for the bourgeoisie. By using the 
renewal of the city as the rationale, old buildings were demolished and wide 
boulevards were built. Factories were also relocated further from the city centre to 
free up space for large-scale construction there.  
  
In short, during the development of industrial capitalism, Paris transformed its space 
                                                      
6 In the book Position: contre les technocreate (1967), Lefebvre provides a more comprehensive 
discussion on the impact of technocrats on urban planning in post-war France (Poster, 1975, p.249). 
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for industrial production and the conspicuous consumption of the bourgeoisie. Walter 
Benjamin also made a similar observation. In the introduction to his book The 
Arcades Project (1999[1935]), he announced that Paris was the capital of the 
nineteenth century because modern urban culture firstly emerged in Paris (p.7). He 
argued that the emergence of arcades (the shopping walkways with glass ceiling and 
metal structure), as a new form of space in Paris resulted from the expansion of 
capitalism and was facilitated by Haussmann’s urban planning. Commercial products 
were displayed in arcades, as well as the World Expos, to stimulate demand and 
‘glorified’ the commodification of products (ibid, p.7). The outcome was that Paris 
was polarised into the bourgeoisie and the working class (ibid, p.13).  
 
This mode of production produced contradictory relations between the working class 
and capitalists. Alongside the physical space, Lefebvre argued that cultural changes 
also emerged with the change of social and economic relations in the city (1988, 
pp.81-82). Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.42) used the term representational space to 
describe the experience of social life in the city, which is mediated through ‘symbolic 
works’ such as artistic illustrations, writings, paintings, architectural design and other 
textual forms. The daily life of individuals was thus narrated. As Paris was occupied 
by the newly-emerged bourgeoisie and the disadvantaged working class, novels, 
paintings and poems were created for celebrating the newly-emerged urban culture 
and describing the plight of the working class, e.g., the work of Balzac and Charles 
Baudelaire.  
 
It is also worth noting the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger in 
shaping the thought of Lefebvre on the production of space. The idea of Nietzschean 
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space was appropriated by Lefebvre to open up the possibility of understanding the 
transformation of the aesthetics of space (Elden, 2004c, p.149). Lefebvre’s interest in 
analysing the resistance against the control of the state through art and symbols can 
also be seen as a dialogue with Nietzsche’s idea on poetic art, which became an 
important element in his theorisation of the spatial triad (i.e. representational space). 
Lefebvre also extensively engaged with Heidegger, though not without disagreement, 
especially about his political views (Elden, 2004b, pp.78-81). In particular, 
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling (wohnen) attracted the attention of Lefebvre. As 
dwelling is the basic character of Being, the experience of the inhabitants in the city 
became the basic character to human existence in modern society. In The Production 
of Space and The Urban Revolution (2003[1970]), Lefebvre appropriated Heidegger’s 
concept of dwelling to develop his concept of abstract space and the lived space 
(Butler, 2012, pp.105-106).  
 
2.1.2  The History of Space   
 
Alongside theorising the spatial dimension of urban space, The Production of Space is 
also ‘a very historic book’ (Elden, 2006, p.195). Lefebvre deepened the discussion of 
the history of space, which he outlined earlier in The Urban Revolution. The history 
of the city is understood by him as a process of an increasing level of urbanisation (or 
the decreasing level of being agrarian/nature), which could be summarised as the axis 
below, from a zero degree of urbanisation (i.e. nature; absolute space) to complete 
urbanisation (100%; abstract space) (2003[1970], p.7):  
 
0 ─────────────────────────── 100% 
Absolute space historical space   Abstract space  Differential space  
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Although Lefebvre agreed to periodise the history of space as a development of the 
‘productive process’ (1991[1974], p.48), he rejected the dogmatic Marxist perspective 
of historical materialism (i.e. from feudalism to capitalism). In his Marxist analysis, 
the history of space should not be simplified as the history of changing modes of 
production, but a history of spatialisation that is concerned with spatial arrangement 
and relations of production (Shields, 1999, p.170). Lefebvre argued that the city 
performed a particular set of functions during each mode of production, so a particular 
set of spatial arrangements (spatial practice) would be produced.  
 
Lefebvre exemplified his periodisation of urbanisation by referring mainly to Western 
experience. In the earliest stage of civilisation in Europe, the city was not involved in 
agrarian production (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.122). Lefebvre argued that the ‘antique 
city’ (the ancient city) was the territorial centre where people gathered and exhibited a 
zero degree of urbanisation. With the expansion of the country, the territorial centre 
evolved to become a political city like the Greek polis or Roman city. As the political 
city needed to perform administrative, political and military functions, meeting halls 
(for decision making and administration) and symbols of the polity (e.g., a palace) 
were built at the centre of the city for political purposes (both functional and 
symbolic). The mode of production was still agricultural, but the emergence of the 
political city symbolised the beginning of organised social life in the city. In other 
words, the mode of production has produced a particular kind of spatial arrangement 
(spatial practice), as well as impacting on inhabitants’ daily life (representational 
space).  
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Lefebvre argued that the production of space corresponds to a ‘leap forward’ of the 
mode of production (1991[1974], pp.102-103). With the fall of feudalism and the rise 
of mercantile capitalism in Medieval Europe, a city, such as Venice, did not only 
perform the role as a political and military centre, but also the trading centre between 
different regions (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.73-75). As agriculture was no longer the 
dominant mode of production, the land was taken over by the bourgeoisie from old 
feudal states. Through real estate projects and other commercial activities, wealth was 
centralised by the bourgeoisie (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.66). The city also began to 
industrialise, so that urban fabric began to reach rural areas (i.e. ‘urban society and 
life penetrate the countryside’) (Elden, 2004c, p.131). The transition from an agrarian 
society to an urban one also began. Subsequently, industrialisation replaced 
mercantilism as the dominant mode of production.  
 
Lefebvre emphasised that the new type of city (new social space) was built upon, not 
taken over by, the previous type of city: ‘new social relationships call for a new space, 
and vice versa’ (1991[1974], p.59). Factories became prominent and infrastructure for 
delivering raw materials and products (e.g., roads, channels) were constructed. The 
periodisation of the history of space is summarised in Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2: Periodisation of urbanisation 
 
 
(Source: Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.15) 
 
The Production of Space should also be read as ‘a study of the history of spatial 
transformation’ (Elden, 2006, p.192). By applying the conceptual triad, Lefebvre 
illustrated changes in the spatial arrangement of (European) cities under different 
modes of production. However, what Lefebvre was particularly interested in were the 
contradictions between the dominant and subordinate classes in the city. He argued 
that the city provided the social space for the ‘real’ existence of such relations of 
production between both classes (1991[1974], p.86):  
 
Social relations, which are concrete abstractions, have no real 
existence save in and through space. Their underpinning is spatial. 
In each particular case, the connection between this underpinning 
and the relations it supports calls for analysis. (Lefebvre, 
1991[1974], p.404; original emphasis) 
 
Lefebvre considered the city as a centre of contradictions between the dominant class 
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and subordinate class – contradictions were produced and reproduced in the city. For 
example, an industrial city should not only be regarded as the centre of industrial 
production but also the social space where the contradictory relationship between 
capitalists (the dominant class) and the working class (the subordinate classes) were 
established. In the industrial city, both classes established a mutually dependent 
relation of production (Shields, 1999, p.152).  
 
Lefebvre argued that social space should be understood as a concrete abstraction 
(1991[1974], p.27). A concrete abstraction (l’abstrait concret) is a Marxist concept 
that Lefebvre first proposed in Dialectical Materialism (2009[1940]) and later 
developed in Logique formelle, logique dialectique (1947) 7 , which means ‘a 
contradictory fusion of content and form, concreteness and abstraction, quality and 
quantity’ (2009[1940], p.xix). Social space is produced by the mode of production (i.e. 
each mode of production has its own space) but also facilitates the development of 
that particular mode of production. For example, an industrial city was produced by 
the capitalist mode of production (characterised by the establishment of factories and 
the emergence of bourgeoisie-proletariat relations), but the industrial city also 
facilitates the development of industrial capitalism (e.g., the comprehensive system of 
financial services and transportation network). The capitalists also could not employ 
sufficient workers to meet the demands of the production line outside the industrial 
city. Social relations of production are regarded as the abstract, while social space is 
the concrete. Social space provided the material space for the dominant and 
subordinate classes to establish a relation of production. In other words, only through 
social space can the ‘abstraction which became true in practice’ (Stanek, 2008c, p.62) 
                                                      
7 Logique formelle, logique dialectique is unavailable in English. English translation of an excerpt can 
be found in Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings (eds. Elden and Lebas, 2003, pp.57-60).  
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be produced in the city.  
 
2.1.3  The Survival of Capitalism  
 
Although Lefebvre agreed with the Marxist view that history should be periodised by 
mode of production, he criticised orthodox Marxists for overemphasising the temporal 
dimension of history, i.e. the development of history as a history of class 
contradictions (1991[1974], pp.10-11). Rather than a crisis of capitalism, it is 
Marxism that is suffering from a crisis in providing a plausible analytical model. In 
the modern world, political revolutions do not take place in most advanced 
industrialised societies as Marx predicted, so a new understanding of Marxism is 
particularly necessary (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.91). Lefebvre sided with the 
Nietzschean view of history that time and space should be considered together in 
analysing the mode of production, especially when ‘[t]he state is consolidating on a 
world scale’ (1991[1974], p.23). In The Survival of Capitalism (1976[1973]), 
Lefebvre argued that the crisis of capitalism has been avoided by the production of 
space:  
  
Capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its 
internal contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the 
hundred years since the writing of Capital, it has succeeded in 
achieving ‘growth’. We cannot calculate at what price, but we do 
know the means: by occupying space, by producing a space. 
(Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.21; original emphasis)  
 
One of Lefebvre’s purposes in emphasising the importance of spatiality is to explain 
the perpetuation of capitalism in the twenty-first century, i.e. capitalism survived 
through its crisis by producing new space and occupying space. Therefore, Lefebvre 
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(1996[1968], p.130) made a clear distinction between industrialisation and 
urbanisation. Industrialisation is concerned with the means of production, while 
urbanisation is about the spatial arrangement and its impact on shaping daily life. In 
the modern world, urbanisation has also replaced industrialisation as the key 
problematic in modern society (1991[1974], p.89). The prevalence of urbanism in the 
1960s was seen by Lefebvre as the outcome of the expansion of industrial capitalism, 
but more importantly, also as a facilitator of the further expansion of industrial 
capitalism (i.e. the reproduction of the mode of production). In other words, 
urbanisation has enabled the survival of capitalism by occupying space (e.g., the 
disintegration of the old town, the redevelopment of the city centre) and producing 
new space (e.g., the construction of new towns). Lefebvre argued that ‘emerging 
industry tends to establish itself outside cities’. Hence, new cities were produced (i.e. 
producing new space), but entrepreneurs found the ‘settlement outside of cities’ not to 
be attractive, so also extended the capitalist logic to the city centre (i.e. occupying 
space) (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.68-69, 81). During an interview, Lefebvre claimed 
that these trends of spatial transformation had prompted him to investigate space: 
 
From the 1960s the historic centres of towns began to be 
refashioned under capitalist hegemony … It was at this time that 
there was a certain bursting forth of the urban phenomenon: the 
disintegration of the historic centre and its redevelopment, the 
expansion of the urban periphery, and, with it, all the planning 
projects. It is in this context that I tried to introduce the concept of 
the production of space, space as a social and political product, 
space as a product that one buys and sells. (Burgel, Burgel and 
Dezes, 1987, pp.29-30) 
 
This observation of Lefebvre is similar to Harvey’s idea of the ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey, 
1981, p.9), but Lefebvre’s conception of the production of (social) space is not 
restricted to geographical expansion. Lefebvre placed more emphasis on exemplifying 
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how urbanism under neo-capitalism has established itself as a superstructure to 
reproduce relations of production (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.163). He recognised 
‘production’ and ‘accumulation’ as the ‘vast contribution’ of Marx in understanding 
the genesis and history of capitalism. But Lefebvre criticised Marx for failing to 
pinpoint the importance of the reproduction of relations of production in 
understanding the nature of capitalism (1976[1973], pp.43-45). Rather than the 
reproduction of the means of production, Lefebvre argued that ‘[i]t is the reproduction 
of the social relations, i.e. the ability of capitalism to maintain itself during and 
beyond its critical moments’ (ibid, p.70; original emphasis). For instance, the 
construction of an industrial park (i.e. producing new space) is a common strategy of 
promoting industrial production by the state. Such a strategy not only facilitates 
capital accumulation (by attracting investment from the private sector), but also 
further produces a working class (by employing more workers). Hence, the relations 
of production (workers and capitalists as subordinate and dominant classes) are 
reproduced by the production of new space.  
 
Moreover, in modern society (roughly from 1950 to 1970 in France), the nature of 
capitalism changed. Capitalism was not only a system of wealth accumulation, but 
also the accumulation of ‘techniques, information, knowledge in general’ (Lefebvre, 
1976[1973], pp.111-112). Sciences were incorporated into production (through 
technology and machinery) to promote economic growth and social sciences became 
the tools of political control (by selling social data to private and public users) that 
ultimately were organised under the state apparatus (ibid). As there was no history in 
the new towns, the spatial practice was almost completely designated by the state and 
its technocrats; the daily life of individuals was ‘programmed’ under the vision of the 
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state and its technocrats (Elden, 2004c, p.133). Lefebvre argued that:  
 
It was only after the Second World War that capitalism succeeded 
in thoroughly penetrating the detail of everyday life. We need new 
concepts in Marxism if it is to retain its capacity to help us both 
understand and transform this radically commodified 
contemporary world. (Lefebvre, 1988, p.70) 
 
Before proceeding to the discussion about how capitalism invaded everyday life to 
reproduce the relations of space in Section 2.2, I discuss the concept of the State 
Mode of Production, in which Lefebvre ‘situates his earlier work on the urban, the 
production of everyday life and space within a more political context’ (Brenner and 
Elden, 2001, p.765).  
 
2.1.4  The State Mode of Production  
 
By reinstating the importance of social relations being exhibited in social space, 
Lefebvre’s dialectical approach has supplemented Marxist analysis of history. While 
he did not rule out the materialistic basis of social relations, he emphasised that it is 
its contradictory spatiality that characterises the nature of the city. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Lefebvre disagreed with the simplistic classification of ‘capitalist city’ 
and ‘socialist city’. In modern society, he argued that state capitalism and state 
socialism become the ‘species of a single genus’ (2009[1975], p.111):  
 
The collapse of free competitive capitalism has come about, 
through the concentration and centralisation of capital; but this 
process has given capitalism an unexpected elasticity and capacity 
for organisation. It resists crises and revolutionary convulsions – 
and especially in the advanced countries, contrary to Marx’s 
predictions. This collapse has given rise to an original and 
contradictory ‘socialist’ process in several economically 
33 
(industrially) backward countries, and to neo-capitalism in the 
highly industrialised countries. Marx's unitary conception has 
disintegrated. (Lefebvre, 1976[1973], p.47) 
 
Lefebvre pointed out the importance of the state in the production of space, especially 
in the post-war period. In the four volumes of De l'État, (1978-1976)8, he elaborated 
the theorisation of the role of the state by proposing the ‘new state form’: the State 
Mode of Production (le Mode de Production Étatique; SMP). Differing from the 
Capitalist Mode of Production (CMP) that was predominant at the time of Marx, 
Lefebvre argued that the state under SMP plays a much greater role in the modern 
world. Firstly, the state has become managerial (gestionnaire) and administrative in 
nature to facilitate economic activities. Secondly, the state assumes the power to 
protect and ensure security (securisante). Thirdly, the state also has the power to kill 
(mortelle), which includes repression, the monopoly of violence, national spending on 
the army and military, as well as the possibility of declaring wars (2009[1979], p.129). 
In other words, the state not only controls economic growth (which is insignificant 
under CMP), but also dominates other aspects of society (relations of production).  
 
Under SMP, the spatial arrangement of cities is not only produced by the 
contradictory relations between dominant and subordinate classes, but significantly 
influenced by the state. Lefebvre (2009[1980], pp.212-216) observed the following 
features under SMP:  
 
(1) Homogeneity: there will be a strong point (centre) and dominated bases (weak 
peripheries) in the city;  
                                                      
8 The whole volume of Le l‘État has not yet been translated into English. Hence, the discussion of 
Lefebvre’s ideas on the state is mainly based on the selected essays in State, Space, World (2009; 
edited by Brenner and Elden), the Chinese version of volume II (1988; on Hegel, Stalin and Mao), as 
well as other secondary sources, such as (Brenner, 2001; Brenner and Elden, 2009).  
34 
(2) Fragmentation: space is strictly quantified and commodified  
(3) Hierarchisation: a hierarchy is established for the space, e.g., the different kinds of 
housing situated between the strong point and the dominated bases.  
 
In particular, Lefebvre (2009[1975], pp.106-107) exemplified SMP by examining 
Stalinism, which is consistent with his earlier endeavour in rejecting Stalinism during 
his membership in the PCF. Rather than putting the principle of proletariat 
dictatorship into practice, the Soviet party-state controlled the means of production 
and determined the relations of production. The power of the state also pervaded 
different realms of society; for instance, political meanings were given to sports 
championships. Lefebvre therefore did not take Stalinism as a model of socialism but 
termed it as SMP.  
 
Another application of this new term was to critique the social democratic movement 
in the post-1968 era. Whilst an increasing role of the state to control economic growth 
could be observed in left/labour governments, Lefebvre argued that the outcome of 
the nationalisation of industries, for example, was not the transfer of power to the 
workers but state control (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.791). By quoting the examples 
of Keynesian economic policy in Britain and the New Deal in the US, he argued that 
the advocates of these policies were liberals, but that the state had played a similar 
crucial role in Stalinism. State productivism was favoured by them. Hence, putting 
aside the debate between the Right and the Left, state socialism and state capitalism, 
Stalinism and neo-liberalism could all be seen by Lefebvre as two faces of the same 
coin (ibid, pp.798-799).  
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2.2   Urban Experience and Urban Revolution  
 
‘In order to understand the modern world’, Lefebvre argued that ‘it is necessary not 
only to retain some of Marx’s essential concepts but also to add new ones’ (1988, p.7). 
This comment was made in his late eighties, which could be seen as a recapitulation 
of his academic career. His list of new concepts included: the everyday, the urban, 
social time and space, as well as the ‘the tendency towards a state-oriented mode of 
production’ (ibid, p.7). The conceptual triad for the production of space, the urban 
problematic and SMP have been discussed in an earlier section. I argued that the 
theory of the production of space has complicated the Marxist understanding of 
historical materialism in the modern world. In this section, I will discuss the concept 
of everyday life, which Lefebvre regarded as his foremost important contribution to 
the development of Western Marxism (Elden, 2004c, p.xv).  
 
In 1947, Lefebvre published the first volume of the trilogy Critique of Everyday Life 
(reprinted with an elaborated preface in 1958 that the current English version is based 
on). The second and final volumes were published in 1961 and 1981 respectively, 
with the book Everyday Life in the Modern World published in 1968. During this long 
interval of publication, Lefebvre switched his fieldwork research focus from rural 
sociology to urban sociology, as well as producing texts on space and urban 
revolution. Rather than regarding his theories on everyday life and the production of 
space as separate projects, I argue that both projects share a common objective of 
reinventing Marx in understanding modern society. His theory of everyday life, as a 
distinctive urban experience in modern society, should be understood together with 
his discussion of space and his vision of urban revolution.  
36 
 
2.2.1  Everyday Life in Modern Society   
 
As pointed out by Frederic Jameson (2003, p.78), everyday life is a ‘relatively new 
postwar concept’ that was ‘pioneered by’ Lefebvre. In a society of ‘abundance, leisure, 
and consumption’, alienation seemed to disappear after the Second World War 
(Lefebvre, 1969[1968], p.10). The revolutionary spirit of the working class also 
disappeared, because the ‘center of interest’ changed from work to leisure (Poster, 
1975, pp.243-244). But the Europeans began to find ‘a loss of meanings and an 
increase in repetition in their lives’ (Shields, 1999, p.65). Although work shaped daily 
routine and occupied a significant portion of the social clock, Lefebvre pointed out 
that in the modern world, ‘workers do not only have a life in the workplace, they have 
a social life, family life, political life; they have experiences outside the domain of 
labour … alienation in leisure just as in work’ (Lefebvre, 1988, p.78). He argued that 
alienation in the modern world is no longer an isolated experience on the factory 
production line, but pervades other aspects of everyday life. Lefebvre defined 
everyday life as:  
 
The everyday can therefore be defined as a set of functions which 
connect and join together systems that might appear to be distinct. 
Thus defined, the everyday is a product, the most general of 
products in an era where production engenders consumption, and 
where consumption is manipulated by producers: not by ‘workers’, 
but by the managers and owners of the means of production 
(intellectual, instrumental, scientific). The everyday is therefore 
the most universal and the most unique condition, the most social 
and the most individuated, the most obvious and the best hidden. 
(Lefebvre, 1987, p.9) 
 
With the transformation of the capitalist mode of production, Lefebvre (1988, p.79) 
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argued that there are three historical stages in the development of everyday life. 
During the first phase, capitalism was restricted to industrial production that was 
separated from everyday life. After the Second World War, under the ‘grand 
movement in the areas of technology and urbanism’ capitalism began to invade 
everyday life. Volume II of Critique of Everyday Life (2002[1961]) has provided a 
lengthy sociological survey on the conditions of life, analysing how everyday life is 
programmed by urbanism. Since the 1960s, it entered a third phase, in which 
everyday life is ‘entirely mediated and mass mediated’ (Lefebvre, 1988, p.79). 
Lefebvre argued that daily life is ‘insidiously programmed by the media, advertising, 
and the press’ (2005[1981], p.26; original emphasis). In short, the everyday is about 
banality and repetition (Shields, 1999, p.63). Referring to James Joyce’s Ulysses, 
Lefebvre argued that ‘a great novel can be boring … and “profoundly boring”’. It is 
because ‘the report of a day in the life of an ordinary man had to be predominantly in 
the epic mode’ (1991[1958], p.27).  
 
As acknowledged by Lefebvre, his concept of the everyday is similar to Lukäcs’s 
concept of Alläglichkeit (trivial life or everydayness) (Trebitsch, 1991, p.xvii), even 
though he denied the influence of Lukäcs in a private letter to Guterman (Elden, 
2004c, p.49). He also argued that his discussion of the everyday is a Marxist analysis 
of the modern world and even proclaimed ‘Marxism, as a whole, really is a critical 
knowledge of the everyday’ (1991[1958], p.148). As I discuss in greater detail in the 
next chapter, Lefebvre also engaged with other philosophers, including Hegel, 
Nietzsche, as well as his contemporaries, including Sartre, Heidegger and Althusser, 
in providing a new reading of Marxism in modern society (Elden, 2007, p.102). 
Critique of Everyday Life was envisioned by Lefebvre as a philosophical and 
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sociological project:  
 
To confront philosophers with life – simple life – and its problems, 
to immerse them in this human raw material and to ask their help 
in mastering it, in scraping away the coating of mud to reveal the 
gems within, would that be a breakthrough, a new direction? How 
should we situate the critique of everyday life in relation to classic 
philosophy? Is there room in Marxist philosophy for a critique of 
everyday life considered as a philosophical discipline? Are we 
dealing with a sociological undertaking in the narrow sense of a 
specialized discipline, or of an undertaking with a philosophical 
meaning and a set of concrete contents and social objects to 
support it? (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.84; original emphasis) 
 
Although Lefebvre’s concept is closer to Nietzsche, the notion of everyday life has 
complicated the Marxist analysis of alienation. Lefebvre’s concept of everyday life 
‘replaced Marx’s work-place as the vulnerable heart of society’ (Poster, 1975, p.246) 
and pointed out that alienation pervaded beyond the workplace. But Lefebvre’s idea 
was not generally accepted by French Marxists when the first volume of Critique of 
Everyday Life was first published, and received the following challenge: ‘[w]hat was 
the point of analysing bourgeois everyday life, the style (or the absence of style) 
imposed by the dominant class?’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.6). Lefebvre illustrated that 
such an examination of bourgeois society is important in understanding modern 
capitalist society. He argued that in post-war France, the capitalist logic has extended 
from the workplace to everyday life. Communal bonds are replaced by isolation, 
egoism and fetishism; everyday life becomes banal, repetitive and meaningless. It 
produced what Lefebvre called a ‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ 
(1971[1968], p.75)9:  
 
… this society’s rational character is defined as well as the limits 
                                                      
9 Trebitsch (2005, p.ix) translated it as ‘bureaucratic society of managed consumption’.  
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set to its rationality (bureaucratic), the object of its organization 
(consumption instead of production) and the level at which it 
operates and upon which it is based: the everyday. (Lefebvre, 
1971[1968], p.60; original emphasis) 
  
In a bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, ‘social relations are enclosed and 
concealed within these economic subjects’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.79). Therefore, 
Lefebvre’s theory of everyday life is also an appropriation of the Marxist concept of 
commodity fetishism. It is a ‘programmed everyday life’ because work and all other 
aspects of life are ‘looked after, cared for, and told’ by the capitalist logic of 
commodification (Merrifield, 2002, p.79). Alongside modern media, urban planning 
also shapes daily routine (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.96-97) and produces a repetitive 
way of life.  
 
2.2.2  Social Space and Social Time   
 
During the ‘spatial turn’ of the 1990s, everyday life was mistakenly appropriated by 
the Anglo-American community as equivalent to social space (Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxv). 
Such a reception has oversimplified Lefebvre’s understanding of the production of 
space and the impact of capitalism on everyday life. On the one hand, Lefebvre’s 
notion of social space is not limited to physical space for inhabitants’ lived experience, 
but also includes two other moments (the perceived and the conceived). According to 
Lefebvre,  
 
[Social] space is not a thing among other things, nor a product 
among other products … It is the outcome of a sequence and set 
of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple 
object … Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what 
permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and 
prohibiting others. (Lefebvre 1991[1974], pp.73, 65, 85-88, 412ff.; 
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1971[1968], pp.iv, 281 cited Brenner, 1997, p.141) 
 
As discussed above, social space was regarded as a concrete abstraction by Lefebvre. 
Everyday life should be viewed as the concrete, while economic production is the 
abstract (Goonewardena, 2008, p.118), where such a dialectical relationship is 
(re)produced in social space. In other words, the everyday should be understood as 
inhabitants’ experience, who are produced by the mode of production in urban society. 
Lefebvre argued that everyday life ‘figures in’ and ‘forms’ representational space 
(1991[1974], p.16). As Lefebvre argued, representational space is the dimension of 
urban inhabitants’ lived experience:  
 
Representational space is alive: it speaks. It has an affective 
kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, 
church, graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action and 
of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time. 
Consequently it may be qualified in various ways: it may be 
directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially 
qualitative, fluid and dynamic. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.42) 
 
At the same time, everyday life is more concerned with the temporal dimension 
(cycles and repetition), i.e. with how the capitalist logic has programmed daily routine 
(2005[1981], p.130). Rather than the Hegelian or Marxist view of a linear 
‘teleological progression’ of time, Lefebvre’s conception of time is closer to the 
Nietzschean understanding of cycle (Elden, 2004c, p.xi). He argued that there are two 
kinds of repetition, which are cyclical time that dominates in nature (day and night, 
seasons and harvest, activity and rest); and linear time is that produced by work and 
consumption (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], pp.47-49):  
 
Linear time is both continuous and discontinuous. Continuous: its 
beginning is absolute, and it grows indefinitely from an initial 
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zero. Discontinuous: it fragments into partial time scales assigned 
to one thing or another according to a program which is abstract 
in relation to time. It dissects indefinitely. Techniques which 
fragment time also produce repetitive gestures. These do not and 
often cannot become part of a rhythm: the gestures of fragmented 
labour, actions which begin at any time or cease at any time. 
(Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.48) 
 
As discussed above, capitalism was mainly concerned with industrial production in its 
early phase of development. Cyclical time (nature) did not produce any significant 
impact on linear time (time and consumption). However, in modern society, there is a 
conjunction between linear and cyclical time, in the way that daily routine has become 
increasingly determined by the capitalist logic of commodification. In other words, in 
modern society, inhabitants’ urban experience is constructed by both social space and 
social time. Generally speaking, the trilogy of Critique of Everyday Life is a 
philosophical and sociological attempt to analyse how capitalism has constructed 
daily routine, while the theory of space is an investigation of how social space is 
produced by the mode of production.  
 
However, Lefebvre’s most successful attempt to unify his discussion on social time 
and social space can be found in the small book Rhythmanalysis (2004[1992]), which 
was co-written with his last wife, Catherine Régulier, and published a year after his 
death. Regarded as ‘de facto the fourth volume’ of Critique of Everyday Life (Elden, 
2004a, p.viii), in this book they further explored rhythm and repetition. They argued 
that rhythm is ‘the way social time actually behaves’, and there is no rhythm without 
repetition (2004[1992], p.73). In other words, by identifying the organisation of daily 
routine (i.e. when and where to travel), the purpose of the rthymanalyatical project 
was to examine repetition in daily life.  
 
42 
2.2.3  Urban Problematic and Urban Revolution   
 
As I have argued, Lefebvre’s projects on space and everyday life shared a common 
theme, i.e. to develop Marxist theory in order to examine modern society by 
introducing new elements. In The Survival of Capitalism, Lefebvre clarified the theme 
of Critique of Everyday Life: 
 
The everyday, and not the economic in general, is the level at 
which neo-capitalism has been able to establish itself. It has 
established itself upon the soil of the everyday, i.e. upon 
something solid, the social substance maintained by political 
authorities. (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], p.58) 
 
Lefebvre went on to argue that the discussion of the reproduction of the social 
relations of production was ‘implicit’ in the discussion of the everyday, which could 
only be explained with ‘full clarity’ when it is discussed together with urban 
phenomena and economic production (1971[1968], p.58). As discussed above, social 
space is a concrete abstraction, where the social relations of production are 
established. In modern society, although there is still a contradiction between the 
dominant and subordinate classes, the nature of such a contradiction should not be 
dogmatically interpreted as a class struggle. Lefebvre (1976[1973], p.63) argued that 
there are two aspects of such contradiction, with the social aspect concerning class 
relations (bourgeoisie-proletariat), and the political aspect concerning the relations 
between the state and individuals (governing-governed). By occupying and producing 
space, the state sustains economic expansion without intensifying the contradictions 
between the governing and the governed. In a bureaucratic society with controlled 
consumption, urbanism as a way of life has also deceived the working class. 
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Therefore, the relations of production can be reproduced and capitalism has survived 
through the production of space.  
 
However, Lefebvre maintained that urbanisation has also produced a new crisis in 
modern society, i.e. the urban problematic. As discussed in an earlier section, 
Lefebvre argued that the history of space is the increasing level of urbanisation. Along 
the axis of the history of space, he used the terms ‘abstract space’ and ‘absolute space’ 
to designate both extremes, where abstract space means nature and community life in 
rural areas, and absolute space means built environment and urban culture in urban 
areas (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], pp.15-16). In Figure 2.3, I have presented Lefebvre’s 
axis, by combining the periodisation of the history of the city and the spatial triad. 
The vertical axis is about the temporal dimension, while the horizontal axis represents 
the spatial dimension. The longitudinal dissection along the vertical axis represents 
the social space of that specific mode of production. In Chapter Three, I further 
discuss the importance of both the temporal and spatial dimensions of space in 
Lefebvre’s social-historical studies. This diagram will also be revised in Chapter Four, 
when the urbanisation history of Shanghai is periodised.  
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Figure 2.3: Spatial-temporal diagram of the history of space 
 
 
 
Urbanisation can be seen as a process of spatial transformation from an absolute space 
to an abstract space. When urbanisation has reached 100%, the city enters the phase of 
a ‘critical zone’ that Lefebvre foresaw an as a time when urban revolution would 
occur (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], pp.5, 16-17). According to orthodox Marxists, 
revolutions are the outcome of class struggle. Although Lefebvre agreed that the 
dominant class and subordinate class are in a contradictory position, for him the 
underpinning of the contradiction is spatial. By producing new space (e.g., the 
creation of new space in rural areas) and occupying space (e.g., urban renewal in 
urban areas), urbanisation results in the marginalisation of the working class from the 
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city centre to the periphery. Class contradiction is therefore converted into the 
contradiction in space within the city. Lefebvre used the term urban phenomenon to 
emphasize that urbanisation itself, rather than industrialisation, is the key problematic 
of modern society (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.89). 
 
Urbanisation is a process involving a move from absolute space to abstract space. 
Nevertheless, Lefebvre (1991[1974], pp.352-354) observed that the state and its 
technocrats also produced the space that is seemingly natural and communal. For 
instance, holiday resorts were developed in the countryside for city-dwellers to relax 
and enjoy the natural environment and old buildings in the city were revitalised for 
showcasing the history of the city and communal value, under the facilitation of the 
state (e.g., by constructing roads and providing funding for revitalisation). Lefebvre 
argued that these measures are not the production of abstract space, but imitations of 
nature that should be regarded as part of the process of urbanisation (i.e. not a process 
of rewinding abstract space to absolute space). For instance, in France in the 1960s 
villages were commercialised to become tourist spots only for enjoyment and old 
buildings were revitalised, not truly for the preservation of history and improving the 
quality of life of the community, but for a social space of nostalgia and gentrification. 
The purpose of the state in facilitating the production of such space is to ideologically 
transform both the middles class (e.g., by providing them with an easily-accessible 
resort) and the working class (e.g., by creating false needs for those leisure activities). 
The space of consumption has become the consumption of space (ibid, pp.352-353) 
 
As gentrification increases the cost of living, the poor are pushed out from the city 
centre to the periphery (e.g., newly-developed areas on the outskirt of the city). Also, 
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as the space for the working class in the city centre may be commodified for other 
uses (e.g., to demolish old buildings in poorer districts for new property development), 
they may be relocated to new towns. The working class becomes spatially excluded 
from the city centre. Urban revolution therefore is about the struggle for reclaiming 
centrality (Merrifield, 2002, p.85). Lefebvre described this urban revolution in the 
following terms.  
 
I refer to the transformations that affect contemporary society, 
ranging from the period when questions of growth and 
industrialisation predominate (models, plans, programs) to the 
period when the urban problematic becomes predominant, when 
the search for solutions and modalities unique to urban society are 
foremost. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.5) 
 
In other words, class-based Marxist theory is no longer directly applicable to 
understand modern society. As Harvey noted with ‘Lefebvre’s vision’, the 
‘revolutionary working class is not always the factory working class, but also urban’ 
(2012, p.xiii).  
 
2.2.4  Moments and the Right to the City   
 
In modern society, everyday life has become the modality of the capitalist mode of 
production, as well as a way of managing society. By controlling social time and 
social space, a ‘repetitive way of life’ has been produced to serve as the basis for 
exploitation and domination (Lefebvre, 1988, p80). However, Lefebvre argued that 
everyday life is ‘a primal arena for meaningful social change’ (Merrifield, 2006, p.10). 
For Lefebvre, the antithesis of ‘alienated man’ is ‘total man’, which he borrowed from 
Marx’s The Economic and Philosophical Manuscript (Merrifield, 2002, p.78; Poster, 
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1975, p.56). The concept of total man was originally introduced in Dialectical 
Materialism, which means a man who ‘appropriates his integral essence in an integral 
way’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.173).  
  
In the second volume of Critique of Everyday Life, Lefebvre discussed the theory of 
moment, which he proposed earlier in La Somme et le Reste (Merrifield, 2006, p.27). 
The moment is ‘the attempt to achieve the total realisation of a possibility’ (Lefebvre, 
2002[1961], p.348 cited Merrifield, 2006, p.27). In order to become a total man, 
Lefebvre argued that there needs to be a break with everyday life:  
 
A break with the everyday by means of festival – violent or 
peaceful – cannot endure. In order to change life, society, space, 
architecture, even the city must change. (Lefebvre, 1987, p.11) 
 
Lefebvre’s discussion of the transformative moment is particularly related to his 
discussion of urban revolution. More specifically, he applied the ideas of moments in 
examining the upheavals of the Paris Commune in 1871 and the student movement in 
1968 (1971[1968], p.36). He argued that both upheavals were urban in nature. 
Lefebvre examined the Paris Commune in his book La Proclamation de la Commune 
(1965). In the 1860s, working class Parisians moved away from the city centre to the 
outskirts of the city because of the relocation of the factories. Haussmann’s plan of 
rebuilding Paris also replaced the working class by the middle class through urban 
renewal projects. The cost of living in the city centre also increased rapidly to an 
unaffordable level. While the Paris Commune was concerned with occupying space in 
the city centre, the upheaval of May 1968 was concerned with producing new space at 
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the periphery of the city10. In the 1960s, some Parisian students moved to the new 
towns in areas just outside the city, such as Nanterre. Buildings were built with an 
emphasis on their function as a production site, so the isolated landscape produced an 
alienated habitat and a sense of being segregated from the city.  
 
In The Explosion: Marxism and the French Revolution, Lefebvre argued that the 
‘foremost cause’ of May 1968 was urban (1969[1968]). In short, Lefebvre’s major 
argument is that ‘the marginalised seek to reclaim the centre’ (Elden, 2006, p.193). 
Both upheavals are urban in nature but not class-based. The subordinate classes were 
spatially marginalised from the centre to the periphery of the city. The primary 
objective of the insurrections was to ‘re-conquest the city’ (1971[1968], p.76) but not 
against capitalism. Lefebvre referred to it as an ‘implosion-explosion’ (1996[1968], 
p.71), which means ‘the tremendous concentration (of people, activities, wealth, 
goods …) of urban reality and the immense explosion … (peripheries, suburbs, 
vacation homes, satellite towns) into space’ (2003[1970], p.14).  
 
Lefebvre maintained that there are four kinds of central-periphery relations in urban 
society, which are: underdeveloped countries (especially the ex-colonial ones, the 
world proletariat), regions (which are distant from the centres within capitalist 
countries), urban peripheries (the inhabitants of suburbs), as well as social and 
political peripheries (e.g., youth, women, homosexuals) (1976[1973], pp.115-116). 
They occupy marginal positions in urban society. Therefore, in his book Le droit à la 
ville (1968; The Right to the City)11, Lefebvre advocated ‘the right to the city’ that 
each member of society should have equal rights in accessing and participating in the 
                                                      
10 For a lengthy record of Lefebvre’s involvement in May 1968, see Trebitsch (2005).  
11 The English version of Le droit à la ville can be found in Writings on Cities (eds. Kofman and Lebas, 
1996, pp.63-181) 
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planning of spatial arrangements in the city:  
 
In the face of this pseudo-right, the right to the city is like a cry 
and demand. This right slowly meanders through the surprising 
detours of nostalgia and tourism, the return to the heart of the 
traditional city, and the call of existent or recently developed 
centralities … … The right to the city cannot be conceived of as a 
simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only 
be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life. 
(Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.158; original emphasis) 
 
As well as reclaiming centrality, the right to the city is also about bringing a change to 
everyday life. Harvey argued that Lefebvre’s vision of the right to the city was ‘a 
response to the existential pain of a withering crisis of everyday life in the city’ 
(Harvey, 2012, p.x). However, the revolutionary spirit of the working class was 
obscured by the individualist mode of consumption. Even though young people 
revolted against the programming of everyday life by an urban revolution, Lefebvre 
admitted that ‘the ideology of consumption was not altogether ineffective’ 
(1969[1968], p.12). Only a break with everyday life can bring about changes in the 
reproduction of social relations. In The Production of Space, Lefebvre emphasized 
that his project of postulating a ‘unitary theory of space’ (1991[1974], p.11) is an 
examination of the reproduction of the relations of production in modern society:  
 
Our chief concern is with space. The problematic of space, which 
subsumes the problems of the urban sphere (the city and its 
extensions) and of everyday life (programmed consumption), has 
displaced the problematic of industrialization. It has not, however, 
destroyed that earlier set of problems: the social relationships that 
obtained previously still obtain; the new problem is, precisely, the 
problem of their reproduction. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.89; 
original emphasis) 
 
Lefebvre envisioned a future in which urban society should develop ‘differential 
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space’; a space that respects difference, so contradictions could be held together in the 
city (1991[1974], pp.302-303). In order to change the reproduction of the relations of 
production, Lefebvre proposed autogestion (self-management) as an alternative 
(1976[1973), p.120; 1969[1968], pp.84-87). Autogestion is also an organisational 
principle by which people can reclaim the means of production and participate in 
management, which can be viewed as a critique of the dominance of the state (2009, 
pp.146-147). When commenting on the possibility of autogestion, Lefebvre made a 
brief comment that ‘[t]he Chinese model of commune – in spite of vast differences – 
exhibits the same orientation’ (1969[1968], p.100). In Chapter Four, I will briefly 
comment on China’s experience of collectivisation during the 1950s.  
 
2.3   The Spatial Turn and Critique 
 
As argued above, Lefebvre’s theory of space should be interpreted together with his 
theory of the everyday. Both theories shared the same objective of supplementing 
Marxist analysis in understanding the nature of capitalism in the modern world. 
However, Lefebvre’s work has received different responses in different places and 
during different periods (Brenner and Elden, 2001, p.764). His ideas are still not well 
understood even today. Generally speaking, the French reading of Lefebvre is more 
Marxist and philosophical (Elden, 2006, pp.195-198). His ‘cry and demand’ for the 
right to the city also brought about an impact on the French government during the 
Mitterrand years (Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008, p.250; Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxi). However, 
his ‘paradoxical reunion with a declining PCF’ in 1980s has been accompanied by the 
suggestion that ‘the Communist Press was virtually the only one to attend to Lefebvre’ 
in France (Trebitsch, 2005, pp.xxiii-xxiv). Lefebvre’s discussion on space was 
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generally ignored in Germany until recent years (Ronneberger, 2008, pp.142-143), but 
it received more favourable responses from Latin American academics.  
 
During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Lefebvre travelled and lectured in different 
countries. In particular, his ideas had significant influence among Californian Marxist 
geographers and literary theorists (Shields, 1999, p.143). Before the ‘spatial turn’, 
social theories mainly emphasised the temporal dimension (Martin and Miller, 2003, 
p.147). In the English-speaking world, Lefebvre was primarily engaged in discussion 
of space, postmodernity and urbanisation (Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et al., 
2008, p.3), mainly among geographers, urbanists and architects (Trebitsch, 2005, 
p.xxi). For instance, Edward Soja reinvented Lefebvre’s spatial triad to postulate the 
concept of ‘third space’ (1996, pp.35-48). Neil Smith criticised the insufficiency of 
Lefebvre’s work in understanding the influence of scale in the production of space, 
and developed a theory of uneven development (Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et 
al., 2008, p.7). David Harvey is perhaps the most important social theorist in 
promoting and engaging with Lefebvre’s ideas. Hence, in this section, I will briefly 
discuss Harvey’s theorisation of urban experience under global capitalism, followed 
by Manuel Castells’ critique. 
 
2.3.1  The Spatial Turn 
 
Like Lefebvre, Harvey insisted that the city is central to the study of modern society 
and criticised the over-emphasis on the time dimension of history, arguing that the 
spatial dimension should be introduced to Marxist theory. He maintained that the 
accumulation of capital is location specific. After capital has been initially 
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accumulated, the state enforces institutional arrangements (law, contract, private 
property and individual juridical rights) so the capitalist system can be reaffirmed 
(Harvey, 1989, pp.273-297). Capitalist activities and technological change are then 
seen as favourable and inevitable, and growth is sustainable by exploitation of labour. 
However, the capitalist system is intrinsically contradictory (though class struggle is 
not presently threatening), and a crisis of over-accumulation will occur and lead to a 
‘temporal shift’ (e.g., large scale public work) (Harvey, 1982, p.393) or a ‘spatial fix’ 
(exporting capital and labour surplus to more profitable space) (ibid, p.415). As 
technology itself cannot guarantee sustainable profit (because of the possibility of 
being copied and surpassed), capitalists transfer their capital to advantageous places 
(coercive law of spatial competition), and this process of ‘annihilating space’ is 
speeded up by technology. However, the built environment (infrastructure) which 
connects both the state and capitalist enterprises to key sites is immobile. Various 
kinds of capital are then concentrated in these key sites to rule out competitors by 
monopoly, so ‘global cities’ are formed and uneven distribution development results.  
 
Although Harvey appreciated that Lefebvre is ‘the most persistent in … incorporating 
a spatial dimension into Marxian thought’ (Harvey, 1982, p.337), he criticised 
Lefebvre’s discussion of urbanism as ‘general’ and ‘incomplete’ (Harvey, 1973, 
p.303). He argued that the process of urbanisation remains incomplete after 
incorporating rural areas into urban areas. He maintained that Lefebvre ignored the 
importance of the ‘rural problem in city’ (1973, p.307), particularly the problem of 
urban poverty resulting from the migration of rural Black and Applalachian Whites to 
inner cities. Harvey also provided a more detailed analysis of urban experience under 
post-Fordist production. In the late 1970s, Lefebvre published De l'État to illustrate 
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the state’s new role in facilitating economic activities. Although this series of books 
represents an initial account of the dismantling of the Fordist regime in France during 
the 1970s, it does little to articulate the global factors involved in this transformation 
and the impact on people’s experience in the city (Brenner, 2001, p.798). Such a ‘sea 
change’ from Fordism was picked up by Harvey (1989, p.vii). He argued that ‘spatial 
rigidity’ was created under a Fordism-Keynesian ideology. He suggested that such a 
spatial barrier is overcome by technological advancement (e.g., communication and 
transport technology).  
 
Harvey’s theory helps us to understand the dialectics of capitalism from a global 
perspective (1989; 1982; 1973). However, he proclaimed that the objective of his 
project is to explore a ‘middle course’ between ‘spatial fetishism’ and space as a 
‘mere reflection of the processes of accumulation and class reproduction’ (Harvey, 
1982, p.374 cited Elden, 2004c, p.142). He emphasised that urban experience is 
constructed by the spatial and temporal dimension of capital accumulation and social 
reproduction; summed up by the term ‘space-time compression’ (Shields, 1999, 
p.143). In the Post-Fordist economy, the increased mobility and internationalisation of 
capital (e.g., a global financial system) leads to the ‘compression of time and space’: 
geographical boundaries are swept away and the sense of time is speeded up (Harvey, 
1989, p.240). Individuals then experience the postmodern feeling of ‘placelessness’.  
 
In The Condition of Postmodernity (1989), Harvey further elucidated how social 
space and individuals’ urban experiences are affected by the circulation and 
accumulation of capital under post-Fordism. By rewriting Lefebvre’s spatial triad with 
his own ideas about ‘accessibility and distanciation’, ‘appropriation and use of space’, 
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‘domination and control of space’ and ‘production of space’, Harvey attempted to 
formulate a more complicated ‘spatial grid’ to theorise individual experience in social 
space (1989, pp.218-222).  
 
2.3.2  A Critique 
 
In the 1970s, ‘only he [Lefebvre] has broken the silence in Marxism about the city’ 
(Katznelson, 1992, p.93). But Lefebvre’s Marxist analysis of space has only received 
limited attention, even from Marxists. The first reason is Lefebvre’s marginal position 
in the French intellectual circle in 1970s, as described above. Another reason is 
Castells’ critique, among other structuralist Marxists, of Lefebvre. The English 
translation of The Urban Question (as a direct response to Lefebvre’s theory on space) 
was available before that of The Production of Space and The Urban Revolution. 
Castells’ ‘hostile reaction’ has therefore further marginalised Lefebvre among English 
speakers (Kipfer, Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, et al., 2008, p.6). In The Urban 
Question, Castells commented on the ‘spontaneity and lack of formalism’ of 
Lefebvre’s analysis (Burgel, Burgel and Dezes, 1987, p.28):  
 
… when Lefebvre speaks of generalised urbanisation, including 
Cuba and China, he is quite simply ignorant of the statistical and 
historical data of the processes he describes, particularly in the 
case of China, where urban growth has been limited to the natural 
growth of the towns (without peasant immigration) and where, on 
the contrary, one is witnessing a permanent and massive shift 
towards the countryside, reinforced by the constitution of the 
people’s communes, as forms that integrate town and country. 
Although the absence of information about the Chinese, Cuban, 
Vietnamese experiences does not warrant overly affirmative 
conclusions, we know enough to reject once and for all the notion 
of the generalisation of the urban as the only form, characteristic 
both of capitalism and socialism. (Castells, 1977[1972], pp.90-91) 
 
55 
As a former assistant of Lefebvre at Nanterre, Castells has also commented that 
‘Lefebvre doesn’t know anything about how the economy works, how technology 
works … but he had a genius for intuiting what really was happening … he was 
probably the greatest philosopher on cities we have had’ (Merrifield, 2006, p.xxii). 
However, these critiques are only partially grounded. It is a fair evaluation that 
Lefebvre’s philosophical and ‘explosive’ writing style has often brought about 
difficulties for readers (Elden, 2004c, p.142; Smith, 2003, p.xxii). But Lefebvre did 
emphasise the importance of empirical studies, as well as carrying out or leading 
fieldwork. For instance, when working on his doctoral thesis in Campen, he carried 
out participant observation in the community and carefully read archives at the town 
hall (Merrifield, 2006, p.4). When he worked at Strasbourg and the Institute of 
Sociology at the University of Nanterre in the 1960s, he encouraged doctoral students 
to carry out empirical research for community groups or unions (Shields, 1999, p.90). 
He also conducted fieldwork in other places, including South America, Canada, North 
Africa, New York and Japan (Elden, 2006, p.192). Alongside overlooking Lefebvre’s 
emphasis on empirical data, Castells also neglected Lefebvre’s idea on everyday life 
(Elden, 2007, p.113). Therefore, an isolated reading of The Production of Space and 
The Urban Revolution will inevitably lead to ignorance of Lefebvre’s endeavour in 
postulating a theoretical-empirical examination of space and its relationship to 
everyday experience. My thesis represents a response to the criticism, insofar as it 
maps the impact of local spatial reorganisation as the experience of everyday life. In 
the next chapter, I further discuss the importance of empirical studies in Lefebvre’s 
theorisation of space.  
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2.4   The Studies of Urban China  
 
During an interview, Lefebvre commented that his interest in space emerged not as an 
academic concern (‘neither from the point of view of philosophy, nor sociology’), but 
due to the observation of ‘the emergence of a new social and political practice’ 
(Burgel, Burgel and Dezes, 1987, p.28). Since the Reform in 1978, China has 
witnessed significant changes in the urban landscape. Before that, China underwent a 
period of industrialisation by collectivising the means of production. Individuals in 
urban areas were organised to work, socialise and participate in political activities 
through the danwei (work unit). Since the liberalisation of the economy, urban 
landscapes, organisation of social life, economic structure, urban culture and 
individual lifestyles have changed drastically. Several questions emerge here. Are 
there any new ‘social and political practices’ in China? What major changes has 
urbanisation brought about? When examining urbanisation, what are the concerns 
among academics? In this section, I briefly introduce the background to the changes 
in urban China after the Reform, as well as some key trends of theorising 
urbanisation.  
 
2.4.1  The Great Urban Transformation  
 
The Reform in 1978, or the Open Door Policy, is often regarded as the most important 
event in China’s development since 1949. It indicated the ending of socialist idealism 
and egalitarianism: centrally-planned socialism has been transformed into a 
market-led ‘Chinese socialism’ with capitalistic features.12 Before the Reform, China 
                                                      
12 The Reform was announced in The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
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adopted the former Soviet Union model of industrial production; government-led 
industrial production was emphasised from the 1950s to the Reform in 1978. In order 
to increase efficiency and social control, private ownership was eradicated, work was 
collectivised and individuals were organised centrally by the danwei to work in urban 
areas (Lü and Perry, 1997, p.10).13 As I discuss in Chapter Four, alongside serving as 
the unit of production, administrative, political and social functions were also 
performed. Individuals in urban areas were organised by the danwei through the 
allocation of public housing (Lü and Perry, 1997, p.14). Political campaigns and 
social activities were carried out and upward social mobility was almost only possible 
in the danwei as the labour market was basically absent (Bian, 1994, p.51). Social 
stratification was also kept at a minimal level. The gradual breakdown of the danwei 
brought about significant difference in the daily life of individuals (Logan and 
Fainstein, 2008, pp.11-12), the nature of which is explored in Chapter Four. 
 
Rather than adopting the shock therapy approach practised by Eastern European 
countries, gradualism was valued by the Reform in 1978, with the nature of the 
reformative policies largely controlled by the party-state. At the beginning, the 
Reform was restricted to rural areas, then extended to urban areas along the eastern 
coast. Since then, the level of urbanisation has increased steadily. While the urban 
population only counted for 17.9% of the national total in 1978 (Zhang, 2007, p.5), it 
                                                                                                                                                           
Communist Party of China, in which the Committee holds the highest power in the country, in 
December 1978 to rebuild the economy through the permission of individual ownership and foreign 
investment. Earlier in March in the same year the goal of ‘Four Modernisations’ (modernisation in 
agriculture, industry, science and national defence) was also been integrated into the revised 
Constitution of the PRC at the Fifth National People’s Congress (NPC) for national advancement 
(Spence, 1999, p.643). Political struggle and socialist idealism during the devastating ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ were replaced by pragmatism (Fan, 1997, p.622). 
13 It is generally argued that the danwei was either adopted from the Soviet Union industrial 
production model or was a continuation of the baojia household registration system originating in 
imperial China (Lü and Perry, 1997, p.4). Most scholars believe that the CPC adopted the danwei 
system in the pre-Liberation period in 1950s (Warner and Zhu, 2000, p.18). For further discussion on 
the historical origin of the danwei, see Lü (1997), Perry (1997) and Yeh (1997).  
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has increased to 51.3% by 2011 (Rong and Zhang, 2012). Urbanisation is also one of 
the major driving forces of economic development since the 1980s. Economic 
activities in urban areas have accounted for 31% of GDP and 65% of FDI (Yu, 2005, 
p.23). Today, urban areas still contribute to more than 60% of GDP and 85% of GDP 
growth (The World Bank, 2013).  
 
2.4.2  Theorising Urban Transformation  
 
The theorisation of the current wave of urbanisation is not an easy task. Though China 
is experiencing the largest scale of urbanisation in human history, uneven 
development between regions has complicated academic research (Ma and Wu, 2005, 
pp.20-21). The speed of continuous changes has also made many local scholars 
hesitate to propose a comprehensive theoretical framework. When the economy was 
moving from a Maoist redistributive model to an uneven development one, local 
scholars tended to take a reserved stance in critiquing the policy change (Fan, 1997, 
pp.620-621). As such, overseas Chinese and foreign scholars have, arguably, paid a 
relatively greater effort to the theorisation of the Chinese experience of urbanisation 
(Ma, 2006, p.372). Some scholars have paid more attention to the influence of 
globalisation on the urbanisation of Chinese cities, especially after the entry into the 
World Trade Organisation in 2001, by mainly referencing Saskia Sassen’s thesis on 
global city (Friedmann, 2005, p.xvi). Others have focused on the role of the state in 
the uneven development across the country and within the city, such as the dual role 
of the state (being regulator and participant of the market economy), dual track 
urbanisation resulting from the presence and absence of the state (Shen, 2006, p.498), 
as well as the outcome of institutional change (Quan, 2006, p.328). The effect of 
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regional competition and cooperation (Yu, 2005, p.33) and rural-urban dynamics have 
also attracted the attention of some scholars (Hung, 2009, p.6).  
 
Various social implications have resulted from urbanisation (Chen and Sun, 2006, 
p.520). With the decline of the danwei, urban inhabitants’ social life is no longer 
organised by the government. Together with the emergence of the property market, 
people have greater freedom in choosing where they live. During this process, the 
commodification of land has further caused housing differentiation; people from 
different sectors of society are scattered into different districts. Social stratification 
has become significant in the city, a new middle class has emerged, and rural migrants 
face inequalities. Sociologists are also interested in understanding the relative role of 
the state and the market and the importance of social networks.  
 
As a non-Western post-socialist developing nation state, several theoretical 
approaches could readily be and have been applied by different scholars to understand 
China’s urban transformation (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, p.2). A first approach is 
‘modernisation’ theory that has been argued mainly by Western researchers. This 
presumes that urbanisation is one of the facets of modernisation, and predicts that 
urbanisation in developing countries will copy the ‘modern practices’ of western cities 
upon the creation of the market economy. Urbanisation is also expected to fuel 
industrialisation. This approach is similar to the neoliberal view of uneven 
development distribution when post-Fordist capitalism dominated during the Dengist 
era (Fan, 1997, p.633). Such conservative views about the general benefits of the free 
market have been challenged in the post-Deng period. Research showed that 
respondents became increasingly dissatisfied with the outcome and pace of the 
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Reform from the late 1980s to the late 1990s (Tang, 2001, pp.906-907).  
 
A second approach, the dependency and world system theory, can be seen as a critique 
of ‘modernisation’ theory (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, p.4). It addressed the issue that 
urbanisation could not resolve social problems, such as unemployment in many 
developing countries, through industrialisation. Moreover ‘over-urbanisation’ has 
been observed in some Third World cities, and it is argued that this might occur in 
China. The peripheral position of developing countries in the world market and the 
state’s inability to change this situation are presented as the primary causes of urban 
degradation.  
 
A third approach references the success of newly-industrialising countries in East Asia. 
Developmentalist state theorists (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, pp.13-15) argue that the 
state has taken a facilitative role to speed up economic development by measures, 
such as rapid land reform. As previously discussed, there are a number of studies 
addressing the role of the state, and some will be discussed and evaluated in greater 
depth in later chapters.  
 
A final approach is the political economy perspective (Logan and Fainstein, 2008, 
pp.20-23). This theory focuses on the impact to social structure of the institutional 
changes from socialism to capitalism by referencing the experience of the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries (e.g., French and Hamilton, 1979, 
pp.9-12). Yet, post-socialist countries are not perfectly comparable, because China’s 
economic reform took place gradually (not through shock therapy) and without a 
fundamental alteration in the political system (Wu and Ma, 2005, p.246).  
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2.5   Conclusion: A Lefebvrian Analysis of Chinese Urbanisation  
 
Urban China is undergoing a remarkable transformation; the process of urbanisation 
is influenced by numerous factors and has resulted in significant changes in various 
aspects. How are we to understand this urban phenomenon within a comprehensive 
theoretical framework? Is Lefebvrian analysis, as a Western theory, applicable and 
helpful to better understand such a complicated issue?  
 
First, an understanding of the current mode of production in China and its influence 
on individuals can be reconsidered by systematically analysing the mechanism of the 
interactions between the elements in Lefebvre’s spatial triad. Ever since the 
announcement of the Reform in 1978, there has been a constant debate about the 
transformation of the Chinese economic system: whether it is socialism, capitalism, 
something in between, or a combination of both. The Reform concluded the period of 
a centrally-planned inward-looking economy. Urban morphology was quickly 
transformed by marketisation. Ma and Wu (2005, p.6) observed the creation of the 
space of globalisation (e.g., high-tech, financial districts and global image-enhancing 
projects, usually with landmarks designed by internationally known architects) and 
the space of elitist consumption (e.g., shopping centres, posh hotels and fancy 
restaurants) in the Chinese economy.  
 
However, such policy change is gradual, largely controlled by the government, and 
complete marketisation is arguably not the ultimate target (Ma, 2002, p.1546). 
Government control over its market and participation is still salient and it can be 
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observed through spatial arrangements. Furthermore, the financial districts and global 
image-enhancing projects are usually planned or approved by the government and the 
active participation of the public sector is also manifested through space. For instance, 
in almost every Chinese city, government buildings are built in prime locations and 
promoted as landmarks (Hung, 2001, p.461); industrial plants are also constructed to 
facilitate industrialisation and the development of the property market (Xu, Yeh and 
Wu, 2009, pp.908-909). Rather than being determined by the needs of the individual 
city, the construction of the high-speed rail system is a national policy written in the 
Twelfth Five-year Plan (Ash, Porter and Summers, 2012, p.78), in which companies 
operating the high-speed rail system are usually state-owned. 
 
Alongside the space of globalisation and the space of elitist consumption, Ma and Wu 
(2005, p.6) argue that there is also the production of the space of differentiation and 
marginalisation (e.g., gated communities and dilapidated migrant enclaves), which is 
similar to the space of illegality and irregularity (e.g., ‘urban village’, illegal buildings) 
as proposed by Smart and Tang (2005, p.73). The inequalities and contradictions are 
produced and manifested by space. Another contribution of Lefebvrian analysis is 
reinstating the significance of class contradictions between the dominant class and 
subordinate classes. Even though class struggles appear to be much less significant in 
modern society, contradictions that result from urbanisation can easily be identified in 
the social space of Chinese cities. For instance, a growing number of shopping centres 
have been constructed with the emergence of a middle class (Bian, 2002, pp.97-98). 
At the same time, ‘urban villages’ are also found in many first-tier cities, including 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which are made invisible by being surrounding by 
newly-built modernist high-rise architecture. ‘Urban villages’ are the squats of mainly 
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internal migrants from rural areas or other provinces. They moved to urban areas amid 
a huge demand for workers. Under the household registration (hukou) system in 
China, people are allocated an urban or rural account (hukou) in accordance with their 
location of birth. People with a rural hukou will be entitled to less social welfare in 
urban areas, and vice versa. Therefore, internal migrants are not entitled to access a 
comprehensive coverage of social welfare (including education) in the city (Du and Li, 
2010, p.95). In other words, inequality will be perpetuated among the next generation 
because of the rural-urban binary.  
 
Since the reform, egalitarianism is no longer assumed in China and a more 
complicated social stratification system has emerged. The Gini Coefficient has 
increased from 0.33 in 1980 (Chang, 2002) to 0.474 in 2012 (Xinhua, 2013) which 
reflects that income inequality has widened. How can China resolve the contradictions 
emerging during economic development? As I discuss in Chapter Five, land 
commodification (i.e. the process of commodifying state-owned land for property 
development through the legal process) becomes an important financial resource for 
sustaining economic development and infrastructure development in the city. By 
producing new space, the economy continues to expand, and so provides legitimacy 
for the party-state. This is particularly significant when relocated residents use their 
compensation to further invest and generate profits.  
 
However, the benefit from economic growth is unequally shared and political stability 
is not unchallenged. As expected by Lefebvre (1991[1974], pp.376-379), resistance 
also results from the process of the production of space itself. In 2011, there was a 
major demonstration in the village of Wukan in the Guangdong Province. The protest 
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was caused primarily by the unreasonable compensation offered by the local 
government when it sold land for property development. The protest resulted in a 
series of elections for local administration (Chin, 2012). Another example is the 
relocation of local residents in the Shanghai Expo site that is discussed in Chapters 
Five and Six. While sometimes the residents make use of the compensation to invest 
in property and the stock market, thus further fuelling economic growth, sometimes 
they are brutally relocated by the authorities without a satisfactory level of 
compensation (Laurans, 2005, p.9). When the government attempts to construct the 
meaning of space (representation of space), resistance will typically result from the 
individuals affected (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.379). 
 
Though the state maintains a strong regulatory and participatory role in the 
post-Reform period, the mobilising power of the state and the linkage between the 
individual and the state is weakened when compared with the revolutionary era.14 
Economic development has replaced political struggle to become the shared goal, 
usually through implementing national and international events and infrastructure 
projects. As I argue in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo should not only be regarded 
as an international expository event, but a campaign to provide a common goal for 
society and justify major urbanisation. The theme ‘Better City, Better Life’ has clearly 
demonstrated the affirmative image of urbanisation that the government has attempted 
to construct. However, the space conceived by the urban planner (the representation 
                                                      
14 No major political campaign similar to those in the revolutionary era has been carried in the 
post-Reform era. Yet, in the megacity, Chongqing, the ‘promotion of red revolutionary songs 
anti-mafia’ campaign (changhong dahei) was carried out in recent years. State-subsidy was provided to 
attract foreign direct investment for economic growth, social housing programmes were targeting for 
internal migrants for political stability, the local mafia was fought and ‘revolutionary songs’ were 
promoted for establishing a new collective ethos. Such a populist campaign for establishing 
government authority is referred to as ‘Chongqing Model’ (Godement, 2011, p.2). However, the 
‘Chongqing experiment’ is arguably concluded with the resignation of party secretary Bo Xilai 
(Montlake, 2012).  
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of space) is different from the space lived by individuals (representational space), 
which is the third dimension that a Lefebvrian analysis helps in theorising the 
urbanisation of China.  
 
With the increasing proportion of private housing in urban areas, and with the 
emergence of the labour market, the control of individuals through the danwei is no 
longer practical. The social life and social clock of individuals are reorganised so that 
new meanings of community and work become necessary, because working in the 
danwei no longer contributes to the revolution or political campaigns (Lü and Perry 
1997, p.14). Lefebvre took a pessimistic view that everyday life in urban society is 
becoming banal (Shields, 1999, p.63). By briefly engaging with Lefebvre’s concept of 
everyday life, Duanfang Lu (2006, pp.144-151) examined the influence of the 
expansion of the private sector of the danwei. He carried out ethnographic research in 
Beijing and Auhui. With the breakdown of the danwei system, leisure time became 
independent from work and political participation, and new recreational activities 
(including dancing and doing martial arts in the garden) emerged in the city. Through 
observation and interviews with local residents, Lu argued that a hierarchy of leisure 
was established (e.g., Western-style and traditional dance were generally regarded as 
the leisure activities for the middle and lower classes respectively).  
 
While new urban culture is passionately promoted, for example, by fashion magazines 
(Ma, 2008, pp.71-72), the government is also attempting to define the imagination of 
city through the planning of space. Urban renewal is the primary strategy for 
relocating local residents, demolishing or revitalising old buildings and constructing 
new images. Gentrification is usual or the residents are relocated to newly-built 
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properties; both resulting in the change of neighbourhood, urban landscape and living 
environment (He and Wu, 2007, p.186). Another important strategy is the creation of 
new towns, which is also noted by Lefebvre, as an important process of urbanisation 
in France (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], p.59). Local residents are taken from an inner 
district of the city (usually because of urban renewal) to a new town (usually at the 
margin, between urban and rural areas). The daily routine of inhabitants is reorganised 
after relocating from the city centre to new towns. Differing from urban renewal 
projects, the creation of new towns usually begins from nothing, as the existing urban 
landscape is destroyed. Most infrastructures (including roads, transportation, locations 
of hospitals, markets and shopping malls, etc.) are newly built. This means that the 
spatial arrangement of the new towns is almost entirely planned by the government; 
and new meanings of urban living constructed. Having said that, social space is not 
completely controlled by the state, individuals can negotiate with the new spatial 
arrangement and express their views on new urban living through the representational 
space.  
 
As discussed above, regional difference is significant in China, and so any discussion 
without a specific geographical focus can only be general. The above observation will 
be discussed in greater detail with the specific focus on the urbanisation of Shanghai, 
resulting from the Shanghai Expo. In Chapter Four, the history of urbanisation in 
Shanghai is periodised. The contrast in different views towards the ‘modern’, 
urbanisation and urban culture under a different mode of production during different 
historical periods can serve as a useful background to understand the issues involved.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
Is not dialectical materialism therefore both a science and a philosophy, a causal 
analysis and a world-view, a form of knowledge and an attitude to life, a becoming 
aware of the given world and a will to transform this world, without any one of these 
characteristics excluding the other?  
‐ Henri Lefebvre (2009[1940], p.91) 
 
 
Following the publication of the English version in 1991 of The Production of Space, 
Lefebvre’s theory on space influenced ‘an entire generation of architects and social 
geographers in Europe, Latin America, the US and Britain’ (Aronowitz, 2007, p.133). 
Lefebvre was regarded as one of the social theorists triggering the ’spatial turn’ in 
social science and humanities (Allweil, 2010, p.2; Soja, 1980, pp.9-10). Nevertheless, 
Stanley Aronowitz, the founding editor of Social Text, argued that the 
‘Anglo-American reception of Henri Lefebvre … is a classic case of mis-recognition’ 
(2007, p.133). Before the availability of the English version of his other works on 
space such as The Urban Revolution (2003[1970]) and Writings on Cities (1996), ‘the 
English language audience has had a very narrow view of his interests’ (Elden, 2004c, 
p.5). The philosophical essence of his theory of space was not meticulously reviewed 
and was appropriated in a non-sophisticated manner (Gottdiener, 1993, p.133). His 
engagement with and contribution to Marxist theory was also undervalued. Even 
though Lefebvre was originally better known in the English world as the interpreter of 
Marx as the author of Dialectical Materialism and The Sociology of Marx, it is argued 
that only a limited number of sociologists were able to fully appreciate Lefebvre’s 
interpretation of Marxism (Gottidiener, 1993, p.129).  
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The influence of Marx on Lefebvre is both philosophical and methodological. The 
Lefebvrian analysis of the city is not only a Marxist perspective scrutinising urban 
space, but also a Marxist approach of theorising city as a totality. As Aronowitz 
commented, Lefebvre ‘did not follow sociology’s methodological imperative, or what 
C. Wright Mills called the “abstracted empiricism” (discrete small studies with no 
discernable implications for social theory) that afflicts the discipline’ (2007, p.134). 
Lefebvrian analysis of urban space differs sharply from most work in the discipline of 
urban sociology in terms of his understanding of methodology. As a reaction to the 
immense changes in urban landscape and its impact on social lives, resulting from the 
Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America, urban sociology emerged in the 
late nineteenth century. Cities were usually negatively narrated as centres of crime, 
exploitation, alienation and pollution, with most early theorists emphasising human 
conditions in cities in contrast to rural areas (Sennett, 1969, pp.13-15). Under the 
influence of scientism during this period, early urban sociologists generally shared the 
epistemological view of natural science that human behaviours should be regarded as 
subjects for ‘objective’ observation, explanation, prediction and generalisation. For 
example, Robert E. Park, one of the key figures of the Chicago School of Sociology, 
argued that the patterns of social space, the movement of individuals and social 
practices are all the reflections of the human condition. Similar to the rules of natural 
science, the moral order was seen to be naturally produced in the ‘ecology’ of city. 
The analysis of ‘human ecology’ was seen as similar to the strategies of understanding 
‘the interrelations of plants and animals’ (Park, 2005[1936], p.1). The purpose of 
conducting descriptive empirical studies was therefore to identify the ‘laws’ of causal 
relationships. Similarly, his colleague Louis Wirth also applied a positivist approach 
69 
to identify the different levels of experience and the structural factors in the city by 
conducting extensive studies on Jewish migrants to American cities, such as the 
ghettos in Chicago (Sennett, 1969, p.14).  
 
Although Lefebvre shared empirical tools, such as participant observation and 
interviews, with early urban sociologists, he upheld a different view of the philosophy 
of social science. He critiqued positivism for being ‘suspicious of theory’:  
 
For positivist thought, it is irrelevant whether the findings from 
which it proceeds result from division or illumination, whether or 
not there is an ‘object’ before it. Facts are classified and specified 
as being part of a given science and technology. (Lefebvre, 
2003[1970], p.63)15 
  
In order not to be constrained by any discipline, Lefebvre developed the 
theoretico-empirical approach, a regressive-progressive method to examine space by 
reinventing Marx’s dialectical materialism (Stanek, 2008c, p.75).16 This dialectical 
method was argued by Jean-Paul Sartre as ‘so clear and so rich’ that it could be 
applied (with modifications) ‘in all the domains of anthropology’ (1968[1963], p.52, 
note 8). The first objective of this chapter is, therefore, to discuss how Lefebvre 
applied this method to theorise and empirically examine the production of space. The 
methodological significance of this method as well as some previous studies of 
Lefebvre will also be discussed.   
 
Another objective of this chapter is to introduce the research questions and the data 
                                                      
15 Despite his reservations about applying a positivist approach to examine space, Lefebvre was also 
involved in ‘scientific research’. For example, while working for Délégation à l’ Aménagement du 
Territoire et à l’Action Régionale (DATAR), Lefebvre was involved in ‘scientific projects’ with 
descriptive results, as well as ‘accurate prediction’ (Burgel, Burgel and Dezes, 1987, p.28).  
16 It was also translated as the ‘projective-retrojective’ method (Shields, 1998, p.132).  
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collection methods applied in this study. As a research with limited scale, it was not 
feasible to engage with every dimension of Lefebvre’s theory. Specific focuses were 
necessary. As explained below, by focussing on applying Lefebvre’s theory of 
production of space and everyday life, this thesis regards the urbanisation of Shanghai 
during the Shanghai Expo as a case to examine the production of space in China. The 
data collection method employed (secondary data analysis and semi-structured 
interviews), the execution process and related methodological issues including 
reflexivity and the role of researcher will also be addressed.  
 
3.1   Regressive-progressive Method  
 
The philosophy of social science is ‘the study of the logic and methods of social 
science’ (Little, 1995, p.704). In Dialectical Materialism, Lefebvre critiqued formal 
logic and reviewed Hegelian and Marxian dialectics.17 He rejected the application of 
formal logic in understanding the social world and history, because the relationship 
between content and form in formal logic is ‘ill-defined and debatable’ (2009[1940], 
p.11). He cited Hegel’s critique of formal logic that ‘the movement of thought seems 
to be something separate, which has nothing to do with the object being thought’ (ibid, 
p.9). For instance, under the transitive law in mathematics, ‘A is A. If A is B and B is 
C, then A is C’ (ibid, p.9). The content of the object of observation (A, B and C), 
could be separated from the form (transitivity). The positivist approach to 
investigating ‘social laws’ overlooks the content (i.e. social reality). Therefore, a 
method in social research needs to address the concern of how to unify the form and 
                                                      
17 Dialectical Materialism is regarded as ‘a thinking radical’s assault on the “official” party Marxism 
of the day’ (Merrifield, 2002, p.78), which received heavy criticism from the PCF. Lefebvre originally 
planned to publish eight more books on it, but only Logique formelle, logique dialectique was 
published in 1947 with the censorship of PCF (Elden, 2004c, p.28; Kipfer, 2009, p.xxvi). 
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content (ibid, p.12). With space situated at the centre of the investigation, Lefebvre 
postulated the regressive-progressive method to answer this question.  
 
3.1.1  Space as Concrete Abstraction  
 
Although Lefebvre argued that dialectical materialism should replace formal logic in 
explaining social reality, a dogmatic reading was rejected. He emphasised that Marx’s 
understanding of dialectical materialism ‘is not an economism’, but ‘analyses 
relations and then reintegrates them into the total movement’ (2009[1940], p.73). The 
social relations of production were investigated through space in his socio-spatial 
dialectics. As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.162) argued that 
every mode of production would produce a particular kind of spatial arrangement, 
because space is (re)constructed by the state and the dominant class to facilitate the 
development of that particular mode of production. The everyday life of the 
individuals (or the subordinate class as a collective) would be shaped by the mode of 
production and be narrated. During the process of urbanisation, the interactions 
between the dominant class and subordinate class (re)constructed and (re)defined new 
(social) space. Therefore, urban space is produced by the material and socio-political, 
as well as cultural and quotidian practices (Stanek, 2008c, p.76). In Marxist terms, 
space is a concrete abstraction. Space is concrete because it is the product of social 
relations; space is also abstract because it is a manifestation of social relations 
(Gottdiener, 1993, p.130; Stanek, 2003c, p.76).  
 
In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre further argued that space can be divided three 
levels: Level G, which means ‘global logic and political strategy of space’; Level M 
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represents the ‘mixed, middle, mediator’; and Level P represents the personal level 
(‘private: habiting’) (2003[1970], p.100). Urban space lied in Level M, and the 
space-time diagram (i.e. Figure 2.3) can be redrawn as shown below:  
 
Figure 3.1: Space-time diagram 
 
 
(Source: Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.100) 
 
Urban space lies in the intermediate level of the spatial axis, which connects ‘the large 
social order’ at Level G and ‘the contradictory level of everyday life’ at Level P 
(Kipfer, Saberi, and Wieditz, 2012, p.119). Therefore, by conducting an empirical 
study on space, the everyday life of the individuals and the political economy can also 
be identified. The (re)production of the social relations can also be explained.  
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3.1.2  Regressive-progressive Method as a Social-historical Method  
 
Although Lefebvre is better known for his analysis of urban space, the 
regressive-progressive method was formulated when he conducted fieldwork in 
France’s rural area in the 1950s. In the article ‘Perspectives on Rural Sociology’, he 
criticised rural sociology as a discipline that failed to methodologically relate social 
reality to history (2003[1953], pp.114-115). He argued that, the history of villages and 
rural inhabitants’ ways of life should be evaluated more comprehensively to 
understand the present and envisage the future of the peasant community (Stanek, 
2008b, p.53).18 Lefebvre maintained that the regressive-progressive method enabled 
sociologists to explain such a historical change in a holistic approach through the 
observation and analysis of social reality, as well as to engage sociological study with 
other relevant disciplines. This ‘simple method’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], p.116) is 
composed of the following three moments:  
 
Descriptive: Observation, but with an eye informed by experience 
and a general theory. In the foreground: participant observation of 
the field. Careful use of survey techniques (interviews, 
questionnaires, statistics).  
 
Analytico-regressive: Analysis of reality as described. Attempt to 
give it a precise date (so as not to be limited to an account turning 
on undated 'archaisms' that are not compared with one another).  
 
Historico-genetic: Studies of changes in this or that previously 
dated structure, by further (internal or external) development and 
by its subordination to overall structures. Attempt to reach a 
genetic classification of formations and structures, in the 
framework of the overall structure. Thus an attempt to return to 
the contemporary as previously described, in order to rediscover 
the present, but elucidated, understood: explained. (Lefebvre, 
                                                      
18 In the house journal of Centre National de la recherche Scientifique, Lefebvre further argued that 
the historical investigation of rural space is even more important than in urban space. The reason is that 
‘the history can remain much more hidden’ in rural space but ‘persists and acts in the present moment’ 
(Elden, 2004c, p.135). 
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2003[1953], p.117; original emphasis) 
 
Lefebvre claimed that the regressive-progressive method is ‘indispensable for 
research on space’ (Stanek, 2008c, p.159), in which its significance was highly 
appreciated by Sartre. In his book Search for a Method, Sartre commented that 
Lefebvre ‘has provided a simple and faultless method for integrating sociology and 
history in the perspective of a materialist dialectic’ (1968[1963], p.51, note 8). He 
particularly appreciated Lefebvre’s suggestion of researching social space by 
horizontal and vertical complexities.19  
 
Horizontal complexity was regarded by Lefebvre as the formation of a particular 
mode of production and social structure during ‘the same historical date’, particularly 
‘those determined by large-scale contemporary social and political phenomena’ 
(2003[1953], p.112). By using sharecropping as an example, Lefebvre argued that a 
sociological study should begin with identifying a village community as the focal 
point of investigation. The communal life of the inhabitants could be surveyed 
through different data collection techniques such as interview and observation 
(‘descriptive moment’). Lefebvre particularly argued that a questionnaire survey itself 
is insufficient to describe the habitat in urban space, but other details such as ‘houses, 
moveable immovable property, clothing, faces and behaviour’ should be included 
(Lefebvre, 2003[1966], p.128). Alongside rural regions such as the Pyrenees, 
Lefebvre also applied the regressive-progressive method to investigate urban areas 
including Mourenx, a new industrial town in southern France. In his article La Revue 
Française de Sociologie (1960), Lefebvre described the everyday life of the 
                                                      
19 As noted by Elden (2004c, p.136), Lefebvre originally argued that the principal stages of 
investigation involve ‘problems of origin’, ‘problems of filiation, succession, sociological causation’, 
and ‘historical problems: the interaction of forms’. But such an idea was not further developed. 
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inhabitants of Mourenx, with reference to the data collected through interviews and 
participant observation (Stanek, 2008c, pp.66-67)20. The purpose of conducting a 
sociological study is therefore to understand the ‘conditions’ of the whole community, 
including social structure, agricultural/industrial productivity and population 
movement at ‘the same historical date’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1966], p.128).  
 
Alongside horizontal complexity, that enabled a researcher to understand 
the ’conditions’ of the community at the present time, Lefebvre also emphasised the 
importance of the temporal dimension of space, i.e. vertical complexity. As discussed 
in the last chapter, Lefebvre argued that new space is produced upon the existing 
space. So, there are ‘sociological fossils’ that ‘differ in age and date but which coexist’ 
(2003[1966], p.113). Lefebvre did not clearly define the meaning of ‘sociological 
fossils’, but the following comments demonstrate how ‘sociological fossils’ could be 
read at Navarrenx, a historical town next to Lefebvre’s hometown (Hagetmau) 
(Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.391 note 1):  
 
In Navarrenx, where ‘I know every stone’. In these stones I can 
read the centuries, rather as botanists can tell the age of a tree by 
the number of rings in its truck … History and civilization in a 
seashell, this town embodies the forms and actions of a 
thousand-year-old community which was itself part of a wider 
society and culture, ever more distant from us as the years pass by. 
This community has shaped its shell, building and rebuilding it, 
modifying it again and again according to its needs. Look closely, 
and within every house you will see the slow, mucous trace of this 
animal which transforms the chalk in the soil around it into 
something delicate and structured: a family. (Lefebvre, 
1995[1962], p.116) 
 
By examining these ‘sociological fossils’, the researcher could analyse how previous 
                                                      
20 For example, Lefebvre conducted a study in Lacq-Mourenx in the Pyrenees in 1959 (Entrikin and 
Berdoulay, 2005, p.133; Stanek, 2008b, p.66).  
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mode(s) of production were preserved and still exert influence on the spatial 
arrangement and urban experience at the present time (Stanek, 2008c, p.113) 
(‘analytico-regressive’). In other words, the regressive-progressive method is a 
social-historical method that balances historical and sociological studies:  
 
… in order to elucidate modern industrial society, the analysis 
must go back to older societies. These it determines in their 
relation to the concrete totality as given today, inasmuch as they 
are original totalities that have been transcended, that is in the 
only historical reality that we can conceive of or determine. In the 
past this analysis finds, under specific forms, certain relations 
(such as that between Master and Slave for example, which Marx 
called ‘the exploitation of man by man’) or else typical modes of 
thought or social existence, such as Fetishism. Dialectical 
materialism's field cannot therefore be restricted to the present 
day; it extends over the whole of sociology. (Lefebvre, 
2009[1940], p.94) 
 
After description, observation and analysis, the final movement of the 
regressive-progressive method (‘historico-genetic’) concerns explanation. For 
instance, Lefebvre argued that the history of a village is the history of changing 
modes of production: from slave and feudal modes of production, to the agricultural 
revolution, then capitalism and finally the industrialisation of agriculture. The 
periodisation of the history of space by modes of production provides the researcher 
with a more comprehensive historical background to elucidate the economic structure 
and everyday life of the present (2003[1970], p.113). As the purpose of applying the 
regressive-progressive method is to decipher the dialectical movement of the 
changing modes of production, Lefebvre did not follow ‘abstracted empiricism’ but 
embraced different techniques of data collection. ‘Sociological fossils’, for instance, 
are collected from various sources, including folklore, mythology or literature (Elden, 
2004c, p.137). By intertwining, intersecting and interacting between vertical and 
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horizontal complexities, the regressive-progressive method provides a general 
methodological framework to situate sociology within relevant fields and disciplines, 
including human geography, political economy and statistics (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], 
p.113).  
 
3.2   Research Questions and Methodology  
 
Lefebvre was primarily concerned with identifying the dialectical relationship 
between the mode of production, the production and arrangement of (social) space 
and inhabitants’ everyday life. By critically engaging with Lefebvre’s theory of the 
production of space and applying the regressive-progressive method, this study 
examines the ‘conditions’ and ‘sociological fossils’ in urban China. The study aims to 
critically examine the changing mode of production in China since the ‘Chinese road 
to socialism’ was announced for more than 30 years. It also aims to identify how the 
political economic system interacts with urban inhabitants and shapes their daily life. 
 
As indicated above, the application of the regressive-progressive method should begin 
with identifying a community for investigation. Shanghai during the organisation of 
the Shanghai Expo, is chosen as the ‘community’ in this study. With its complicated 
history of urbanisation and urban culture, as well as its symbolic meaning as the 
miracle of China’s recent economic success, Shanghai provides an ideal location for 
scrutinising the political economy of Chinese urbanisation and its influence on the 
urban experience of its inhabitants. More specifically, this study sets out to address 
three research questions outlined below.  
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3.2.1  Research Questions  
 
Firstly, what is Shanghai’s mode of production after 30 years of reform? This question 
will be addressed mainly through illustrating the process of the production of space 
for organising the Shanghai Expo. As a city-based, as well as government-led mega 
event, the urban (re)development projects of the Shanghai Expo were supervised by 
the Central Government and executed by the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government through urban planning and resource allocation. It involved the 
participation of the private sector with state-owned enterprises heavily involved. 
Through demarcating the spatial arrangement of Shanghai, this research aims at 
analysing the vision of experts. As the organisation of this mega-event also involved 
the mobilisation of individuals for urban (re)development and the participation in the 
event, I have taken the model of the Shanghai Expo as an ideal type to illustrate how 
the daily life of individuals was affected by the rearrangement of space. This also 
facilitates a more general examination of whether China is pursuing a capitalist, a 
socialist system, or a combination of both.  
 
Secondly, what were the experiences of Shanghai’s inhabitants during the Shanghai 
Expo? As Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.26) asserted, mode of production defines social 
relations and produced social space. With the transformation of urban space in the city 
centre and the urbanisation of rural areas, the inhabitants’ experience and imagination 
were also expected to change. How does the change of spatial arrangement affect the 
daily routine and experience of the inhabitants? How do the inhabitants imagine a 
modern city life? As the negotiation between the state and individuals took place 
through space, the importance of locality should be emphasised in a Lefebvrian 
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analysis. This study will thematise the inhabitants’ experience as being shaped by the 
mode of production. In addressing these questions, this research may also help to 
evaluate the applicability of a Western theory to a non-western context.  
 
Thirdly, the research addresses the modernisation and modernity of China. As I 
discuss in Chapter Seven, when the early World Expos were held in Europe in the late 
nineteenth century, the host countries set out to showcase their industrial achievement 
and national strength. The promising aspect of modernity (or modernism as referred 
to by Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.2) was reflected in the human inventions that were 
constructing a ‘modern’ lifestyle. The organisation of the World Expo was even 
regarded as the ‘birth of modernity’ of the country (Barth, 2008, p.33). The Chinese 
government also regarded the Shanghai Expo as the accomplishment of ‘a century 
dream of modernisation’ (Wen, 2009). Is the modernisation of China completed? How 
can we characterise the modernity of China today? In addressing these questions, 
what parameters should we reference and what dimensions should we pay attention to? 
These questions will be critically explored by examining the reorganisation of urban 
space by the state and its impact on individuals’ daily life. 
 
3.2.2  Data Collection Methods  
 
As Lefebvre argued, the regressive-progressive method is ‘a general framework, a 
conception of the overall process’ (2003[1953], p.117). This method provided a 
general framework for social research (e.g., three moments, vertical and horizontal 
complexities). The openness of the method enabled researchers to employ different 
data collection techniques and appropriate theories to describe and explain the object 
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of investigation. In this study, several data collection methods were applied to address 
the above research questions within a Lefebvrian theoretical framework. This section 
discusses the data collection methods employed in the study and the methodological 
concerns of each method, while the execution process is addressed in the following 
sections.  
 
As indicated above, the regressive-progressive method begins with the selection of a 
community for investigation. In this study, Shanghai, during the organisation of the 
Shanghai Expo, was chosen as that focal point for two main reasons. First, Shanghai 
was regarded by the Chinese government as the showroom of the Reform. An 
examination of the social life and spatial arrangement (i.e. horizontal complexity) 
helps evaluate the ‘conditions’ of community in the ‘model city’ of China. The second 
reason is the urbanisation history of Shanghai (i.e. vertical complexity). As I discuss 
in Chapter Four, although Shanghai has a shorter history than the country, it was 
where Western modernity was introduced to China (Bergère, 2009, pp.4-5). Modern 
urban infrastructure facilities, a capitalist economic system, new philosophical 
thought and lifestyle, etc. were firstly introduced to and/or promoted through 
Shanghai (e.g., Lee, 1999b, p.38). Together with the obliteration of urbanism during 
the socialist construction period and market liberalisation in recent decades, its rich 
history of urbanisation provided a perfect site in understanding how different modes 
of production influenced China.  
 
There are horizontal and vertical complexities in Lefebvre’s typology of space. In 
order to provide accurate descriptions of both complexities, the following data 
collection techniques were applied, as set out below:  
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1. By focusing on the Shanghai Expo, secondary data including economic data, 
financial reports, regulations and the political system were referenced to depict the 
mode of production in Shanghai (mainly discussed in Chapter Five).  
 
2. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with the inhabitants of Shanghai to 
collect data on their daily practices, experience, perception and imagination about 
the urbanisation of Shanghai (mainly discussed in Chapter Six).  
 
3. Concerning vertical complexity, the urbanisation history of Shanghai was 
periodised by applying Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space to provide a 
historical backdrop, in order to examine how the ‘sociological fossils’ exerted 
influences on the production of space in Shanghai. A literature review on 
socio-historical studies of Shanghai was conducted (mainly discussed in Chapter 
Four).  
 
Alongside the methods mentioned above, whenever appropriate, ‘sociological fossils’ 
from other sources were also gathered in a less systemic manner. Since a pragmatic 
principle was upheld during the construction period under the Socialist regime, urban 
space was not reconstructed as massively as the Soviet Union. There is therefore a 
‘thick layer of presocialist legacy’ in Chinese cities (Wu, 2002, p.1594). In terms of 
physical space, ‘sociological fossils’ were not difficult to be spotted for investigation. 
In Chapter Five, I discuss how spatial practice can be characterised by these built 
forms of the Republican and the socialist period.  
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Since the 1990s, there has been a wave of ‘Shanghai nostalgia’, with the history of 
Shanghai referenced to re-imagine history and narrate a new discourse among 
intellectuals (Zhang, 2002, p.148). These studies provide a wide range of sources to 
examine how ‘sociological fossils’ exert influence on the present. For instance, in 
Chapter Four, when periodising Shanghai’s history, novels about Shanghai and old 
travel guidebooks, etc. were also referenced.  
 
3.3   Methodological Issues and the Executive Process  
 
When commenting on Lefebvre’s regressive-progressive method, Sartre argued that 
the horizontal and vertical complexities of space ‘react upon one another’ helping 
empirically to evaluate space in a comprehensive manner (1968[1963], p.52). The 
openness of the regressive-progressive method provides a general framework to relate 
content and form in social research. Nevertheless, the regressive-progressive method 
does not address the methodological concerns of each data collection technique. 
Therefore, in this section, the methodological issues of the data collection method, i.e. 
secondary data analysis and semi-structured interview, will be evaluated. The 
execution process will also be introduced.  
 
3.3.1  Secondary Data Analysis 
 
Secondary data analysis is the further analysis, interpretation of or addition of 
knowledge to existing data, usually with the lack of resources to collect first-hand 
data as the primary drive (Hakim, 1982, p.12; Hyman, 1972, p.3). In this study, with 
limited time and resource, secondary data about the Shanghai Expo and the 
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urbanisation of Shanghai, e.g., urban (re)development projects, data about economic 
activities in Shanghai and demographic data were gathered to evaluate the influence 
of the mode of production on urban development.  
 
In the past, the credibility of government data has raised concern when the 
observation or analysis within a study has been solely based on official figures. 
Researchers using government data have been sceptical of ‘official figures’ that might 
have constructed for political reasons. The reliability of data collection processes has 
also been of concern (Hakim, 1982, pp.22-23). In particular, under political pressure, 
Chinese official data has been criticised as unreliable, e.g., economic data usually 
seen as exaggerated to ‘maintain’ economic growth (Holz, 2005, pp.22-24; Movshuk, 
2002, pp.5-8; Takahashi, 2006, pp.89-90). However, by evaluating the quality of the 
data of the Chinese Statistical Yearbook and the institutional structure of the data 
collection, it is also argued that economic figures in recent decades are generally 
reliable (Chow, 2010, pp.4-7). Researchers on China therefore need to be more 
cautious when applying and interpreting official data.  
 
The distrust of government data can generally be avoided by clearly distinguishing the 
data deriving from administrative records, household surveys or other collection 
methods by independent agents (Hakim, 1982, pp.22-23). Alongside government data, 
this study also used information from other sources, such as data collected by 
independent researchers, etc.  
 
3.3.2  Semi-structured Interview  
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As discussed above, Lefebvre regarded urban space as the intermediate level; the 
‘mediating relationship to everyday life and state-bound and global social institutions’ 
(Kipfer, Saberi, and Wieditz, 2012, p.117). For him, the mode of production can be 
observed through describing the experience of inhabitants. In this study, 
semi-structured interviews were therefore conducted with inhabitants to understand 
their subjective experience of living in Shanghai (the lived space) and their views on 
the transformation of the city and the Shanghai Expo. As a form of ethnographic 
fieldwork, semi-structured interviews involved the documentation of respondents’ 
beliefs, meanings and practices from their own perspectives (Riemer, 2009, p.203). As 
an informal conversation, it enabled greater flexibility during the interviews, enabling 
the researcher to seek clarifications of the respondents’ accounts (Leech, 2002, 
pp.667-668). The application of semi-structured interviews as a data collection 
method enables the researcher to understand and interpret the subjective experience of 
individuals and allows in-depth discussions more than other data collection techniques 
(Fetterman, 2009, pp.1-2). In other words, the purpose of carrying out interviews in 
this study is not limited to describing the thoughts, practices and interpretations from 
the individuals’ perspectives, but, perhaps more importantly, providing a systemic and 
theoretical analysis of what individuals experienced, perceived and imagined. The 
study can also be regarded as a ‘work describing a culture’; investigating respondents’ 
beliefs and practices through verbal conversation and observation of non-verbal 
practices (Spradley, 1979, p.3).  
 
Ethnography was first applied by anthropologists in the nineteenth century on 
non-Western societies, typically focussing on community life and kinship of tribal 
groups. It then became more widely applied to understand different social groups’ 
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experience in urban areas. For example, the Chicago School of Sociology portrayed 
the patterns of social life in the city and theorised the social conditions that shaped 
behaviours, through conducting ethnographic fieldwork in urban areas (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, pp.2-5). The Birmingham School of Cultural Studies further promoted 
its application in areas including youth studies and gender studies (Johnson, 1986, 
pp.70-72). Ethnographers might have different objectives when carrying out 
ethnography. For example, each ethnographer might take different steps, apply 
different techniques or even uphold different views in terms of their theoretical 
position and the subjectivity of the research object, but most would agree that 
ethnography begins with a problem or an issue. Bronislaw Malinowski coined the 
term ‘foreshadowed problem’ to argue that every ethnography begins with a problem 
or a topic of interest, in which the problem or topic of interest can originate from 
theories, social issues or personal interest, etc. (Riemer, 2009, p.206). However 
diverse the method is, ethnography can be viewed as a critical response to the 
advocacy of objectivity and, in particular, the literature on the ethnographic interview 
from the 1980s onwards can also be viewed as a challenge over positivism (Heyl, 
2001, p.372).  
 
As discussed above, positivists argued that ‘objective’ research study should be based 
on observable social actions with the absolute absence of the researcher’s bias. Such 
objectivity could be achieved if and only if social actions could be objectively 
observed and the researcher maintains an objective and value free theoretical position. 
As the data from semi-structured interview is not ‘collected’ but ‘produced’, the key 
methodological concern of semi-structured interviews is hence the theoretical dualism 
between subjectivity and objectivity (Berg, 2001, pp.134-135). The concern cab be 
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summarised into two questions: are we able to collect objective data from the research 
subject? How can we ensure the research subject is expressing his/her true thoughts in 
his/her mind?  
 
Unlike ‘social facts’ that positivism aimed to observe, the data from semi-structured 
interviews are ‘produced’, because there would be no ‘data’ available unless there is 
an intervention from the researcher. In other words, the data collected can be regarded 
as an outcome of the researcher’s intervention. Lefebvre argued that the researcher’s 
personal judgement would inevitably influence the way and the nature of data being 
‘collected’:  
 
Every observation is an interpretation. Every observation, up to 
and including those that give the greatest sense of being 
immediate and patently obvious, in fact contains all the thought 
processes of the person making it. (Lefebvre and Guterman, 
2003[1933], p.80) 
 
In this study, the respondents were asked about their experience of living in Shanghai 
as well as their perception and imagination of the city. The role of the researcher was 
therefore to discover the understandings and interpretations of the actions of 
individuals and social structure, in which these aspects are usually not possible to be 
addressed by quantitative study (May, 1993, pp.191-194). Autobiographic reflection 
of the researcher is generally practised to address such a methodological concern, 
which is discussed below.  
 
3.3.3  Execution Process  
 
In this study, snowball sampling was employed for recruiting the respondents for the 
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semi-structured interviews. The interviewees were mainly recruited through my 
personal networks that were established during the fieldwork for my M.Phil. study. 
Interviews were conducted with 13 respondents between October 2009 and October 
2010, when I made visits to Shanghai at least every two months, with each stay lasted 
for two days to a month. As the Shanghai Expo was held between May to October 
2010, this extended fieldwork period also enabled me to observe the changes in the 
urban landscape before the Shanghai Expo and when it took place. Respondents 
included permanent residents of Shanghai, internal migrants from other provinces of 
China and a foreigner working and residing in Shanghai during the fieldwork period. 
The profiles of respondents are listed in Appendix I. Pseudo names were listed to keep 
the personal information of the respondents confidential. 
 
As the interview questions might sometimes be too conceptual, vague or abstract to 
the interviewers (Riemer, 2009, p.206), an interview guide was prepared to aid the 
interviews (refer to Appendix II). Alongside demographic backgrounds, the interview 
questions can be categorised into the following areas, with the ‘foreshadowed 
problem’ about how the experience, perception and imagination of Shanghai’s 
inhabitants were shaped by (re)development in Shanghai in recent decades:  
 
- Experience: daily life being shaped by the urban (re)development in Shanghai 
and the Shanghai Expo;  
- Perception: subjective interpretations of the influence of urban (re)development 
in Shanghai on their daily life; and  
- Imagination: the expectation of living in Shanghai and what kind(s) of changes 
that they imagine taking place in Shanghai.  
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In establishing the Critique of Everyday Life as a sociological project, Lefebvre 
outlined some ‘axioms’ for conducting sociological studies. In particular, he reminded 
sociologists that he/she should speak ‘the same language as the men (individuals; 
members of a group) he is seeking to reach and whose way of life he wishes to 
understand’ (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.102). As the use of language is important in 
understanding cultural meanings during semi-structured interviews (Leech, 2002, 
pp.666-667), all interviews were conducted in Mandarin; the only exception was an 
expatriate with whom English was our only common language. On occasions when 
the respondents suddenly spoke in Shanghainese (the dialect of Shanghai; the Hu 
dialect), clarifications were sought.  
 
Concerning the interview as a data collection method, Lefebvre also noticed that 
usually there is ‘a period of awkwardness’ at the beginning of the conversation. He 
argued that: 
 
Beginners would like to avoid or shorten this period; they do not 
realise how fruitful it is. That such awkwardness cannot be 
avoided, that uneasiness arises almost of necessity when a living 
contact is established, is something which techniques of group 
dynamics and psychotherapeutic interviews would confirm, were 
confirmation needed … The interview starts with a sort of tacit 
challenge to the interviewee by the interviewer (to reach him, to 
grasp him, to know him) and to the interviewer by the interviewee 
(to put him off track, to elude him). (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], 
p.102) 
 
However, Lefebvre (2002[1961], pp.102-103) immediately recognised that such an 
approach might become similar to a police interrogation with an accompanying 
psychological investment if it was not applied carefully. Rather than posting 
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challenges to the interviewee, I adopted James Spradley’s suggestion to begin the 
interview with ‘grand tour questions’ (1979, p.86). General and broad questions about 
their daily life and opinions of the Shanghai Expo were among the first questions I 
asked before deeper and more focused ones. In order to establish a rapport between 
the interviewees and myself, I tried to create a favourable atmosphere through 
introducing new elements (e.g., moving from general discussion to specific topic) 
slowly to prevent the loss of rapport and the interview becoming a ‘formal 
interrogation’ (Spradley, 1979, p.58). I hoped that such an approach lessened the 
differences in the power relations between myself and the interviewee, encouraging 
the interviewees to express themselves.  
 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face and on an individual basis, which each 
lasted for between 45 and 90 minutes at the location which was convenient for the 
interviewees and free from disturbances. There was an exception that one interviewee 
exchanged ideas with me after the interview. This interviewee spent several days with 
me wandering around the Expo Site, during which time, we discussed his expectation 
and participation of the Expo and Shanghai’s changing urban landscape. When audio 
recording was not always possible, reflexive journals of the conservation were 
prepared as an alternative tool. This interviewee has been informed and agreed to 
include these conversations into the research. In fact, the experience of wandering 
around the Expo Site gave me a chance to talk more deeply with the interviewees in 
an informal setting, which is one of the advantages of an ethnographic study 
(Fetterman, 2009, pp.33-34). All interviews were audio recorded and kept confidential 
and anonymous. I ensured that the respondents did not experience any physical or 
psychological harm. Consent was sought before all interviews. 
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3.3.4  Autobiographical Reflexivity  
 
In this section, I discuss how I addressed the methodological issues of the data 
collection method. As a member of society, a researcher’s personal background, 
academic training and relationship with a research subject inevitably affects how the 
research study is conducted as well as how the findings are presented and analysed 
(e.g., Alvesson and Sklödberg, 2000, p.266; Johnson, 1975, p.112-113). Over his sixty 
years of an academic/writing career, Lefebvre’s thinking was in active dialogue with 
his experience of changing social environments (from Vichy France, post-war Europe 
to neo-liberalism), his affiliations (the PCF, the Situationist International), as well as 
during debates with other academics (e.g., on structuralism, phenomenology) (Elden, 
2004c, pp.21-22). Lefebvre also noted that sometimes ‘ideology and knowledge are 
barely distinguishable’ (1991[1974], p.45). 
 
As a ‘sociologist is socially situated’, Pierre Bourdieu called for reflexivity about 
three kinds of bias during data collection and interpretation. Firstly, similar to other 
social theorists, he argued that social background, including the class origin, ethnicity 
and gender of the researcher influences his/her interpretation of the research subject. 
Secondly, the position of the researcher within his/her field(s) in the academia limits 
the methodology and direction of interpretation. Thirdly, and the most important 
aspect of reflexivity for him, is intellectual bias of the discipline the researcher is 
associated with (Wacquant, 1989, p.32). He argued that the professional skills and 
knowledge of researchers constitute the most significant difference from the position 
of a research subject. 
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Autobiographical reflection of a researcher’s personal academic journey is the 
common approach to exhibit his/her social and theoretical position (Maton, 2003, 
pp.54-55). As a second generation immigrant from the Fujian Province of China to 
Hong Kong, I completed my college schooling a few years after the resumption of 
sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China from the United Kingdom in 1997. As 
the policy makers neither hoped to evoke an anti-colonialism sentiment nor Chinese 
nationalism, education before the Handover was ‘largely-depoliticized’ (Mathews, Ma 
and Lui, 2008, p.82). Some might argue that local born Hong Kong people, though 
ethnically Chinese, could not entirely appreciate the development of Mainland China 
with the lack of experience in and identification with Mainland China. During 
fieldwork, two questions frequently emerged from the respondents: (1) You came 
from Hong Kong, why do you conduct research on Shanghai? (2) Can Hong Kong 
people understand Mainland China?  
 
However, I tend not to agree with such a sceptical view. The colonial history had 
isolated Hong Kong from most political struggles in the Chinese Mainland. 
Indigenous Hong Kong identity has also emerged on the basis of being politically ‘not 
Communist’ and culturally ‘not Mainland China’ (Mathews, 1997, pp.5-8). From a 
Mainland Chinese perspective, Hong Kong people are ‘others’ but also ‘us’. Hong 
Kong people can be viewed as ‘others’. Culturally it is also at the periphery (Lingnan 
region) of the country (Siu, 1996, pp.178-179). Such detachment from political 
struggles and debates has also provided a relative neutral space to discuss and observe 
the social changes of Mainland China. The experience of rapid economic growth and 
urbanisation of Hong Kong in the 1980s can also be served as an example of 
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understanding how a Chinese society can modernise and adapt Western ideas, 
particularly about the emergence of urban culture (Ma, 2006, p.349). Hong Kong 
researchers may also be better positioned to avoid Orientalism, to which many 
Western researchers might need to pay more attention. Hence, I would argue that the 
specific position of Hong Kong as ‘apart from China’ and ‘a part of China’ can 
facilitate rather than hamper Hong Kong researchers to understand China. 
Furthermore, Hong Kong and Shanghai are typically regarded as twin cities by social 
theorists and commentators when analysing the social changes. 
 
3.4   The Empirical and the Theoretical  
 
According to Bruce Berg (2001, p.225), a case study involves ‘systematically 
gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group 
to permit the researcher to effectively understand how it operates or functions. The 
case study is not actually a data-gathering technique, but a methodological approach 
that incorporates a number of data-gathering measures’. As the Shanghai Expo was 
the focal point of investigation and different data collection methods were applied, 
this research could be categorised as a case study.  
 
Lefebvre also conducted several case studies in rural and urban areas with his team at 
the Institut de Sociologie Urbaine and the University of Nanterre21. However, the 
regressive-progressive method is more than data-gathering measures. It is a dialectical 
method that is ‘both a science and a philosophy’ (2009[1940], p.91). In this section, I 
further discuss how the regressive-progressive method combined the empirical and 
                                                      
21 Some examples include the case studies of workers in Lacq-Mourenx peasant communities at 
Pyrenees and Tuscany. For a detailed review of Lefebvre’s empirical studies, see Stanek (2008a; 
2008b).  
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the theoretical elements for Lefebvre’s theoretisation of space, and how this method 
was applied in this study.  
 
3.4.1  Regressive-progressive Method as a Theoretical-empirical Method  
 
As discussed above, Lefebvre emphasised that the production of space could be 
investigated by researching daily life. The regressive-progressive method served as a 
theoretical and methodological framework to enable the application of different data 
collection methods. However, he noted that all empirical studies have their limits. At a 
certain point, description, no matter how detailed turns out to be inadequate, and the 
limits of morphology and ecology are soon reached. Description is unable to explain 
certain social relations – apparently abstract with respect to the given and the ‘lived’ – 
which appear concrete but are only immediate (Lefebvre 2003[1970], p.46; original 
emphasis). He criticised empiricist and positivist sociology as only producing a 
‘vicious circle’ of superficially accepting the predominance of problems caused by 
town planning (urbanisme) itself (2003[1966], p.121). In contrast to the Chicago 
School, Lefebvre went further than the description of inhabitants’ experience, linking 
experience in the city to the Marxist discussion of the mode of production and social 
relations of production.  
 
The regressive-progressive method provided a holistic theoretico-empirical 
framework to understand the dialectical relationships between space, urban 
experience, state, social relations and mode of production in temporal and spatial 
dimension (Stanek, 2008c, p.75). As a prolific writer, Lefebvre ‘did not write in 
isolation, but lived the life of a Parisian intellectual and participated in lively debates 
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with others’ (Gottidiener, 1993, p.129). As discussed the in last chapter, he was 
influenced by Nietzsche’s concept of the everyday. The purpose of describing the 
everyday life of inhabitants (horizontal complexity) is more than phenomenological 
description, but rather to analyse the production of social space. When he identified 
the isolated experience of inhabitants, Lefebvre went further than relating it to the 
flaws of urban planning (e.g., the lack of facilities in new towns), linking the boredom 
of inhabitants’ everyday life to the process of spatial production under capitalist mode 
of production (Stanek, 2008c, p.67). The purpose of the regressive-progressive 
method can therefore be seen as a call for reinstating everyday life in philosophical 
discussion (Elden, 2004c, p.180). 
 
The suggestion of vertical complexity can similarly be regarded as a response to 
structuralists’ lack of interest in history (Elden, 2004c, p.137). As discussed in the last 
chapter, Lefebvre’s purpose in theorising space is to decipher how capitalism survived 
its internal contradictions through occupying and producing space (Elden, 2004c, 
p.236; Soja, 1980, p.214). His ‘grand project’ is ‘to discern the consequences of 
modernity in its late capitalist incarnation for the multiplicity of forms of social life 
and for (social) being itself’ (Aronowitz, 2007, p.134). In order words, the purpose of 
depicting the vertical complexity of space is to historicise the city, through which the 
dialectical movement of the mode of production can be explained.  
 
3.4.2  The Application of the Regressive-progressive Method  
 
While the methodological issues of the data collection techniques have been discussed 
above, below are the strategies that this study applied to describe, analyse and theorise 
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the production of space in Shanghai:  
 
Descriptive: The descriptive moment serves as the basis for analysing the social 
reality and theoretically explaining it. It involved different data collection techniques. 
As indicated above, semi-structured interviews were carried out with the inhabitants 
of Shanghai. Specific foci were addressed to understand their perception, experience 
and imagination of residing in Shanghai during the Shanghai Expo (horizontal 
complexity). Their urban experience is explored in Chapter Six. Also, the spatial 
arrangement of Shanghai is outlined in Chapter Five.  
 
Analytico-regressive: The second moment involved analysis of social reality 
(analytico), with reference to vertical complexity (regressive). In Chapter Four, the 
history of the urbanisation of Shanghai is periodised to briefly outline the changing 
modes of production and its influence on the present. Lefebvre’s theory of the 
production of space is applied to understand the political economy of the Shanghai 
Expo, as well as (the production of) social relations of production (by mainly referring 
to the secondary data analysis).  
 
Historico-genetic: The final moment concerned explanation. This study attempted to 
answer three questions (mode of production, urban experience and Chinese 
modernity). In Chapter Five, I postulated the current mode of production in Shanghai 
by relating it to a discussion of the history of Shanghai, spatial arrangement and the 
political economy of Shanghai Expo. Then, in Chapter Six I discussed how the daily 
life of the inhabitants was shaped by the transformation of urban space. In Chapter 
Seven, I concluded the thesis by a discussion on Chinese modernity, and evaluated the 
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applicability of Lefebvre’s theory in a non-Western context.  
 
3.5   Conclusion: A Dialectical Method Uniting Content and Form  
 
This chapter began with Lefebvre’s critique of formal logics, followed by a discussion 
of the regressive-progressive method as a dialectical method to unite content and form. 
Considering space as a concrete abstraction, Lefebvre argued that space was produced 
by, and manifested, the mode of production. In volume 1 of Critique of Everyday Life, 
Lefebvre further emphasised the importance of empirical studies of everyday life in 
Marxist analysis of political economy:  
 
The method of Marx and Engels consists precisely in a search for 
the link which exists between what men think, desire, say and 
believe for themselves and what they are, what they do. This link 
always exists. It can be explored in two directions. On the one 
hand, the historian or the man of action can proceed from ideas to 
men, from consciousness to being - i.e. towards practical, 
everyday reality - bringing the two into confrontation and thereby 
achieving criticism of ideas by action and realities …  
 
But it is equally possible to follow this link in another direction, 
taking real life as the point of departure in an investigation of how 
the ideas which express it and the forms of consciousness which 
reflect it emerge. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.145; original 
emphasis) 
 
Shanghai, and other regions of China, is under drastic transformation in its spatial 
arrangement, cultural practices and social relations, etc. in recent decades. By 
focusing on the secondary data about the Shanghai Expo, China’s political economy 
after 30 years of Reform is delineated. The mode of production of Shanghai was 
explored in Chapter Five, mainly exemplified by demarcating the organisation of the 
Shanghai Expo. During rapid urbanisation, the inhabitants also experienced 
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frustration, joy, boredom, anger, excitement or anxiety, etc. ‘Taking real life as the 
point of departure’, this study also aimed to contribute to the field of analysis by 
describing, analysing and explaining the urban experience of inhabitants. In Chapter 
Six, I explored the daily life of the inhabitants of Shanghai by engaging with a 
discussion of a new mode of production in the city. It is argued that a 
regressive-progressive method ‘helps us go forward and onward’ by ‘going backward’ 
(Merrifield, 2006, p.19). Therefore, before proceeding to the analysis of the spatial 
arrangement and daily life during the Shanghai Expo, the urbanisation history of 
Shanghai was periodised in Chapter Four, so as to serve as a background for relating 
social reality to history, (the analytico-regressive moment), thus examining how the 
‘sociological fossils’ are affecting the present.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A SPATIAL HISTORY OF SHANGHAI 
 
The ‘Chinese road’ testifies to a real concern to draw the people and space in its 
entirety into the process of building a different society. This process is conceived of as 
a multidimensional one, involving not only the production of wealth and economic 
growth but also the development and enrichment of social relationships – implying the 
production in space of a variety of goods as well as the production of space as a 
whole, the production of a space ever more effectively appropriated. The rift between 
strong and weak points would have no place in such a process. Uneven development 
would disappear or at least tend to disappear. This strategy means that political 
action will not result in the elevation of either the state or a political formation or 
party above society. This is the meaning generally given to the ‘cultural revolution.  
- Henri Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.421) 
 
 
Although the mode of production was agriculturally based, feudal China has a very 
long history of urbanisation. During the Shanghai Expo, the animated version of the 
Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival (Qingming Shanghe Tu), regarded as an 
‘Expo treasure’, was exhibited in the China Pavilion (CNTN, 2010). The Riverside 
Scene at the Qingming Festival is a Chinese scroll painting portraying the rich urban 
and commercial life of Bianjing (the capital of the North Song Dynasty) in the twelfth 
century. It depicted the urban landscape, commercial activities (e.g., ‘woodsmen 
leading donkeys carrying fuel to market’), the complicated market system (e.g., large 
and small enterprises, the use of the world’s first paper money), ‘many pleasures cities 
offered’ (e.g., ‘taverns, restaurants, stores …lively crowds’), as well as government 
control on business activities (e.g., officials closely monitored the business hours of 
the market) (Hansen, 1996, p.2). The animated version is a giant multi-projector 
display digitising the still painting and showing the urban life from morning to night 
(Pan, Liu and Li, 2007).  
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When compared with other ancient Chinese cities, the history of the urbanisation of 
Shanghai is relatively ‘short’. According to the Shanghai Municipality (2011b; 2011c), 
Shanghai as an administrative unit was established in the thirteenth century. Around 
that period of time, the population of Hangzhou (the capital of the South Song 
Dynasty) had already reached a million, which made it the world’s most populous city 
(Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.92). Shanghai then developed as a textile production 
centre and regional market town. However, Shanghai is regarded as the first modern 
city of China (Wang, 1997, p.89). Under the Treaty of Nanjing, Shanghai was ‘opened 
up’ for foreign trade in 1843. Since then, Western capitalism began to develop and 
became Shanghai an important treaty port and financial centre in Asia. The 
self-sustained economic system of China was then replaced by a treaty port system 
(Bergère, 2009, pp.15-18).  
 
In terms of city planning, infrastructure development, spatial arrangement, economic 
structure and urban culture, Shanghai developed in a different way from any 
‘traditional’ Chinese city (Yeh, 1997, p.378). Since much foreign thought, lifestyles, 
consumer products, as well as economic system were first introduced to China 
through Shanghai, the city has been regarded as ‘China’s gateway of modernity’, 
where ‘Chinese civilization and Western modernity took a pragmatic form’ (Bergère, 
2009, p.4). A travel guide in 1935 stated that: 
 
Shanghai, sixth city of the World!  
Shanghai, the Paris of the East!  
Shanghai, the New York of the West!  
Shanghai, the most cosmopolitan city in the world, the 
fishing village on a mudflat which almost literally overnight 
became a great metropolis. (The University Press, 1935, p.1) 
100 
 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, Shanghai experienced rapid changes in its mode of 
production – it became ‘the most cosmopolitan city in the world’ (ibid). The socialist 
revolution in 1949, however, caused drastic changes in both spatial practice and 
everyday life in urban areas of China. With negative views and hostility towards 
urban life, the Communist Party of China (CPC) applied the rural areas’ 
organisational forms and policies to urban areas (Whyte and Parish, 1984, p.15). 
Shanghai was ‘punished for its colonial and imperialist past, fell victim to a policy 
that curbed urban development while advocating industrialization’, and ‘entered a 
long period of disgrace’ until the Open Door Policy was implemented (Bergère, 2009, 
p.367).  
 
In this chapter, I will periodise the spatial history of Shanghai within a Lefebvrian 
framework. Lefebvre argued that whenever there was a change in the mode of 
production, new space would be produced upon the original social space. Under a 
new mode of production, new social relations would also be produced and the 
‘underpinning’ of such social relations is spatial (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.404). A 
particular mode of production would produce corresponding social relations, as well 
as a dialectical relationship between the planning of spatial arrangement (spatial 
practice), individual experience (representational space) and cultural representation 
(representations of space). A similar strategy is adopted in this chapter in order to 
examine the underpinning of the dialectical relationship between the mode of 
production and social relations.  
 
First, by applying this Lefebvrian analytical framework, the spatial history of 
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Shanghai will be periodised into a ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (cosmopolitan and 
national city), a ‘socialist reform era’ (socialist city) and a ‘post-socialist reform era’ 
(post-socialist/global city). This periodisation is based on the modes of production in 
Shanghai, which correspond to the periods from the late Qing Dynasty to the 
Republican era (1843-1949), then the socialist construction period after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (1949-1978), and finally the 
reform period (1978 to now). As it could be a thesis topic in itself, this chapter does 
not attempt to review a complete history of Shanghai. Thus, I will concentrate on 
addressing how spatial arrangement, urban experience, the daily life of the inhabitants 
and cultural representations changed with the alteration of the mode of production. In 
other words, this chapter outlines the political and cultural history of Shanghai by 
answering the following three questions within the Lefebvrian framework: How did 
the mode of production produce the specific spatial arrangements in Shanghai? How 
did the mode of production shape the daily life and experience of the inhabitants? 
How were these changes represented culturally?  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre proposed the regressive-progressive method 
to examine the vertical and horizontal complexities of space. It is a social-historical 
method investigating how new social space is built upon the existing one, and how 
previous modes of production still exert influence on social space today (Lefebvre, 
2003[1966], p.113). The second purpose of this chapter is to serve as the second 
moment of the regressive-progressive method (i.e. analytic-regressive moment) 
(2003[1953], p.117). By periodising the spatial history of Shanghai, this chapter 
provides a historical background of Shanghai to examine the vertical complexity of 
space. As I illustrate in detail in Chapters Five and Six, the capitalist past of the city 
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was reconstructed to provide an ideological justification for the reform policies of 
recent years. The inhabitants’ experience during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ 
was also re-imagined to construct the identity of local Shanghaiese today. The history 
of the urbanisation of Shanghai is therefore particularly pertinent in examining 
Shanghai’s contemporary production of space. As Lefebvre mainly referenced 
European examples, the applicability of his theory to a non-Western context will also 
be evaluated during the periodisation of Shanghai’s history of space. 
 
4.1   A Gateway to Modernity: 1843-1949 
 
On the 17th November, 1843, ‘Shanghai was formally opened to foreign trade’ 
(Wakeman and Yeh, 1992, p.1). Under the Treaty of Nanjing in 1843, the Qing 
Empire was forced by Great Britain to ‘open up’ Shanghai and another four cities for 
foreign trade and military presence. Since that time, Shanghai has quickly developed 
from a feudal town to a capitalist cosmopolitan city. In the 1920s, Shanghai was even 
praised as the ‘Paris of the Orient’ and the ‘New York of the West’ for its ‘vernacular’ 
urban landscape, importance in the global economy and cosmopolitanism (Lee, 1999a, 
p.37; Wasserstrom, 2009, p.129). The English writer, Aldous Huxley, travelled to 
Shanghai in 1926 and made the following comment about Shanghai:  
 
In no city, West and East, have I ever had such an impression of 
dense, rank, richly clotted life. (Huxley, 1926, p.271 cited Lu, 
1999, p.25).  
 
This section will outline Shanghai’s history of space between 1843 and 1949. During 
this period of time, Shanghai served as a ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial capitalist 
cosmopolitan city’ (during the late Qing Dynasty; 1843-1911), where Western 
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capitalism was introduced to China and established cultural exchanges and economic 
linkages with foreign countries. It then developed into a ‘nationalist city’ (during the 
Republican era; 1911-1949), where the Republican government hoped to establish 
national identity through the spatial transformation of Shanghai. However, this section 
will not provide a chronicle of Shanghai. My discussion will only focus on the 
emergence of Western capitalism in Shanghai and its impact on producing social 
space for the emergence of a new urban culture. By applying a Lefebvrian framework, 
I illustrate how the capitalist mode of production produced a new spatial arrangement 
to facilitate the growth of western capitalism in Shanghai, and how new social classes 
(e.g., capitalist, compradors, bourgeoisie and working class) and urban life emerged.  
 
4.1.1  From a Market Town to a Cosmopolitan City 
 
In feudal China, the economy was predominantly agriculturally-based. Cities mainly 
served as centres of political, commercial and cultural activities, usually located near 
farmlands or at the junction of rivers, so agrarian products could be exchanged and 
delivered more efficiently (Skinner, 1977, p.4). Taking advantage of its geographical 
location, Shanghai has functioned as a market town and port in the Jiangnan region 
(in eastern China) since the fifteenth century. Agricultural and craftsmen’s products 
(e.g., cotton, woven fabrics, silk) were delivered from the farms of Shanghai around 
the Yangtze River Delta to Suzhou through the rivers and extensive networks of 
canals (Bergère, 2009, pp.23-24).22 It has been argued that this waterway system is 
‘more efficient than those normally found in advanced premodern economies’ (Elvin, 
                                                      
22 Suzhou, a historical city about 110km away from Shanghai with travel time less than half an hour 
after a High Speed intercity railway was constructed, was once the agricultural and manufacturing 
centre (including silk and other craftsmen’s products) of imperial China. However, during the Taiping 
Rebellion the city was occupied and quite significantly destroyed, and Shanghai then overtook the 
leading role as a trading centre (Bergère, 2009, p.42). 
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1977, p.444), and therefore facilitated Shanghai to play an important role in the 
economy in the Jiangnan region. After the ‘opening up’ in 1843, Shanghai was 
transformed from a market town to a capitalist cosmopolitan city, and the economic 
composition, administration, polity and cultural practices of the city changed 
dramatically within decades.  
 
Shanghai was not the first Chinese city that ‘opened up’ to foreign trade. Before 
Shanghai, Guangzhou (the provincial capital of Guangdong in southern region) was 
‘opened up’ for foreign trade with the Europeans. The activities of foreigners in 
Guangzhou were restricted to designated areas, so that encounters and cultural 
exchanges with the Chinese were limited. Some foreigners were requested to live on 
the bank along the river outside the city centre (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.195). 
However, under Article 2 of the Treaty of Nanjing, ‘British subjects with their 
families and establishment, shall be allowed to reside … without molestation or 
restraint’ (Thomas, 2001, p.7), which guaranteed foreigners’ rights to live in Shanghai. 
The Intendant of Shanghai (Daotai; the head of local administration) hoped to 
segregate foreign communities from locals, and came up with the idea of a 
‘concession area’. In 1845, an agreement of Shanghai Land Regulations was reached 
between Daotai of Shanghai and the Consul of Britain to establish a British 
Concession Area (referred as the British Settlement) (Bergère, 2009, p.28; Wei, 1987, 
p.38). The United States and France also established their respective concession areas 
in 1846 and 1849 (Liang, 2010, p.11; Smith, 2011, p.236). The map below shows the 
locations of the concession areas and the original walled-city of Shanghai (‘the 
Chinese city’):  
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Figure 4.1: Sketch map of Shanghai (19th Century) 
 
 
Source: Halcombe (1896, p.9) cited Gamble (2003, p.3) 
 
Concessions were similar to colonies because the foreign settlements were assumed to 
have independence over public finance, law and order, education, healthcare and 
urban planning but not sovereignty. The extraterritorial rights of the foreign 
communities were formally recognised by the Qing government (Wei, 1987, p.6). 
Shanghai therefore was in a ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period during which the city 
was partly administered by the empire (the walled Chinese city) and partly by foreign 
countries (concession areas) (ibid, p.2).  
 
Concession areas formed a new space in Shanghai. All concession areas have now 
become the central districts of Shanghai, but these areas were ‘truly rural’ in the mid 
nineteenth century (Lu, 1999, p.26). For instance, the British Settlement was located 
at the north of the walled-city and along the bank of the Huangpu River, where a 
Shanghai-based English newspaper described it as ‘in the shape of sundry reed-beds, 
swamps, ponds and other malarious constituents’ (Wakeman and Yeh, 1992, p.1). 
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Different from the European experience that Lefebvre cited, new social space in 
Shanghai was not built upon the original space (the walled-city) but in the concession 
areas (a newly-produced urban space above farmland). As shown in Figure 3.1, the 
concession areas were located outside the walled-city of Shanghai, but its size 
expanded and quickly exceeded that of the walled-city (Gamble, 2003, p.3). During 
the Republican era, the walled-city accounted for only about one-twentieth of the 
city’s size. Rather than evolving from the existing space (the walled-city), modern 
Shanghai ‘did spring from obscure rural origins’ (Lu, 1999, p.26).  
 
From 1843 to the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), Shanghai underwent a 
transformation from a market town (for domestic trade; feudalism) to a capitalist 
cosmopolitan city (for regional and international trade; capitalism). The Chinese 
merchants could legally trade with foreigners, which meant China was integrated to 
the global economic system. A new treaty port system between China and European 
countries was established (Bergère, 2009, pp.15-18). At the beginning, tea, textile 
products and opium contributed to the majority of the trade volume but later extended 
to other manufactured products and other consumer goods such as cotton goods, soap 
and cigarettes (Thomas, 2001, pp.13-14). Foreign trade grew rapidly and Shanghai 
emerged as an important regional trade centre in Asia. For instance, the foreign ships 
entering the port increased from 44 in 1844 to 437 in 1855. The total value of the silk 
trade reached over US$20 million by the mid 1850s (Spence, 1999, p.162). The 
transaction volume of the gold market also ranked third in the world in the 1930s, 
second only to London and New York (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.273).  
 
With the growth of regional trade, a financial system also gradually emerged in 
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Shanghai that was a pioneer in the country. Sectors, including banking, insurance, 
accountancy and legal services began to grow, and Shanghai’s first share market was 
established in 1866 in the International Settlement (Thomas, 2001, p.92). During the 
early stage, the stock market was dominated by foreign companies, but these later 
were surpassed by Chinese companies (most were privately-owned). In 1920, 
Shanghai’s Stock Exchange was established with the growing share of Chinese 
companies in the economy (Bergère, 2009, p.151). By the 1930s, Shanghai became 
the third largest financial centre and the sixth largest city in the world. In order to 
facilitate the development of the financial system, new laws and regulations relating 
to the financial system were established in the concession areas. This strengthened the 
role of Shanghai as a financial centre and also distinguished Shanghai from the rest of 
the country. Hence, a modern capitalist system began to develop in Shanghai during 
the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (ibid, see Chapter 3).  
 
4.1.2  Spatial Practice: The World Expo of Architectures  
 
Lefebvre’s discussion on colonialism is mainly found in the book series De l'État, 
which is ‘a little discussed aspect’ of his work (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). 
Lefebvre argued that colonisation is an aspect of the urbanisation of the production of 
space through which ‘the new political organization of territorial relations’ is 
produced (ibid). As discussed in Chapter Three, he regarded urbanisation as the 
process of marginalising the working class (the subordinate class) from the city centre 
to the periphery (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.14). Similarly, colonialisation also 
produced a new centre-periphery relation between the coloniser and the colonised. 
The coloniser exerted domination over the territory of the colony, and the space 
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related to the new political order and economic logics became the new centre (Kipfer 
and Goonewardena, 2007). In The Production of Space, Lefebvre commented on the 
impact of colonialism on the spatial arrangement of Spanish-American towns (refer to 
Figure 3.1):  
 
Their urban space, which was instrumental in this larger 
production process, has continued to be produced despite the 
vicissitudes of imperialism, independence and industrialization. It 
is an urban space especially appropriate for study in that the 
colonial towns of Latin America were founded at the time of the 
Renaissance in Europe – that is to say, at a time when the study of 
the ancient world, and of the history, constitution, architecture and 
planning of its cities, was being resumed. The Spanish-American 
town was typically built according to a plan laid down on the 
basis of standing orders, according to the veritable code of urban 
space constituted by the Orders for Discovery and Settlement, a 
collection, published in 1573, of official instructions issued to 
founders of towns from 1513 on. These instructions were 
arranged under the three heads of discovery, settlement and 
pacification. The very building of the towns thus embodied a plan 
which would determine the mode of occupation of the territory 
and define how it was to be reorganized under the administrative 
and political authority of urban power. (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], 
p.151) 
 
Since the colonial powers conceived Shanghai as their settlement rather than a ‘rented’ 
space, similarly, they planned to transform the concession areas into a European 
modern city (representation of space) (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.238). Alongside 
Western architecture, different kinds of ‘modern facilities’ were also imported into the 
concession areas before other regions of the country. Between the mid-nineteenth 
century and the 1910s, Western style streets, gaslights, electricity, telephones, running 
water system, automobiles, and trams were introduced to the concession areas (Lee, 
1999a, p.77). A racecourse was also built in 1848 at the centre of the International 
Settlement to provide entertainment, and more importantly for social occasions for the 
foreign community (Smith, 2011, p.236). A travel guide published in 1904 even 
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proclaimed that it is ‘quite possible for the traveller to visit all the places and see all 
the sights mentioned in these pages [i.e. this travel guide] without knowing a word of 
Chinese’ (Darwent, 1904, p.i).  
 
Alongside the transformation of political power, the capitalist mode of production 
also facilitated the production of new social space. Since opening up as a treaty port, 
trade was no longer limited to regional areas within the country (e.g., Jiangnan) but 
extended to foreigners under the treaty system. Located at the mouth of the Yangtze 
River, Shanghai was geographically more convenient than Suzhou for international 
trade and replaced the latter as the most important regional trading port with overseas 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Liang, 2010, p.113). The Bund, at the 
waterfront of Puxi (west bank of the Huangpu River) near Suzhou Creek remains the 
most potent symbol of Shanghai’s global economic status (representational space). 
With the presence of buildings with western architectural styles, the Bund was 
referred to as the ‘Ten-mile-long foreign zone’ (shili yanchang) which ‘marked the 
hegemonic presence of foreign powers’ (Lee, 1999b, pp.8, 32).  
 
However, the iconic skyline of the Bund was not originally part of the plan of the 
colonial powers. When the British Settlement was established, the Bund was not the 
primary focus of urban development and only the consulate and a few western 
residential houses were built there. The Bund mainly served as the port for loading 
goods between China and the Far East (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.238). With the 
growth of foreign trade and the financial sector, there was increased demand for office 
space and new buildings (with Western architectural styles) in the Bund. Only after 
the headquarters of the trading companies were built and became the centre of 
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commercial activities, the British began to have more comprehensive planning on that 
area (Wu, 2008, p.17). In 1863, the British Concessions and the American 
Concessions were combined to establish the International Settlement. The Bund 
further developed as a commercial and residential area, as well as a political centre 
under imperialism. Alongside the facilities for the reception of trade goods, the 
headquarters of foreign and nationalist banks, ‘hongs’ (foreign trading companies), 
accountancy firms, hotels and embassies were also located at the Bund 
(Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.238). The Customs House, the office of the Chinese 
Maritime Customs Service, was also located at the Bund (Bergère, 2009, p.246).  
 
The Bund became the new spatial centre under colonialisation. Rather than simply 
being produced by colonialisation, the Bund, as an iconic space, was created by the 
role of Shanghai as a leading trading centre between China and the international 
market. Although Lefebvre argued that the production of the colonial town was ‘by 
political power – that is, by violence in the service of economic goals’ (1991[1974], 
pp.151-152), in terms of urban development, the transformation in Shanghai produced 
a much more hybrid social space that Lefebvre’s theory would predict. Leo Lee 
commented that:  
 
… by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Shanghai 
concessions already had the infrastructure of a modern city even 
by Western standards. By the 1930s, Shanghai was on a par with 
the major cities of the world. (Lee, 1999b, p.6) 
 
Lefebvre argued that ‘each mode of production has its own particular space; the shift 
from one mode to another must entail the production of a new space’ (1991[1974], 
p.46). During the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, the space of feudal China and 
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colonial power coexisted in Shanghai. On the one hand, buildings with different 
architectural styles, such as baroque, Roman Classic, Renaissance, art deco and 
contemporary design, were found along the Bund (Bergère, 2009, p.246; Lu, 1999, 
p.110). These concrete structures with marble and metal established the modernist 
skyline of Shanghai by the 1930s (Rowe and Kuan, 2002, pp.57-58). Therefore, the 
Bund is also referred to as the ‘World Expo of Architectures’ (wangguo jianzhu 
bolang) (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.197), which is the physical symbol of the presence 
of colonial power, as well as the emergence of western capitalism in Shanghai. On the 
other hand, Shanghai was also regarded as ‘a museum of global architecture’. 
Alongside new buildings with Western, Japanese or Islamic architectural styles, the 
city’s urban landscapes were also dominated by the presence of linong and the 
shantytown (Lu, 1999, p.110). The space of colonialism and feudalism produced a 
sharp contrast, which showed ‘the hegemony of the West’ and the distinctive status of 
Shanghai as a city being ‘free from the control of a debilitated and inefficient agrarian 
bureaucratic state’ (Abbas, 2002, p.42). 
 
4.1.3  The Emergence of New Social Classes  
 
With a new mode of production, Lefebvre predicted that new social relations would 
be established (1971[1968], p.58). From the establishment of a concession in late 
Qing Dynasty, new space (concession areas) was produced with the emergence of a 
new mode of production (from feudalism to capitalism) in Shanghai. New social 
relations were established with the transformation from feudalism to capitalism, and 
new social classes further transformed the city.  
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It is observed that an early form of capitalism emerged in urban China around the 
eleventh Century (the Song Dynasty), which was depicted in the scroll painting 
Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival (Hansen, 1996, p.2). However, commerce 
was deliberately inhibited by the feudal state after the Song Dynasty to restrain the 
political potential of businessmen (Huang, 1987, see Preface). In The Religion of 
China: Confucianism and Taoism (1951[1920]), Max Weber identified the factors 
favouring and inhibiting the development of capitalism China. Even though there 
were favourable factors like a general peaceful social environment, effective control 
over rivers to reduce flooding, the socio-political environment of China constrained 
the development of capitalism (Bendix, 1977, pp.103-104). Without a religious 
organisation with strong binding power (comparing to Christianity in Europe), the 
emperor and statesmen upheld a supreme power of the empire. He used the terms 
‘patrimonialism’ and ‘officialdom’ to describe it a centralised bureaucracy of the 
Chinese empire, and argued that it inhibited individual autonomy and the 
development of commercial associations (Ritzer, 1992, pp.132-133). Weber also 
pointed out that cities in ancient China were not political and socially independent 
from rural areas. The inhabitants in urban areas maintained a strong tie with the 
relatives in the rural areas, so that ‘the fetters of the kinship group were never 
shattered’ (Weber, 1951[1920], p.14 cited Bendix, 1977, p.100). As cities were the 
political and administrative centres of the empire, it further reduced the possibility of 
developing an autonomous business group there. The state therefore maintained its 
ultimate control over the country and sustained feudalism. Even though Chinese cities 
had a rich history of urban and commercial activities, capitalism did not further 
develop.  
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However, Western capitalism began to develop in Shanghai since it was ‘opened up’. 
The emergence of treaty port trade between China and the West in the late nineteenth 
century produced a new social group called the comprador (maiban; also found in 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong). With their understanding of Western culture and foreign 
language(s), compradors acted as agents between Chinese and foreign merchants 
(usually on behalf of ‘hong’ or local banks), sometimes also participating in 
negotiations between governments, at the initial stage of foreign trade (Yeh, 2007, 
p.13). However, the compradors represented just a very small group of new rich, and 
most disappeared with the opening up of world trade after the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (Hao, 1970, p.62).  
 
Between the establishment of the Republic of China and the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (1912-1937), Shanghai entered a golden age of capitalism and a new group of 
elites emerged (Bergère, 2009, see Chapter 7; Yeh, 2007, see Chapter 2). The elites 
included the entrepreneurs who owned factories, department stores, banks, etc. Unlike 
the urban notables (shenshang) in feudal China, these new entrepreneurs distanced 
themselves from authority. They played a key role in introducing Western technology 
and management culture to China, as well as sustaining economic growth without the 
presence of an effective government (Bergère, 2009, pp.155, 158-159).  
 
Alongside the entrepreneurs, the development of capitalism produced an urban middle 
class, or the petty urbanite, which included professionals like lawyers, brokers, 
bankers and accountants, who were involved in the capitalist economy (Yeh, 2007, 
p.30). With their consumption power and cultural display, the Chinese bourgeoisie 
produced a new social space, including cafés, dance halls, cinemas, department stores, 
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etc that created new social lives among the rich and cultural elites (Lee, 1999b, p.38). 
Last but not least, a working class was also produced with the establishment of 
factories, shipyards and workshops in Shanghai. The number of people working in 
these sectors increased from about 37,000 in 1895 to about 150,000 in 1911 (Bergère, 
2009, p.103). The working class then became the basis for a labour movement in the 
city (Yeh, 2007, p.3).  
 
4.1.4  The Emergence of a New Urban Culture  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that urban experience is constructed by 
both social space and social time (1988, p.80). For instance, alongside spatial 
rearrangement, the social clock of the inhabitants was also altered by the introduction 
of western capitalism in Shanghai in the late nineteenth century. As Wen-hsin Yeh 
(1995, p.99) noted, ‘Shanghai was a place where mechanical timepieces of European 
origin achieved prominence in public space’, the clocks ‘not only made a necessity of 
the habits of punctuality but also turned standardized measurements of time into basic 
units in the structure of everyday life’. In the International Settlement, the ‘clock was 
omnipresent’ (Bergère, 2009, pp.261-262). The clock at the Customs House ensured 
that the employees could strictly follow office hours.  
 
Alongside office buildings, the capitalist mode of production also transformed the 
everyday life of the inhabitants of Shanghai by producing new social spaces, 
including department stores, cinemas and dance halls. Briefly referring to Lefebvre’s 
contribution to the discussion about everyday life, Lee commented that:  
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The problem of everyday life has received considerable 
theoretical attention in the field of cultural studies, because, 
among other reasons, it addressed directly the problematic of the 
(Western) culture of modernity and postmodernity … in the 
Chinese context of the early twentieth century, the theme had 
gradually become an ‘imagined reality’ as created by print media. 
The everyday life depicted therein was modern and urban, no 
longer seen as traditional and unchanging. When we look in to the 
basic content of such a new form of everyday life, we realize that 
it is very much structured and governed by a semiotic of material 
culture. The contours of such a material world can be detected, 
again, in the advertisement and magazine. (Lee, 1999b, p.74) 
 
The presence of new social space, such as department stores, cafés, cinemas and 
dance halls, which celebrate individual lifestyle, leisure and consumption, was 
successfully introduced into Shanghai as a result of the new economic logic. These 
social spaces were then crucial in shaping the experience of individuals through the 
representation of space. The emergence of urban culture was celebrated by a ‘new 
literature’ (including magazines and novels) and movies, with most leading cultural 
elites at that time living in Shanghai. Such a representational space has narrated and 
aestheticised urban spatial practice and further facilitated its development. For 
instance, Lin Wei-yin, a Shanghai-based famous script-writer working in the banking 
industry in the 1930s, is among the best writers providing a sensitive depiction of the 
life of ‘leisure class’ (Chen, 2009, p.66). Lin illustrated the combination of Chinese 
and Western lifestyles, such as Chinese casinos, French barracks and western style 
cake shops, located on Avenue Joffre (located at the French Concession, the French 
name of the street Xia Fei Lu). The rich and cultural elites could also enjoy night life 
on the Avenue. This Shanghaiese writer once wrote:  
 
After watching a movie, or after the cafés are closed at two 
o’clock, if you still want to go somewhere, you could go to Black 
Eye. At Black Eye you could stay till sunrise. You could feel free 
to have any drinks, listen to wild music. If you want to dance, 
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there are Russian and Gypsy mistresses waiting for your 
invitation. You can feel free to choose anyone you like. Then, she 
is yours for the whole night, if you do not leave for the whole 
night. (Lin, 1996[1935], p.142) 
 
Urban culture emerged with the production of new social space. In literature, 
illustrations and moving pictures, Shanghai was portrayed as a cosmopolitan Chinese 
society with a significant presence of foreign communities, where extravagant 
businessmen, petty bourgeoisie and diplomats enjoyed themselves in dance halls, and 
elegant and educated intellectuals wandered in Western-styled streets with Western 
parasol trees on both sides. Chinese women wearing a qipao, a close-fitting 
Chinese-styled dress with side vents, in particular, is the typical representation of such 
a new urban culture. Cosmopolitanism, as opposite to the traditional inward-looking 
view of Chinese culture, was also a feature of Shanghai, contributing to the 
emergence of China’s modernity (Lee, 1999b, p.315). 
 
The publishing industry burgeoned in Shanghai amid the peak of urban culture that 
Shanghaiese writers constructed within the context of a new urban lifestyle in 
cosmopolitan Shanghai. Alongside literature, publications on Western and Japanese 
thinking and modern literature also circulated in Shanghai. Fuzhou Road in the 
International Settlement, which is just next to the commercial street, Nanjing Road, 
was the national publishing centre where key publishing houses were located. For 
instance, more than a hundred books on science and technology were translated into 
Chinese in late the nineteenth century (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.218). Lee 
(1999b, see Chapter 4) has outlined how the publishers consciously introduced 
foreign intellectual thinkers alongside promoting urban culture. New ideas from 
Europe, the United States and Japan, such as socialism, social Darwinism and 
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Romanticism were translated and published. These publications were part of a process 
of cultural modernisation in China which accompanied the development of science 
and technology.  
 
In short, from the late Qing to the Republican era, Shanghai served as the capital of 
modernity for China in three aspects. Economically, capitalism encouraged individual 
investment and state-led industrialisation, such that a new mode of production began 
to grow. For instance, although the customs revenue of the Qing government was 
managed by the British in the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, Chinese employees 
made use of the chance to acquire modern knowledge from Westerners (Chang, 2013, 
see Chapter 3). The concept of modernity also entailed adapting a model of 
technological advancement from Western civilisation. Another aspect is the 
cosmopolitan outlook that contrasts with the traditional Chinese worldview. In 
Chapter Seven, I further discuss the role of Shanghai in the modernisation and 
modernity in China. Lastly, on a cultural level, Shanghai introduced new urban 
lifestyles into China, which advocated leisure, foreign cultures, extravagance, 
individual expression and cosmopolitanism rather than labour, tradition, prudence and 
an inward-looking perspective. 
 
4.1.5  Contradictions in the Capitalist City  
 
Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.86) argued that the city provides the social space for 
antagonistic classes to exist together and facilitates the development of a 
corresponding mode of production. So, who were the dominant and subordinate 
classes in Shanghai during the semi-feudal/semi-colonial era? Foreigners and Chinese 
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were the obvious pair, through whom social, economic and political contradictions 
were exhibited and imagined through space. After the Shanghai Land Regulations 
were enacted, Chinese people were prohibited from entering the concession areas, to 
avoid cultural encounters with foreigners. However, the walled-city of Shanghai was 
occupied by the rebel group, Small Swords (Xiaodaohui), in 1853 (Bergère, 2009, 
p.37). Within 17 months, the population declined from around 300,000 to around 
30,000, with most of the residents fleeing to the concession areas or outside Shanghai 
(Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.61). The colonial powers allowed the ‘refugees’ to enter the 
concession areas by amending the Shanghai Land Regulations in 1854 without the 
prior consent of the feudal administration (ibid, p.62). The motive was not 
humanitarian or political but economic: the huge influx of people had created a major 
housing demand (Smith, 2011, pp.250-252). Hence, businessmen in the French 
Concession constructed a new kind of housing built on a narrow lane, linong (or 
longtang), for sale to the Chinese:  
 
The urban form itself, comprising single dwelling units, had a 
number of variants based on the European row house, and placed 
in a parallel format similar to the nineteenth century’s housing in 
the industrial cities of England, but with consistent southern 
orientation for all main rooms. The houses themselves represent a 
traditional characteristic of the Chinese dwelling as a private 
walled enclosure with an internalised courtyard … In many cases 
the external street frontages were designated for commercial uses, 
effectively enclosing the residential blocks and incorporated 
gateway access to the lanes behind. (Smith, 2011, pp.250-251) 
 
The linongs were usually gated by a stone-wrapping gate, or shikumen, which also 
became a distinctive architectural style of Shanghai (Pan, 2008, p.216). As I discuss in 
Chapter Six, linong, as a Western-style of building for Chinese ‘refugees’, ironically 
is currently regarded as the origin of indigenous Shanghaiese identity. The property 
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market developed quickly and further speeded up the growth of capitalism (Bergère, 
2009, p.58). In the 1900s, the distinction in daily life between locals and foreign 
communities became ‘increasingly blurred’ (Wasserstrom, 2009, p.72). Lefebvre 
pointed out that ‘[d]ominated space is usually closed, sterilized, emptied out’ 
(1991[1974], p.165). Even though the borderline between the walled-city and the 
concession areas became less rigid, Chinese people were still separated from foreign 
communities in some designated places within the concession areas. A typical 
example is the Public Garden in the French Concession, the first garden open to the 
‘public’ in China, which was restricted to the foreign community. Though the sign at 
the gate did not display the phrase ‘Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted’ at any time, such 
spatial segregation was generally symbolised as colonial invasion and discrimination 
(Bickers and Wasserstrom, 1995, pp.450-451). Discrimination also existed in the 
racecourse in the International Settlement where Chinese was not allowed to enter 
(except grooms and servants) (Xiong, 2007, pp.106-107) 
 
Despite discrimination, the population expanded with the further influx of migrants 
and capital which speeded up the development of capitalism in Shanghai. Social 
problems including crime, gambling, mafia presence and prostitution also became 
increasingly serious (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.313-321). For instance, about one in 
thirty residents ‘sold sex for a living’ (Wakeman and Yeh, 1992, p.7). While foreigners 
and Chinese existed within contradictory relations, the Chinese in Shanghai could be 
further divided into another contradictory pair – the bourgeoisie and working class – 
during the golden age of capitalism in the 1920s and the 1930s. When Shanghai 
industrialised, it gradually produced a working class mainly constituted by the 
Chinese migrants from outside Shanghai. While the bourgeoisie enjoyed a 
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splendorous modern lifestyle, the working class lived in linong with poor living 
conditions and suffered exploitation in the factories (Bergère, 2009, p.103).  
 
Lefebvre would most probably not be surprised that the CPC was officially 
established in Shanghai (in the French Concession), because only in a capitalist city 
could the bourgeoisie and the working class exist together. Marie-Claire Bergère 
(2009, p.5) argued that Shanghai is ‘the most ‘foreign’ of all Chinese towns, but also 
the one where nationalist awareness and revolution involving the mobilization of the 
masses first developed. Alongside industrial strikes (e.g., 30 May Incident in 1925), 
Shanghai became the centre of the political activities of the CPC and the 
dissemination of new ideas (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.235-240). It is observed that 
Shanghai experienced ‘one of the most aggressive labour movements in world history’ 
(Perry, 1994, p.1).  
 
4.1.6  Industrialisation and the Nationalist City  
 
Different from colonies such as Hong Kong, where cultural encounters and foreign 
trade were also significant, Shanghai was a ‘semi-feudal/semi-colonial’ cosmopolitan 
city where the Chinese government (the Qing Empire or the Republican government) 
sustained its sovereignty. Shanghai exhibited such a complicated character because of 
the coexistence of the spaces for feudalism, colonialism, and capitalism, as well as 
nationalism (Lee, 1999a, pp.101-102). In Shanghai, the Chinese government and 
colonial powers co-existed, where the Chinese government maintained partial the 
control of the city and was not isolated from the development of the city. The 
economy was also mainly dominated by the Chinese (Murphey, 1953, p.24). Even 
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though the Chinese and foreigners existed within contradictory relations, both 
facilitated the transformation of the city. On the one hand, Shanghai was regarded by 
the colonisers as a stepping stone for colonial expansion and exploration of new 
markets in China. On the other hand, the Chinese government carried out reform 
measures in Shanghai to explore the Chinese road to modernisation.  
 
Alongside the development of the financial sector, Shanghai also underwent a period 
of industrialisation. Both light (e.g., textile manufacturing) and heavy industries (e.g., 
mining) were introduced. Industrialisation was firstly led by the private sector, but 
later the national experiment of modernisation was implemented mainly by the 
government. During the period of the Restoration of the 1860s, the feudal state carried 
out a range of reforms for national revitalisation, with industrialisation and 
modernisation of the military force as the main goals (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, 
p.212). For instance, the Jiangnan Machinery Manufacture Arsenal, the China 
Merchant Steam Navigation Company and the Shanghai Machine Weaving Plant were 
established in Shanghai to promote state-led industrialisation (Xu, 2001, pp.27-28).23 
Capitalists also played a significant role in industrialisation by opening up factories. 
Since industrialisation was regarded as a solution of ‘rescuing the country’, the 
emergence of the capitalist class neither received strong suppression from the feudal 
state capitalists nor built up contradictory relations with the working class.  
 
In 1911, the feudal empire (Qing Dynasty) was overthrown by Kuomintang (the 
Nationalist Party). The Republic of China was established. Although Shanghai was 
still a semi-colonial city, it was in transition from a feudal society to a capitalist 
                                                      
23 The office of the Jiang Nan Machinery Manufacture Arsenal is located now in the Expo site. The 
organiser of the Shanghai Expo has built a pavilion, and will turn it into a museum, to consciously 
write it as an official record and construct a historical legacy of the event (Gu, 2006). 
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modern city. A capitalist mode of production continued to develop, but the roles of the 
state and capitalists changed as Shanghai entered another phase of history of space as 
a ‘nationalist city’. The nationalist government envisioned Shanghai as the symbol of 
national development and against colonial powers (representation of space). 
Concerning the spatial arrangement of the city, between the 1920s and the 1930s, the 
Republican Shanghai government launched a ‘Greater Shanghai Plan’. Large scale 
infrastructure (re)constructions including public facilities and new roads were built in 
Wu Jiao Chang, the northern region at the creek of the Suzhou River where colonial 
powers exerted no significant influence, to compete with the concession areas and 
rebuild national pride (Wu, 2008, pp.164-165).  
 
In 1937, Japan launched an invasion in China. The ‘Greater Shanghai Plan’ and the 
blossoming of the urban culture were brought to an end by the Second Sino-Japanese 
and Chinese Civil War between 1945 and 1949 (Lee, 1999b, p.106). However, 
because of the ambiguous stance of the colonial powers, the concession areas 
maintained ‘independence’ before they were occupied by Japanese troops in 1941. 
Indeed refugees and capital were moved in from other regions during this ‘isolated 
island period’ (gudao shiqi) and economic activities became even more expansive. 
For instance, the annual turnover of real estate business rose from 12 million yuan (in 
fabi; Fiat Money issued by the Nationalist government) in 1938 to 55 million in 1939 
and 100 million in 1940 (Ji, 2003, p.205). New banks and financial institutions were 
established resulting from economic growth. People in Shanghai enjoyed an 
‘extravagant and dissipated life’ (zhizui jinmi), when the country was war-torn. 
Capitalists no longer played a role in national revitalisation but became purely 
profit-oriented. Capitalists lost their legitimacy and established contradictory relations 
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with the working class and provided the background for the emergence of the socialist 
movement in Shanghai (Yeh, 2007, p.3).  
 
Economic activities essentially stopped with the Japanese occupation in 1941. After 
the end of the second Sino-Japanese War, inflation became a serious problem across 
the country. In Shanghai alone there were 1,600 factories closed down and 300,000 
workers unemployed in 1946 (Wu, 2003, p.1682). The stock market was also closed. 
The entrepreneurs fled to Hong Kong or overseas to escape from collectivisation 
under the socialist regime. Hence, urban culture, entrepreneurship and 
cosmopolitanism were brought to a temporary halt. Shanghai then entered ‘a long 
period of disgrace’ during which it was ‘punished for its colonial and imperialist past’ 
(Bergère, 2009, p.367).  
 
4.2   The Aversion of Urban Culture: 1949-1978 
 
The People’s Liberation Army gained control of Shanghai a few months before the 
People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949. On the 27th May, 1949 
‘Shanghai was liberated’ (Huang, 2008, p.2) and entered the ‘socialist reform era’. 
With the immense fear over the CPC, many businessmen fled to Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, taking with them capital, machinery, skills and talent. Most foreigners, 
including diplomats, businessmen and missionaries, also left the city (Bergère, 2009, 
p.347).  
 
As Lefebvre noted, ‘Marxist-Leninist thought in China denounced the city as a centre 
of despotic power (which is not without an element of truth)’ (2003[1970], p.112). In 
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1939, Mao Zedong collaborated with other comrades and wrote The Chinese 
Revolution and the Chinese Community Party (1939) to illustrate the major objectives 
of the socialist revolution in China. It has been argued that the condition of Chinese 
society at that time was ‘colonial, semi-colonial, semi-feudal’, the ‘chief targets or 
enemies’ of the revolution were therefore ‘imperialism and feudalism, the bourgeoisie 
of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country’ (Mao, 1939). 
Shanghai was denounced as ‘a centre of despotic power’ because of the presence of 
the ‘chief targets or enemies’ (ibid). As Mao noted:  
 
Since China’s key cities have long been occupied by the powerful 
imperialist and their reactionary Chinese allies, it is imperative for 
the revolutionary ranks to turn the backward villages into 
advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, 
economic and cultural bastions … victory in the Chinese 
revolution can be won first in the rural areas and this is possible 
because China’s economic development is uneven (her economy 
not being a unified capitalist economy), because her territory is 
extensive (which gives the revolutionary forces room to 
manoeuvre) … Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the necessity of 
using rural districts as revolutionary base areas, to neglect 
painstaking work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla 
warfare. (Mao, 1939)  
 
With its history as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial cosmopolitan city, Shanghai was 
therefore regarded by the socialist regime as the centre of corruption and as parasitic 
on the rest of the country. The development of urban culture in Shanghai was brought 
to an end by the regime, and was planned to be transformed from a 
‘foreigner-dominated city’ to a ‘truly prosperous new people’s city’ (Fung, 1981, 
p.280). In the following section, my discussion is focused on how the capitalist 
cosmopolitan city was transformed by the state to become a socialist industrial city, 
and how the urban life of Shanghai inhabitants was reorganised by the state.  
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4.2.1  The Production of Socialist Space  
 
Even though Shanghai was the most developed city in China, the urban development 
of Beijing as the capital city became more important during the early phase of the 
socialist regime. While various iconic buildings were built in Beijing (the capital of 
feudalism) to construct a new ‘socialist space’, urban development in Shanghai (the 
capital of capitalism) was limited. Until the Reform, ‘Shanghai was never allowed to 
transform its physical surroundings’ (Lee, 1999a, p.106). The state planned to 
transform Shanghai from a consumption city to a production city, through the 
implementation of the housing registration system, allocation of material resources 
and restraining the supply of consumer goods (including housing), etc. (Wu, 2003, 
p.1683). During the phase of the ‘socialist city’, Shanghai experienced a rapid period 
of state-led industrialisation and collectivisation during which the development of 
cosmopolitan urban culture was brought to an abrupt halt (Abbas, 2000, p.776).  
 
Since 1953 under the First Five-Year Plan, with the participation of Russian experts, 
the socialist government adopted the Soviet Union model of state-led industrialisation 
for economic growth, with the purpose of converting cities from consumption centres 
to production centres (Bergère, 2009, p.173) and centralising industrialisation in key 
cities (Rowe, 2004, p.274). Production (including the means of production and variety 
of products) and resources allocation (e.g., raw resources, labour and consumer goods) 
were controlled by the Party-State. Shanghai was chosen as the key-point city in the 
First Five Year Plan (Fung, 1981, p.280). Individual property was nationalised or 
collectivised. Virtually all kinds of communication with the ‘outside world’ were 
banned under the socialist regime. By the early 1950s, most foreign companies in 
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Shanghai had been nationalised or closed down (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.505-506). 
In other words, under the socialist mode of production, China became separated from 
the economic system of the capitalist world. With the decline in foreign trade, 
financial activities and the absence of a foreign community, Shanghai’s role as a 
capitalist cosmopolitan city could no longer be performed.  
 
From the perspective of policy makers, the transformation of Shanghai from a 
regional financial centre (a capitalist city) to a socialist industrial production centre 
was successful. Heavy industries such as steel production and the manufacturing 
sector grew rapidly. Between 1952 and 1978, the contribution to GDP of tertiary 
industry reduced from 41.7% to 18.6%, while that of secondary industry increased 
from 52.4% to 77.4% (Xu, 2008, p.6). Only between 1957 and 1958, the number of 
workers employed in heavy industry sharply increase from 4.5 million to 17.5 million 
(Bergère, 2009, p.369). During the 1970s, Shanghai contributed one-seventh of 
national industrial output and about a quarter to one-sixth of national fiscal revenue 
(Huang, 2008, p.4).  
 
Under the new mode of production, new social space was produced. Unlike Beijing, 
new space was not produced in Shanghai through large-scale constructions but mainly 
by transforming the usage of the dominant space of the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial 
era’. For instance, Western style architecture on the Bund, the icon of foreign 
occupation and regional trade, was confiscated for government use. From the 1950s to 
the 1970s, no new buildings were completed on the Bund. It is reported that there was 
a plan to destroy the buildings at the Bund during the ‘Cultural Revolution’, but it was 
prevented by Zhou Enlai (Smith, 2011, p.267). While the absence of urban 
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development and urban renewal symbolised the representation of space during this 
mode of production, the Renmin Park and the People’s Square, both adjacent to the 
pedestrian street, Nanjing Road, were the few exceptions of a large-scale development 
plan for producing ‘socialist space’. Before their construction, the land was occupied 
by the racecourse – the social space of foreign communities in the concession areas. 
In 1951, the racecourse was demolished and transformed into the People’s Square, for 
political gatherings like Tiananmen Square (Smith, 2011, p.268). Another example 
was the construction of the China-Russia Friendship Building at the Jingan District, as 
a symbol of socialism. Alongside this, the streets were also renamed to eradicate 
colonial connotations. For instance, the Bund, Avenue Joffre and Edinburgh Road 
were renamed to Sun Yat-sen Avenue, Huaihai Street and Jiangsu Road respectively 
(Bergère, 2009, pp.377-378; Wei, 1987, p.91).  
 
The socialist economy emphasised planning by the state and such an idea is also 
reflected in the pattern of urban development. Agglomeration, integration or grouping 
towns nearby to major cities was practised for the expansion of socialist cities in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries to facilitate industrial 
expansion (French and Hamilton, 1979, pp.9-12). Factors such as history, 
geographical location, existing economic structure and built infrastructure influenced 
the degree of agglomeration and urbanisation. Yet the presence of strong state 
intervention on economic structure and social and spatial development was one of the 
key features of the socialist city. A similar strategy was practised in Shanghai. With 
the participation of Russian experts, about ten counties of the Jiangsu Province were 
merged administratively into the Shanghai municipality (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, 
p.532).  
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4.2.2  Industrialisation without Urbanisation  
 
Massive industrialisation and expansion of the administration area of the Shanghai 
Municipality, however, did not bring about large-scale urbanisation or significant 
change in the urban landscape of ‘old Shanghai’ (the walled city and the concession 
areas). Shanghai experienced the slowest rate of construction and urban renewal in 
China from the 1950s to the 1970s with living conditions declining (Xiong and Zhou, 
2007 pp.554-555). Firstly, despite massive industrialisation, the spatial arrangement 
of Shanghai remained more or less unchanged. The huge influx of migrant workers 
created a housing problem. New building blocks called worker estates (gongren 
xinchuen) were built for migrant workers; although they were developed mainly 
outside of the city centre or in Pudong, they became the dominant form of urban 
architectural space (Bergère, 2009, p.379). Migrants were either distributed to the 
newly-built worker estates or instructed to share homes with local residents by the 
state. Together with the danwei system, these arrangements invaded the social space 
of the Shanghaiese and created a lot of social problems (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, 
p.555).  
 
Secondly, social space, such as cafés and cinemas that facilitated the growth of urban 
culture in the 1920s and the 1930s was converted for other purposes. For instance, 
prostitutes, once regarded as the symbol of the cosmopolitan city (Yeh, 2006, see 
Chapter 7), received brutal prosecution. Casinos, dance hall and opium dens were also 
banned (Bergère, 2009, p.347). Hollywood movies and national productions 
celebrating capitalism, individualism, consumption and Western lifestyles were 
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restricted. People were directed to cinemas to watch ‘revolutionary movies’ that 
glorified the party, leaders, labour, egalitarianism, class struggle and industrial 
modernisation. Publications, movies and cultural performances were also closely 
monitored; any deviation from official doctrines was banned and very often publicly 
criticised (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, pp.525-529). Shanghai could no longer play the 
role of introducing foreign ideas and lifestyles. In addition, most foreign countries 
withdrew their diplomatic representatives and citizens, and most foreign companies 
stopped trading in Shanghai from about 1950. Hence, the cosmopolitanism of 
Shanghai was brought to an abrupt end. The Italian journalist and politician Maria 
Macciocchi made the following comment on the streets of Shanghai during her visit 
in 1972:  
 
In contrast to Peking [Beijing], all the stores of Shanghai are well 
stocked and one can spend hours window-shopping in Nanking 
Road [Nanjing Road], once the site of the most luxurious shops – 
like Via Condotti and Via Veneto in Rome, the Champs-Élysées in 
Paris, Fifth Avenue in New York – the ones no Chinese used to be 
able to enter, like the restaurant, unless he was dressed European 
style. In Nanking Road there is a large store which sells nothing 
but pictures of Mao, badges, tapestries, calendars, and greeting 
cards citing Mao’s thoughts … The only gifts the Chinese 
exchange are these Mao badges. (Macciocchi, 1972, p.310) 
 
The outcome of the aversion to urban culture was massive industrialisation with a 
limited degree of urbanisation and the eradication of urban lifestyle. As discussed, few 
buildings were built. Linongs were also preserved (Bergère, 2009, p.347). In terms of 
spatial development, Shanghai witnessed her slowest stage and preserved the spatial 
arrangement of ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, though industrialisation took place at 
its quickest pace in her history.  
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During Mao’s period, the urban was generally regarded as capitalistic, parasitic, and 
aristocratic. Officially, the dominant ideology at that time understood industrialisation 
as modernisation and ‘bourgeois’ urban culture as the opposite to the advancement of 
socialist thought. The ideology of anti-urbanism and anti-urbanisation pervaded the 
country (Ran and Berry, 1989, p.111). Wide support in rural areas is recorded as being 
one of the major reasons for the CPC winning the Chinese Civil War; such a history is 
typically taken as the reason for Mao’s aversion to urban culture. Lawrence Ma (2002, 
p.1558) however argued that anti-urbanism and counter-urbanisation during the 
Maoist period was not the goal set by Chinese socialism, but an ideological means to 
achieve the egalitarian pledge of the Party-State. Under socialism, every individual 
across the socialist state, is assumed to have the same access to resources, yet, 
inhabitants in cities usually possessed better access to resources. Hence, anti-urbanism 
and counter-urbanisation were held by the CPC as a dominant ideology to combat the 
growth of the city. The Household Registration System (hukou) was established to 
manage internal migration between rural and urban areas. The pledge of 
egalitarianism was to be achieved by removing the inequalities between rural and 
urban areas. Urban lifestyle, represented by the petty urbanites of Shanghai, was also 
contradictory to the notion of egalitarianism. As I discuss below, the social life of 
urban inhabitants was organised through the danwei system to restrain unauthorised 
urban culture. In other words, the aversion to urban culture during the Maoist era was 
not only a political strategy to foster its support from the ‘rural base’, but also a 
strategy to achieve the promise of egalitarianism.  
 
Is it possible for a society to experience industrialisation without urbanisation? 
Lefebvre’s account of the relationship between space and capital would compel him to 
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answer no. As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre made a clear distinction between 
urbanisation and industrialisation – the former concerns the production of social space 
and its impact on inhabitants’ daily life, while the latter is about the means of 
production. Lefebvre argued that urbanisation and industrialisation form a ‘dialectical 
unity’, which means that the ‘industrialisation of society always implies urbanisation’ 
(Ronneberger, 2008, p.137). In The Right to the City, Lefebvre argued the urban 
problematic will emerge during this double process:  
 
Until now, in theory as in practice, the double process of 
industrialization and urbanization has not been mastered. The 
incomplete teachings of Marx and Marxist thought have been 
misunderstood … Marx did not show (and in his time he could 
not) that urbanization and the urban contain the meaning of 
industrialization. He did not see that industrial production implied 
the urbanization of society, and that the mastery of industrial 
potentials required specific knowledge concerning urbanization. 
Industrial production, after a certain growth, produces 
urbanization, providing it with conditions, and possibilities. The 
problematic is displaced and becomes that of urban 
development. The works of Marx (notably Capital) contained 
precious indications on the city and particularly on the historical 
relations between town and country. They do not pose the urban 
problem. In Marx's time, only the housing problem was raised and 
studied by Engels. Now, the problem of the city is immensely 
greater than that of housing. (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.130; 
original emphasis) 
 
Lefebvre argued that the history of urbanisation is the transformation from the rural 
(zero degree of urbanisation), to an industrial city and finally an urban society 
(Ronneberger, 2008 p.137). The ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976), in the eyes of 
Lefebvre, was a ‘Chinese road’ to experiment with the possibility of ‘building a 
different society’ (1991[1974], p.421). History tells us that this socialist experiment 
was not successful. Alongside other political and economic factors, socialism’s failure 
to create a new everyday life is a major reason.  
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4.2.3  The Danwei and Organised Social Lives  
 
As suggested in Chapter Two, Lefebvre regarded his discussion about everyday life as 
his most important contribution to Marxist analysis. He argued that the concept of the 
everyday has enriched an understanding of capitalism in modern world, i.e. alienation 
occurred beyond the workplace and penetrated everyday life. This produced a 
‘bureaucratic society of controlled consumption’ in post-war Europe (Lefebvre, 1988, 
p.80). Alongside capitalist society, Lefebvre also argued that the success of socialism 
should be examined in the context of the everyday:  
 
To put it another way, socialism (the new society, the new life) 
can only be defined concretely on the level of everyday life, as a 
system of changes in what can be called lived experience. Now, 
half a century of historical upheavals have taught us that everyday 
relations between ‘lived experience’ – change more slowly than 
the structure of the State. And in a different way, at a different rate. 
Thus in the history of societies modifications in the different 
sectors take place unevenly, some ahead of their times, others 
lagging behind. The fact that one sector is ahead does not mean 
that there is immediate progress in another. And vice versa. 
(Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.49) 
 
In order to increase efficiency of production and social control, private ownership was 
eradicated, work was collectivised and individuals were organised centrally by the 
danwei in urban China. Gongzuo danwei, usually abbreviated as the danwei, was 
more than a space for production, and functioned as the ‘centre of social activities’ 
(Lü and Perry, 1997, p.14). It was a nation-wide social institution, so supposedly 
people in Shanghai would share similar urban experience with their counterparts in 
other urban areas. Urban life in socialist Shanghai during the ‘socialist reform era’ 
could only be understood through the danwei system.  
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Literally, the danwei can be translated as the ‘work unit’, or sometimes known as the 
‘workplace organisation’ (Li and Wang, 1996, p.63). Alongside delivering production 
command, the danwei is a system performing multiple functions. The state exerted 
social control through the danwei, e.g., controlling the appointment and removal of 
employees (through the dossier system) and the allocation of communal facilities 
(including housing and other social welfare). Individuals working for the same danwei 
were usually directed to share the same housing estate. Political campaigns were also 
carried out through the danwei to achieve mass mobilisation. Political study sessions 
were very often organised after work (Lü and Perry, 1997, pp.5-8; 61-62). The danwei 
became the centre of social life for urban residents. It is so important that ‘one could 
be without a job, but not without a danwei’ (ibid, p.3). By 1978, the danwei employed 
over 99% of workers in Shanghai and 78.5% of them worked and lived in their work 
unit (Fujita, 2010, p.306). The outcome was the emergence of an organised social life 
in the workplace and in everyday life. As Lefebvre pointed out:  
 
So the New China, from the lowliest peasant girl to the highest 
Party chief, dresses up in blue overalls. She has given up the 
mandarins’ silks, for hundreds of millions of peasants the direct 
opposite of their own rags. She has relegated them to museums or 
turned them into export items, along with the magic dragons and 
ivory buddhas. She is becoming austere, her mind bent on being 
victorious on the labour front. Solid Republics are founded on 
virtue. (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.44) 
 
It terms of the relations of production, the socialist experiment targeted the 
eradication of class differences. With the absence of the private sector, access to 
consumption products and employment could only be sought through the danwei 
system. Thus, individual life was not possible as social life was collectivised. Leisure 
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activities also ‘took the form of group action in the name of “collectivisim”’ (Wang, 
1995 cited Lu, 2006, p.145), including team sports and standardised exercise over 
loudspeakers. People’s work life and social life were under close surveillance by the 
state, through the censorship by their colleagues in the workplace and neighbours in 
the neighbourhood committee, to ensure political loyalty (Bergère, 2009, p.388). In 
other words, everyday life of the urban inhabitants was ‘colonised’ by socialist 
economic logic through the danwei system. A former reporter at the New York Times 
therefore described the danwei as ‘feudalism in industrialisation’ (Dutton, 1998, p.42). 
 
4.2.4  Eradicating Class Differences? 
 
As illustrated above, socialist planning during this period of time was spatial. First, 
the socialist government speeded up industrialisation by agglomerating the districts in 
the vicinity of Shanghai. Second, the danwei system was a social-spatial institution 
reorganising the social lives of the people (Fujita, 2010, p.306). Third, the hukou 
system was established to eradicate uneven development between rural and urban 
regions. The socialist economic development of Shanghai was interrupted by political 
struggles during the ‘Cultural Revolution’24. With limited available information, 
Lefebvre commented on the ‘Cultural Revolution’: 
 
Some have claimed that the cultural revolution in China will 
eliminate the difference between city and country, between the 
agricultural labourer and the industrial labourer, between the 
manual and intellectual labor. Their approach resembles that of 
                                                      
24 For instance, in 1967 during the early phase of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, Zhang Chunqiao of ‘the 
Gang of Four’ established a Shanghai Commune, arguably based on the model of the Paris Commune, 
to institutionalise this power in the party, army and the mass. The Shanghai Commune lasted for less 
than a month, but similar revolutionary committees were established across the country for political 
struggles (Bergère, 2009, pp.403-405). Lefebvre briefly commented that the Shanghai Commune is an 
extreme yet rich ‘violent festival’ (1988[1976], p.244).  
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Marx and Soviet ideological claims. There is little novelty, 
however, in sending intellectuals to the countryside for a dose of 
manual labor, to work in fields or neighboring factories. Does this 
overcome the division of labor? Hardly. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], 
pp.111-112) 
 
By reorganising space in the city and organising social life through the danwei, the 
socialist regime attempted to eradicate class difference and produce homogeneity 
among individuals. Socialist construction campaigns were also carried out across the 
nation to eradicate the difference between urban and rural areas. For instance, under 
the political campaign of ‘Up the Mountains, Down to the Villages’, millions of 
educated young people were ‘sent to the villages’ from cities to ideologically edify 
them with the value of labour (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006, p.402; Mitter, 2004, 
p.201). Hence, during ‘socialist reform era’, the government produced space through 
the absence of urbanisation, the creation of the danwei system, as well as integration 
with other counties. Urban space and hence social lives were re-organised. 
Industrialisation in Shanghai from the 1950s to the 1970s was more than a change in 
economic structure, with social space and individuals’ practices also altered.  
 
However, the promises of egalitarianism and the elimination of ‘the difference 
between the city and the country’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.111) were entirely 
undelivered. Some former bourgeoisie and elite groups in Shanghai managed to 
sustain their luxurious lifestyle, and even passed on their status to their children 
(Bergère, 2009, pp.393-394). Individualism, consumption, cosmopolitanism and 
capitalism were eradicated, in the sense that at a personal level, such values could not 
be pursued or practised within the spatial arrangement brought about by the 
implementation of the danwei. However, the danwei system did produce ‘superior 
living standards’ in urban areas, because employees in the danwei were guaranteed to 
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receive better job security, medical care and housing than the people in rural areas (Lü 
and Perry, 1997, pp.5-8).  
 
Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.54) commented that a successful revolution should not only 
produce a new space, but also transform the daily life of the people. Under the 
socialist mode of production, urban life was deliberately restrained through limiting 
urbanisation and providing new meanings of social space. Although the state managed 
to reorganise the social lives of the people, Liu Kang (2000) argued that the socialist 
experiment was not successful. This was because the state failed to revolutionise the 
daily life of the people by providing a meaning to their everyday life:  
 
… after the city (rather than the countryside) again became the 
locus of social life after the establishment of the revolutionary 
regime, the vision of the everyday in Mao’s culture of the masses 
failed to provide a stabilizing and enduring point of reference for 
‘everydayness’, that is, the tangible, the concrete, and the 
countless individual routine activities – eating, dressing, sleeping, 
working, lovemaking, et cetera – in a vastly complicated and 
diverse urban environment. Instead, the everyday was constantly 
transformed into spectacles of the noneveryday – stories of 
violence, death, catastrophe, revolutionary martyrs, and 
counterrevolutionary villains and enemies abounded. (Liu, 2000, 
p.141) 
 
The reform of economic liberalisation was announced in 1978, but it was not until 
1992 that major reform measures were implemented in Shanghai (Wu, 2003, 
pp.1683-1684). Since then, the state designated Shanghai to play the role of the ‘head 
of the dragon’ of the Chinese re-entry into the global economy (Li, 2009, p.27). Upon 
the withdrawal of totalitarian social control by the state, urbanism within Shanghai 
quickly resumed (Wu, 2011, p.709). ‘Nightlife has recovered all its dazzle’, the 
skyline is ‘again ablaze with multicolored neon light’, karaoke bars, dance floors and 
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discotheques were also opened (Bergère, 2009, p.426). The ‘Chinese road’ of the 
socialist experiment was unsuccessful in revolutionising the everyday life of people, 
so that organised social life quickly disappeared once the danwei system began to 
breakdown. 
 
4.3   A Post-socialist City or Global City: 1979-Now 
 
I have reviewed the recent academic debates on China’s urbanisation in Chapter Two. 
In Chapters Five and Six, I will examine Shanghai’s current mode of production, as 
well as the urban experience of the inhabitants which was the focus of my fieldwork. 
Therefore, this final section provides only a brief review of recent discussions about 
the urbanisation of Shanghai in the ‘post-socialist reform era’. In 1978, Open Door 
Policy, or usually referred as the Reform, was officially announced. It was introduced 
in rural areas before being implemented in the cities. Shanghai began to implement 
reform measures in the 1980s but it was only after the Central Government announced 
the planning of the Pudong Development Zone in 1992 that the urban landscape and 
the daily life of the inhabitants experienced drastic transformation (Wasserstrom, 2009, 
p.122).  
 
4.3.1  Daily Lives in Post-reform China 
 
Applying the theoretical framework of social contract theory, Wenfang Tang and 
William Parish carried out extensive fieldwork and gathered data to understand the 
impact of the Reform on individual life in urban China (Tang and Parish, 2000, p.51). 
They agreed that the Reform was a fundamental change of the social contract from a 
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socialist to a capitalist one. Hence, social lives were altered accordingly. Widening 
income inequality was observed (not equally distributed), employees were promoted 
by performance (not seniority or the particularised relationship with seniors in the 
workplace) and education become a commodity in the workplace (not determined by 
class or status background).  
 
As discussed earlier, the danwei system was the medium between the state and 
individuals under socialism. In terms of (social) space, it was the reform of the work 
unit, or the danwei, that brought significant changes. Full employment through the 
danwei has not been guaranteed since the reform. The ‘three irons bowls’ were 
‘broken’, that is, the three promises of the original employment relation (iron 
rice-bowl, iron wages and iron position) no longer existed (Warner and Zhu, 2000, 
pp.25-26). But the vanishing of the danwei system also freed individuals to seek 
employment in the labour market or invest on an individual basis. In Shanghai the 
educated population returned, financial services were restored and the ‘old Shanghai’ 
urban culture was soon reconstructed as a glorious past. The history of the ‘Paris of 
the Orient’ was re-narrated, so as to valorise Shanghai’s re-entering the global market. 
The inhabitants ‘escaped the previous social and spatial constraints’, because ‘the 
work unit no longer had a monopoly on the organization of everyday life’ (Lu, 2006, 
pp.156-157). For example, in a study of bars in Shanghai, it is argued that 
globalisation has influenced the everyday life of individuals. Shanghai’s inhabitants 
imagined a foreign/global lifestyle and the capitalist past of Shanghai by hanging out 
at bars (Bao, Wang, Zhu, et. al, 2001, see Section III, Chapter 6).  
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4.3.2  Post-socialist City/Global City: a Question to be Answered  
 
The debate about the influence of globalisation on Shanghai draws upon the concept 
of the global city (Chen, 2009, p.xxii). As proposed by Saskia Sassen (2000, pp.7-8), 
in the age of globalisation, global cities differ from world cities in the early twentieth 
century, that now function as a node for a global economic system by providing 
professional services for global conglomerates. Infrastructure in terms of 
transportation and communications in the global city has to be well constructed for 
the facilitation of the flow of capital and people and connections to other parts of the 
world. As such, it will bring a critical amount of middle and upper class expatriates 
and the lifestyle that they prefer. Income polarisation will result in the creation of 
local communities based on relative wealth. In terms of urban space, skyscrapers will 
be constructed and gentrification will mean that local communities will be forcefully 
relocated from the city centre.  
 
By referencing data of foreign direct investment, import/export, numbers of foreign 
companies and number of skyscrapers, some have argued that Shanghai has shown 
the features of a global city (e.g., Wei, Leung and Luo, 2006, p.232; Ye, 2004, p.17). 
Table 4.1 also shows that Shanghai’s tertiary sector has become increasingly 
important to the economic structure, which reflects her role as a global city. However, 
some empirical studies showed argued that Shanghai can be regarded as a global city, 
as the status of being a command site of international economic activities has yet to be 
achieved (Ma and Wu, 2006, pp.8-9). It is pointed out that it still mainly serves the 
region around the Yangtze River Delta, though some features of the global city are 
exhibited and the influence of globalisation on urban development in Shanghai, 
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similar to other regions of China, is apparent. More importantly, local urban 
development has involved a process of ‘place making’ (Cartier, 2005, p.58) or 
‘(re)turn to the local’ (Chen, 2009, p.xxi) and influences from the local political 
economy are of more significance than forces from globalisation.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Economic structure of Shanghai (1978-2006) 
 
Indicator 1978 1990 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006
Contribution of Primary 
sector in GDP (%) 4.0 4.3 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.5 0.9 
Contribution of Secondary 
sector in GDP (%) 77.4 63.8 57.3 50.1 48.4 47.6 50.1 48.5 
Contribution of Tertiary 
sector in GDP (%) 18.6 31.9 40.2 47.8 49.5 50.7 48.4 50.6 
Contribution of Primary 
sector in employment (%) 34.3 11.1 11.9 12.7 11.4 11.6 9.1 6.2 
Contribution of Secondary 
sector in employment (%) 44.0 59.3 54.6 49.1 46.5 41.2 39.0 37.0 
Contribution of Tertiary 
sector in employment (%) 21.6 29.6 33.5 38.2 42.1 47.2 51.9 56.8 
GDP per capita (USD) 312 739 2,368 3,219 3,841 - 4,558 7,116
Source: Chen and Zhou (2009, pp.13-14 Table 0.1) 
 
4.3.3  Political Economy and Space  
 
The political economy of Shanghai’s urban space is also of concern to scholars, with a 
particular interest in delineating the transition of the economy from socialism to 
capitalism. Upon the Reform, individuals were gradually released from the danwei 
and free to choose their housing. The government legalised the purchase and release 
of property and individual property rights were acknowledged, though officially 
individuals only have the right of transfer but not ownership of the property. Lin and 
Ho (2005, p.420) argued that there are three kinds of practices of land development 
since the late 1990s, namely state land supply, collective land supply and land supply 
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in the black market, which are characterised by different modes of proviso. State 
intervention is salient in the first kind of practice that they name as state land supply. 
Land, whether state-owned or collectively-owned, was banked through a 
governmental agent. As I discuss in Chapter Five, a similar strategy was adopted for 
constructing the site of the Shanghai Expo.  
 
Xu, Yeh and Wu (2009, pp.908-909) argued that the commodification of space is 
central to the finance of economic reform in China by citing Shanghai as an example. 
In the early 1990s, when the Pudong district was announced by the State Council 
(Central Government) to be zoned in order to attract foreign investment and establish 
it as an international financial centre, the Shanghai municipal government actively 
contributed funding to speed up progress, for example, through investment in 
infrastructure construction. Gradual and greater participation of foreign companies is 
later observed. More recently, a land leasing system was practised by the local 
government as a new finance model. By Constitution, all land is owned by the 
Party-State if it is not collectively-owned, in other words, the government has 
complete control of land resources. Through controlling land allocation, the 
government has assumed the power to decide urban development and through leasing 
the land to developers, the government can fund its infrastructure development. Land 
has been commodified. To conclude, marketisation has reduced the role of 
government but the state has transformed its role to resource allocation, so significant 
intervention can be still be made in the market economy.  
 
4.4   Conclusion: Two Meanings of ‘Modern’ 
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As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, although Lefebvre rejected a dogmatic 
reading of Marx, he did not completely disregard the Marxist view of historical 
materialism. He agreed that history can be periodised into different stages by mode of 
production with a spatial dimension considered:  
 
Historical time can be broken down (periodized) by mode of 
production: Asiatic, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist … Moreover, 
each mode of production has ‘produced’ (not in the sense of any 
ordinary thing but as a privileged work) a type of city, which 
‘expresses’ it in a way that is immediately visible and legible on 
the environment, by making the most abstract relationships – legal, 
political, ideological – tangible. (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.24) 
 
Applying this Lefebvrian framework in this chapter, the spatial history of Shanghai 
was outlined according to the alterations of the modes of production from feudal 
China, the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (including the Republican period) to the 
‘socialist reform era’ and then the ‘post-socialist reform’ years. I also illustrated the 
dialectical relationships between spatial arrangement, cultural representation, 
everyday life and mode of production. Shanghai’s spatial history can be summarised 
in the diagram below:  
  
143 
 
Figure 4.2: Shanghai’s Spatial History  
 
 
 
Even though Lefebvre conducted fieldwork outside France, his reference for the 
periodisation of the history of space was predominantly European (e.g., Rome, Paris, 
Venice) (2003[1970], pp.9-15; 1991[1974], p.41-58, 73-77). This provides an 
epistemological challenge when a Western theory is applied within a Chinese context. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Castells (1977[1972], pp.90-91) criticised Lefebvre’s 
theory of space as too general with statistical details being largely ignored. He 
particularly cited the People’s Commune in China as an example to counter 
Lefebvre’s deterministic view of the development of history (i.e. China underwent a 
period of collective production or industrialisation without considerable urbanisation). 
Is it possible for a city to industrialise without urbanisation? If it is the case, does it 
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mean that Lefebvre’s theory cannot be universally applied? 
 
Rather than questioning the applicability of Lefebvre’s analysis of space in a Chinese 
context, I argue that his discussion on industrialisation and urbanisation has provided 
an insightful theoretical framework to examine the complexity of Shanghai’s history 
of space. Lefebvre argued that industrialisation and urbanisation should be regarded 
as a double process:  
 
… the term ‘industrial society’ is exact in a different sense from 
that given to it by its promoters. Industry or the economic 
capacity for material production has not been rationally mastered; 
the theory is still incomplete, even where socialism is concerned; 
industrial expansion is only meaningful (acquires orientation and 
significance) when understood as this double process and through 
it. … Urban existence gives significance to industrialization, 
which in turn contains it as a second aspect of the process… What 
scope has an ‘industrial society’ if it fails to produce a fruitful 
urban life? None, unless it be to produce for the sake of producing. 
(Lefebvre, 1971[1968], pp.47-48; original emphasis) 
 
As illustrated in this chapter, Shanghai industrialised rapidly during both the periods 
of a ‘semi-feudal, semi colonial cosmopolitan’ city and a ‘socialist city’. However, 
Shanghai performed different roles under capitalist and socialist modes of production, 
and with accompanying different meanings of being ‘modern’. In Chinese, ‘modern’ 
can be translated into ‘modeng’ or ‘xiandai’; the former is a linguistic transcription, 
while the latter is a literal translation. Both translations mean ‘modern’ but with 
different connotations. ‘Modeng’ is more concerned with cultural and social aspects, 
while ‘xiandai’ is the term usually used to describe the institutional and materialistic 
aspects of modernisation (Lee, 1999b, p.5). The former translation is used to describe 
the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, while the latter can be linked to the goals of 
socialist campaigns.  
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On the one hand, Shanghai’s urban culture during the semi-feudal/semi-colonial era 
was usually described as ‘modeng’, which means Western practices were for the first 
time being introduced into China. The capitalist mode of production produced the 
social space for the emergence of urbanism in this coastal city. New social classes also 
emerged under a new mode of production, with new daily routines and lifestyles (e.g., 
the petty urbanite). The concession areas of Shanghai (as a new space under China’s 
sovereignty) also provided a social space for urbanism, as well as for different ideas 
to be promoted and debated. Such extravagant ‘modeng’ urban culture 
(representational space) was celebrated even when the country was experiencing 
colonial invasion. Hence, the first dimension of ‘modern’ means ideas and practices 
being imported from overseas (Western countries or Japan), which are dichotomous 
from the traditional Chinese worldview. Hence, urban culture in Shanghai would not 
be regarded as ‘modernisation for safeguarding the country’ but the celebration of 
capitalism and cosmopolitanism.  
 
On the other hand, ‘modern’ is usually translated as ‘xiandai’, when discussions are 
about technological and economic modernisations (xiandai hua in Chinese), as well as 
national revitalisation. For instance, the Chinese governments (feudal state and the 
Republican government) launched industrialisation or infrastructural development 
programmes in Shanghai, not only to experiment with technological modernisation 
and institutional reform but also to reinstate national pride. Not without grounds, 
urban life in the Republican Shanghai was criticised by the socialist regime. Though 
the motive may have been political, the aversion to urban culture during the Maoist 
era clearly demonstrated another meaning of being modern, which concerned 
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technological and economic modernisations. In other words, ‘xiandai’ could be 
regarded as a critique of capitalism.  
 
However, urbanisation in Shanghai was suppressed during the ‘socialist reform era’. 
Together with restrained consumption, it therefore ‘failed to produce a fruitful urban 
life’ and ‘produce for the sake of producing’ (Lefebvre, 1971[1968], pp.47-48). In 
other words, without urbanisation (including the production of urban social space, 
urban life, expansion of the urban fabric to rural area, etc.), industrialisation during 
the ‘socialist reform era’ became meaningless. The history of urbanisation in 
Shanghai is distinctive from the rest of China, with Shanghai being the birthplace of 
modernity in China. The feudal system and Confucianism have been replaced by 
‘modern’ institutions and western thinking; the socialist experiment was also 
vigorously carried out. How can the two meanings of ‘modern’ during the 
urbanisation of Shanghai, from a traditional Chinese city to a capitalist cosmopolitan 
city and then to a (post)socialist city, contribute to the debates about the 
modernisation and modernity of China? Can we observe ‘sociological fossils’ in 
Shanghai today? How does the history of space in Shanghai exert influence on the 
current mode of production? I discuss these issues in the following Chapters.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN SHANGHAI 
 
The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the 
fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also the fundamental law of 
thought … According to dialectical materialism, contradiction is present in all 
processes of objectively existing things and of subjective thought and permeates all 
these processes from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of 
contradiction. 
- Mao Zedong (1937) 
 
 
In his essay On Contradiction, Mao Zedong (1937) urged for political struggles by 
beginning with the above assertion. Applying dialectics, he proclaimed that 
contradiction exists in, and is a priori to every kind of historical development. Things 
in opposites (e.g., bourgeoisie vs. proletariat; the Communist Party of China vs. the 
Nationalist Party) must come in pairs. The ‘process of development’ in history is 
produced by the contradictions between the oppositional pairs. In 1956 when China 
began to implement its first Five-Year Plan, Mao outlined his vision to develop a 
socialist country by identifying the ‘Ten Major Relationships’ (i.e. the ten major 
contradictory relations of the country) by also applying the above ‘dialectical thought’. 
Although his personal agenda (by advocating political struggle to sustain his personal 
legacy) needs to be critically addressed, his writing still provides a helpful lens to 
understand how early Chinese communists strategically applied dialectics in outlining 
practical policies.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre proposed the term State Mode of Production 
(SMP) to characterise the growing involvement of the modern state in production 
148 
after the Second World War (Lefebvre, 2009[1975], p.105). Lefebvre was also drawn 
to Mao’s writing. Referring to the articles, including On Contradiction and On 
Practice, Lefebvre briefly examined Mao’s theorisation of the state in the second 
volume of De l'État (1988[1976], see Chapter 15). For Lefebvre, Mao’s application of 
dialectics to analyse the ‘oppositional pairs’ was an erroneous appropriation of the 
Marxist theory for realpolitik. He also criticised Mao for not successfully developing 
a theory of the state. The roles of the party, the state and the military force were 
undivided, so Mao could maintain his ultimate control over the country/his 
people/China (ibid, p.238). Lefebvre criticised the People’s Commune, as a 
production and administrative unit in rural areas, that failed to actualise its potential of 
sharing the functions of the state. The state therefore remained the dominant force in 
production. Lefebvre cautiously argued that the possibility of China establishing a 
state mode of production (SMP) should not be ruled out (ibid, p.247). Even though 
Lefebvre tended to romanticise the ‘Cultural Revolution’, he accurately evaluated 
Mao’s application of Marxist theory. On the one hand, Marxist theory was applied as 
a theoretical basis to understand the historical development of China, social relations 
of production and the possibility of replacing feudalism by a socialist mode of 
production. On the other hand, the class struggle dimension of Marxist theory was 
heavily emphasised and appropriated for practical politics. Marxist theory was 
manipulated by this veteran comrade as an ideological tool for initiating political 
struggles (ibid, pp.243-244).  
 
In the same year that the second volume of De l'État was published the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ ended, and the Reform was announced two years later. The reformatory 
policies under the Reform were essentially a rejection of Maoism and an affirmation 
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of a neoliberal capitalist logic, so that the Reformists faced challenges from loyal 
Maoists within the Party and in from academics. Similarly, the veteran comrade, Deng 
Xiaoping, who was regarded as the ‘architect of the Reform’, also appropriated 
Marxist theory for political struggle. He ended the debate by creating the term 
‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (People’s Daily, 2007). The implementation 
of policies with capitalist features could be rationalised as the manifestation of 
socialism in a Chinese way, while the preservation of existing policies could be 
regarded as the continuation of socialism. Applying dialectics, the oppositional pair – 
socialism and capitalism – was also brought into ‘unity’.  
 
More than 30 years after the Reform, the refusal against economic reform is no longer 
central to political struggle. China’s development is also widely regarded as an 
economic miracle. ‘Has China completed the transition from socialism to capitalism?’ 
This is a typical question that concerns scholars, the business sector, the media and 
the general public, which presumes that China is undergoing a ‘transition’ from 
socialism to capitalism. However, China’s Reform is more complicated than a simple 
transition from one system to another. For instance, Laurence Ma argued that the 
Reform should not be regarded as a ‘transition’ but a ‘transformation’: 
 
…  the concept of ‘transition’, as used in the literature on 
postsocialist development, assumes a process of change toward a 
preconceived and fixed target, it is not entirely appropriate for 
China where economic reforms seem to have aimed at a number 
of moving targets. Instead, I prefer the concept ‘transformation’, 
which avoids the implication of the inevitability of ‘transition’. 
Moreover, China's economic transformation away from state 
socialism should be viewed as a prolonged process of change with 
unpredictable consequences, instead of as a transitory short phase 
leading to a Western capitalist system of production. (Ma, 2002, 
p.1546) 
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Similar to Mao’s ‘law of contradiction in things’, socialist and capitalist logics coexist 
in the ‘post-socialist reform era’. It involves the abandonment, preservation and 
modification of some features of the socialist system, as well as the incorporation of 
new features of the capitalist system. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how 
the contradictory features were brought into ‘unity’. What is the mode of production 
in China after over three decades of economic reform? What are the roles of the state 
and the market? How can the features of socialism and capitalism coexist in a system? 
What is the process of the production of (social space)? What are the implications for 
the social relations of production? These are the guiding questions of this chapter. I 
examine the China’s current mode of production within a Lefebvrian framework by 
investigating the Shanghai Expo as a case study. This chapter argues that Shanghai 
has developed what I call a ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’. In the first 
section, the role of the state, as the definitive feature of SMP, will be depicted by a 
detailed examination of the bureaucratic structure of the Shanghai Expo and the 
implications of the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It argues that 
the state maintains a high degree of control of society amid economic liberalisation. 
Secondary data from policy papers, government statistics and economic data are also 
used to illustrate the state-market relations.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre asserted that each mode of production 
produces its own (social) space (1991[1974], p.46). The second objective of this 
chapter is therefore to illustrate the production of space within Shanghai under the 
state-led/-participation mode of production. What kinds of spatial arrangement have 
been produced in Shanghai? What kind of space did the state plan to construct? How 
did the state provide ideological justifications for the urbanisation project? How was 
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the urban experience of individuals affected? How did individuals respond to the 
changes in spatial arrangement? In Lefebvrian terms, what are the spatial practice 
(arrangement of physical environment), representation of space (the social space the 
state attempted to construct) and representational space (the articulation of the 
experience of individuals) in Shanghai? While the spatial practice (strategies of 
urbanisation and its spatial implications) and representation of space in Shanghai (the 
state’s vision of the production of space and ideological justifications) will be 
discussed in the second and the third section of this chapter, the representational space 
of Shanghai will be illustrated in Chapter Six by drawing reference to the data 
collected in my ethnographic interviews.  
 
As Lefebvre emphasised the trialectical relationship among the three moments in the 
spatial triad (1991[1974], p.36), the examination of the production of space in this 
chapter will therefore go beyond the descriptions of the transformation of spatial 
arrangements in Shanghai, and will articulate how such a production of space 
facilitates the development of the state-led/-participation mode of production. 
Specifically, I argue that land commodification, as the key driving force of Shanghai’s 
economic expansion and urbanisation, played the vital role in the 
state-led/-participation mode of production. A pro-growth interest bloc of the state and 
the non-public sector was established and reinforced the mode of production. 
However, such a process also produced a contradictory space in urban China, i.e. it 
commodified space and produced inequalities among the inhabitants. This chapter 
ends with a discussion on how the state-led/-participation mode of production is 
reproduced. The urban experience of Shanghai’s inhabitants under such a dramatic 
transformation of space and the possibility of an urban revolution will be discussed in 
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the next chapter.  
 
5.1   State-led/-participation Mode of Production  
 
This chapter deciphers the state-led/-participation mode of production that Shanghai 
has developed since the late 1990s. We begin by asking, what is a ‘mode of 
production’? As Harvey (1973) suggests, mode of production is at the centre of 
Marxist theory, though its meaning is ‘seemingly somewhat ambiguous’ (p.197) it is 
easier to grasp through ‘its constituent features’ (p.199). In this chapter, I illustrate the 
constituent features of a state-led/-participation mode of production by mainly 
referring to the Shanghai Expo. As the Shanghai Expo was a state project speeding up 
land commodification, urban renewal, infrastructure development and involved the 
relocation of a large number of residents, it provides an ideal example to demonstrate 
how (social) space is produced. The organisational structure of the Shanghai Expo 
also helps to illustrate the role of the state. Therefore, before proceeding to discussion 
on the spatial practice and representations of space under a state-led/-participation 
mode of production, it is necessary to briefly introduce the background to the 
Shanghai Expo.  
 
5.1.1  The Bureaucratic Structure of the Shanghai Expo  
 
New space has always been created by a new economic logic. As briefly introduced in 
Chapter Two, special economic zones (SEZs) were established during the early phase 
of the Reform in order to attract FDI, as well as to set a physical boundary controlling 
the impact of the economic experiment (Tommaso, Rubini, and Barbieri, 2013, p.62). 
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However, the export-driven economy was challenged by the outbreak of Asian 
Financial Turmoil in 1997. With the instability of the global financial market and 
shrinking demand from the overseas market, China’s economic growth began to slow 
down in the late 1990s. The state therefore needed to explore other driving forces to 
sustain its economic growth.  
 
In the midst of shrinking export demand, and together with other motives such as 
nation and city branding, different Chinese cities began to bid for hosting 
mega-events (Wang, 2000, p.154). However, as I discuss in Chapter Seven, the World 
Expo originated as a national project for showcasing the national strength of the host 
country. The current regulation still requires the organiser of the World Expo to be a 
country. Therefore, Shanghai Municipality needed the approval from the State 
Council to bid for a World Expo. In May 1999, the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government proposed to the State Council to organise a World Expo in 2010, and 
received approval in March 2000.25 The Shanghai Expo is thus a national project 
under the direct supervision of the State Council, through the Shanghai 2010 World 
Exposition National Organising Committee (Organising Committee) and under the 
chairpersonship of the Vice Premier. At the executive and local level, the Shanghai 
2010 World Exposition Executive Committee (Executive Committee) was established 
to report to the Organising Committee, and provided ‘guidance’ and ‘assistance’ to 
local governments in Shanghai. ‘Guidance’ in a Chinese political context means that 
policies will be legislated for the execution by the governments at the district level 
(Huang, 2007, p.46-48).  
 
                                                      
25 Shanghai’s application was approved by the Bureau des International Expositions (BIE; the 
organisation supervising World Expo) on 3 December 2002 and the registration was completed in 2005 
(Huang, 2007, pp.41, 83). 
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At the local level, the Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination (EXPO Bureau) 
was established, under the Executive Committee, as the daily operation unit for the 
preparation, organisation, operation and management of the event. The Shanghai 
Municipal Government has also established the Shanghai World Expo Land Holding 
Corporation (EXPO Land) and the Shanghai World Expo Group (World Expo Group), 
in which both organisations are governed by company law and under the supervision 
of the Expo Bureau. EXPO Land was established mainly for infrastructure 
development within and outside the Expo Site, the relocation of residents and raising 
funds to finance the Shanghai Expo. The main functions of the World Expo Group 
were the construction of key pavilions and the operation of the Expo (Huang, 2007, 
p.47). The bureaucratic structure can be summarised in the diagram in Figure 5.1:
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Figure 5.1: Organisation Chart of the Shanghai Expo  
 
 
Information based on: Huang (2007, pp.46-48) 
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It is not uncommon for a government to establish a private company for organising a 
one-off event to achieve greater flexibility, efficiency and revenue generation. What is 
distinctive about the ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’ of Shanghai is the 
manipulative power of the state through economic activities in a state-controlled market. 
Similar to Lefebvre’s notion of SMP (2009[1979], p.129), the Chinese state was also 
managerial (gestionnaire). In order to demarcate the constituent features of this mode of 
production, it is necessary to address the changing role of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) as an economic apparatus of the state in the last decade.  
 
5.1.2  The Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises 
 
When individual investment was prohibited during the ‘socialist-reform era’, SOEs 
were practically the only possible workplace in urban areas other than working as a civil 
servant (Lü and Perry 1997, p.14). During the early stage of the Reform, with the lack 
of incentives and flexibility, SOEs usually showed limited adaptability in responding to 
the market situation and generated many social problems, including unemployment 
(Geng, Yang and Janus, 2009, p.155). The transformation of SOEs was usually regarded 
as one of the key obstacles to the Reform. Corruption and profiteering activities were 
also serious among government officials that resulted in student demonstrations and 
political instability in the late 1980s (Fenby, 2008, p.594).  
 
However, SOEs should not be regarded as a residual element of the socialist system. 
Rather than being completely wiped out, the economic role of SOEs has been 
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strengthened by the state since the late 1990s. With the economy shifting from an 
export-driven to an urbanisation-driven one, the state took an active role in promoting 
economic growth through the reorganisation of SOEs. Under the policy of ‘Grasping the 
big, letting go of the small’, the unprofitable SOEs were released to the market but the 
state maintained the dominant shares of the profitable ones (Chiu and Lewis, 2006, 
p.66). Through marketisation and corporatisation, SOEs were given greater flexibility to 
adapt to market competition and released from political and social functions (ibid, 
p.399).26 As shown in Table 6.1, the proportion of enterprises and the number of 
employees of SOEs in Shanghai reduced by more than half between 2000 and 2007, and 
been maintained at a steady level in recent years. At the same time, SOEs still contribute 
about more than one-third of the Gross Output Value (GOV) of the city, which means 
that the efficiency of SOEs has improved over the last decade. In 2010, the proportion 
of total tax and duty paid by SOEs even exceeded the level at the turn of the century. 
The proportion of loss-making enterprises and total losses made by SOEs are also kept 
at a comparatively low level now.27 All figures indicate that the transformation of SOEs 
was successful.  
  
                                                      
26 Management reform was also carried out. Most SOEs are now registered and operate as private 
companies so greater autonomy and flexibility in daily operations were made possible. However, the 
marketisation and corporatisation of SOEs could not be taken as the same as privatisation. The purpose of 
the formation of joint-stock companies (as the most popular kind of transformation of SOEs), for instance, 
is not to privatise the business, but to serve as a means for capitalising investment from the market and 
financing its reinvestment (Nakaya, 2006, pp.33-34). 
27 According to the direct communication between Janos Kornai and the director of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, 203 out of 205 firms were bailed out by the state in 1988 (Kornai, 1992, 
p.490, refer to Table 21.5).  
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Major economic indicators of enterprises in Shanghai  
with state as the major shareholder 
 
 2000 
% 
2002 
% 
2006 
% 
2007 
% 
2008 
% 
2009 
% 
2010 
% 
Number of Enterprises  16.3 13.7 9.4 7.7 6.3 6.2 6.1 
Year-end employees 40.2 33.2 20.8 17.9 16.5 16.6 15.9 
Gross Output Value 
(GOV) of Industry 48.4 43.9 37.3 35.5 35.7 37.3 37.2 
Total Tax and Duty 67.6 67.1 65.4 66.6 61.2 68.8 72.2 
Number of loss-making 
enterprises 16.9 13.6 11.8 8.5 6.8 6.4 6.9 
Total losses made by 
enterprise-in-red 45.7 29.5 30.3 28.2 53.8 24.5 26.1 
Source: Shanghai Statistics Yearbook (2001, 2003, 2007-2011)28 
 
The privatisation of the unprofitable SOEs is the first reason for the success, while state 
monopolisation in the market is another. As Lefebvre noted, under SMP, the state would 
take control over energy, information technology and the connection with the world 
market (2009[1979], pp.130-135). A similar strategy was applied by the Chinese 
government to dominate the access to natural resources and the respective markets. In 
2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
was established at both central and local levels to administer SOEs and maintained the 
majority of the shares (Naughton, 2008, p.4). 29  Under the policy of ‘Strategic 
Adjustment and Reorganisation of the State-owned Economy’, some SOEs were merged 
for ‘natural’ monopoly (Nakaya, 2006, p.36). In some ‘strategic industries’ including 
electricity, petroleum and refining, coal, tobacco, telecommunications, military, 
transportation equipment and iron and steel manufacturing, SOEs shared around 60% to 
80% of the national total economic activities (Nakaya 2006, p.31).  
                                                      
28 The statistics for other years are unavailable. Many SOEs are not entirely owned by the state now. The 
table here shows the enterprises that the state owned the majority of the shares. These enterprises are 
referred to as SOEs in this thesis for convenience sake.  
29 Before the establishment of the SASAC, SOEs were owned and managed under the Asset Management 
Agency. The SASAC was established in 2003 under ‘Interim Regulations on the Management of 
Enterprise State-owned Assets’ that clearly clarified the ownership of SOEs at central and local 
government levels (Naughton, 2006, p.16).  
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Although the SASAC was established by the State Council as a governing entity, it took 
a comparatively greater effort to facilitate the market activities of SOEs. SOEs enjoy 
preferential treatment including favourable tax treatment, lower interest rates (offered 
by the state-controlled banks) and the contribution of capital by the state when 
necessary (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011, pp.44-47). With preferential policies, better 
access to state resources and ‘natural’ monopoly, huge profits were generated by SOEs. 
The credit crunch during Asian Financial Tsunami in the late 1990s also facilitated the 
restructuring of SOEs by squeezing out the small and rural enterprises (Andreas, 2010, 
p.72). In 2005, central SASAC enterprises generated a profit of 628 billion (RMB, the 
same below unless otherwise stated), which accounted for 3.4% of the revised GDP.30 
However, SOEs were required to remit 10% of its after-tax profit (at most) to the State 
Council and the rest was retained by the SOEs (Naughton, 2008, p.1). As the top 
executives of the central SASAC enterprises were usually the key personnel of the Party 
or somebody having close ties, the appointment of top executives of SOEs was usually 
directly instructed by the central Community Party Organisation Department but not the 
SASAC.31 Some party or government officials could receive huge income by having a 
position in these key SOEs. SASAC therefore failed to perform the regulatory role but 
SOEs became the tool of a bureaucratic interest group (Nauhgton, 2006, p.14). 
 
                                                      
30 As at June 2012, there were 117 central SOEs being subordinated to SASAC; some notable enterprises 
with huge profits include Baosteel Group Corporation, China Eastern Air Holding Company, China 
Mobile Communications Corporation, Sinochem Group (SASAC, n.d.).  
31 Sometimes, the same government official would also take up different positions at the same time. For 
instance, the Director of Personnel for the City of Shanghai and the Party Committee with Shanghai 
SASAC (Naughton, 2006, p.5).  
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5.1.3  The Corporatisation of the World Expo Group 
 
The strategy of exercising the advantages of SOEs to generate profit from the market 
can be demonstrated by deciphering the organisational structure of the Shanghai Expo. 
As suggested above, the World Expo Group was established by the Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Government in 2004 for the construction of major pavilions (the Expo Centre, 
Theme Pavilion and the early stage of the construction of China Pavilion) and the 
operation of the Expo during the exhibition period. This company was restructured from 
Shanghai Eastbest International (Group) Company Limited32, together with investment 
mainly from the Shanghai Media & Entertainment Group and The Orient International 
(Holding) Company Limited. These three companies, which were all state-owned, 
provided a start-up fund of 1.1 billion for the World Expo Group. Although Dai Liu, the 
chairperson of the Board and the party secretary of the World Expo Group, emphasised 
that the company operated with market principles (Shanghai World Expo (Group) Co., 
Ltd, 2008), public funding still contributed about two-thirds of the total operational 
costs. The World Expo Group also raised capital from the market through issuing bonds, 
but the credibility of the bonds was mainly based on the state-owned status of the 
company. In 2010, the operational scale of the World Expo Group reached 40.3 billion 
with a profit of 3.7 billion, which already exceeded the start-up fund. In 2011, the 
company recorded an annual income of 55 billion and was listed among the top 200 
Chinese enterprises. In August 2011, the municipal government approved to rename the 
World Expo Group to its original name: the Shanghai Eastbest International (Group). In 
other words, with the organisation of the Shanghai Expo as the justification, Shanghai 
                                                      
32 The Shanghai Eastbest International (Group) Company Limited is a SOE established by the Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government in 1997 with foreign trade and exhibition service as the key areas of 
business (Shanghai World Expo (Group) Co., Ltd., n.d.). 
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Eastbest expanded its market size and generated more profits by utilising state 
resources.  
 
When introducing SMP as a ‘new state form’, Lefebvre emphasised that the state in the 
post-war era played a much stronger role than at the turn of the last century (2009[1979], 
p.124). The capitalist states actively promoted economic growth through economic 
stimulus or pro-growth measures (e.g., New Deal, Fordism), while the socialist state 
(Stalinism, Eurocommunism) centralised the apparatus of production (Brenner and 
Elden, 2001, p.765). In other words, Lefebvre abandoned the dogmatic dichotomy of 
socialism and capitalism, and argued that the state became much more involved in 
production in both the socialist and capitalist political camps.  
 
Similar features of SMP can be observed in the state-led/-participation mode of 
production in Shanghai. With an increasing proportion of market activities and upon 
entry to the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the state began to withdraw from 
absolute control of the market and comprehensive planning in production and 
consumption. The collapse of the Soviet Union also alerted China to be more cautious 
but practical when privatising SOEs (Sheng and Zhao, 2013, p.260). As illustrated 
above, the state maintained the dominant shares on the profitable SOEs. The ‘leading 
role of corporate public ownership’ in these SOEs was also emphasised, so that the state 
would exert close control over these companies (Nakaya, 2006, p.33). The 
transformation of SOEs was a heavy burden on the state during the early stage of the 
reform, but has become an advantage for its domination in the market now. Even though 
some SOEs (or their subsidiaries) have been listed on the stock market, the state exerted 
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close control via the SASAC (Naughton, 2008, p.13). Rather than transforming the state 
from the role of production to regulation, the government still deliberately maintained a 
major role in public participation in economic activities. Through SOEs, the state does 
not forfeit its ultimate control of the economy, but has transformed the allocation and 
production roles to the regulatory body and monopolistic player in the market.  
 
As a result, the state still upholds control of the market by skilfully manipulating the 
features of the old system (socialist) and incorporating new features (capitalist). The 
economy is state-led and ‘socialist’ characteristics of the economic system are valued. 
Even though the market becomes more open to individual and foreign investments, the 
state creates a favourable market environment for SOEs through legislation, regulations 
and favourable policies, as discussed above. The state also participates in market 
activities and values the importance of market competition. SOEs operate as companies 
in the market, thus profit maximisation can be legitimised and retained by SOEs under 
the state-led/-participation mode of production.33  
 
5.1.4  Land Commodification 
 
As illustrated above, the state began to perform both the regulatory and participatory 
roles since the late 1990s. By utilising its regulatory and legislative power, SOEs were 
facilitated to enjoy comparative advantages in market competition or even ‘natural’ 
monopoly. SOEs were reorganised to become the medium for the state to retain its 
indirect control in the market. Similar to the reorganisation of SOEs, the process of land 
                                                      
33 For the mechanism and process of relocation in Shanghai, see Lee (2006).  
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commodification was also facilitated by the ‘unity’ of socialist and capitalist features. 
Article 10 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states the ownership of 
land in China in the following terms: 
 
Land in the cities is owned by the state. Land in the rural and 
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions 
which belong to the state in accordance with the law … The state 
may in the public interest take over land for its use in accordance 
with the law. (Gov.cn, 2004) 
 
As the land was state-owned, land market was absent in China until the Reform was 
carried out. The Constitution also enabled the state to expropriate land in the public 
interest whenever it wished (Lin and Ho, 2005, p.418). This fundamental understanding 
of public ownership generally has remained unchanged after the Reform, so that 
individuals or organisations are only assumed the rights of land use and land transfer. In 
other words, land can only be leased, but not be sold, to individuals. Lefebvre argued 
that land, capital and labour established a ‘trinity in the capitalist society through the 
production of space (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.282). A similar trend can be observed in 
Shanghai now. This ‘persistence’ of the socialist system is particularly important in the 
production of space in urban China. As private ownership and the lease of land were 
prohibited before the Reform, the state virtually became the only land owner when the 
land market was created in the late 1980s. In the early phase of the Reform, urbanisation 
(i.e. turning rural areas to non-agricultural use) contributed significantly to the 
expansion of the economy through land sales (Zhang, 2002, p.483). In recent years, land 
sales still account for between 30% and 70% of the revenue of many municipal 
governments (Lin and Ho, 2005, p.423). Table 6.2 shows the income received by the 
Shanghai Municipality from the transfer of land use rights. The revenue in 2009 and 
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2010 was 8.37 billion and 29.21 billion respectively. In 2010, the fiscal revenue of 
Shanghai from tax was 800.34 billion, but 500 billion was remitted to Central 
Government. As the income from land sale was regarded as non-tax income that was not 
required to be remitted to the Central Government, land commodification therefore 
became an important income source for local governments.  
 
Income from Transfer of Land Use Rights of Shanghai Municipality 
 
 2009 
(RMB billion) 
2010 
(RMB billion) 
Income from the transfer of land use rights  67.57 194.98 
Expenses  
­ Cost for the transfer of Land Use Right (e.g., 
compensation for land appropriation and relocation, 
land development, service charge etc.) 
­ Revenue expenditure (e.g., expenses for city 
development, urban subsidiary rental house, 
compensation  
 
47.71 
 
 
11.49 
 
124.50 
 
 
41.27 
Revenue  8.37 29.21 
Source: Shanghai Municipality (2010, 2011a) 
 
Since the late 1990s, different policy reforms, including the land-banking mechanism, 
were introduced to better protect individual property rights and restrain urbanisation (or 
to slow down economic growth), but land commodification is still an important means 
for capital accumulation. Land banking means the advance acquisition and reservation 
of land by the state or private companies before development (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, 
p.896). Its vision is to regulate land sale, provide fair and stable land supply and 
intervene in urban development, but with the monopoly of the state in land ownership in 
China, in practice it has become a mechanism for the state to generate further income by 
commodifying land.  
 
Rather than directly raising capital from the market through the transfer of land use 
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rights, land commodification at local government level is more complicated and 
involves different interest groups. Land is expropriated by the land banking agency, and 
conveyed to the land user (other government body or developer) through administrative 
allocation, negotiation, tender, auction or quotation. Then, the land users are responsible 
for financing the projects through land trading or mortgaging with banks or other 
companies in the secondary market. This is an important practice particularly for the 
municipality with capital shortage. As these banks and other enterprises are reliant on 
these businesses, the economy is thus ultimately dependent on land commodification. 
Rather than regulating urban development and land price, the state makes more effort in 
sustaining such a model of economic development. This is because the contraction of 
the property market will damage the economy and reduce the income of local 
governments (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, pp.908-909) 
 
This process of land commodification is smooth due to the dual identity of the state. 
Alongside its regulatory role (land banking and legislation power), the state also 
participates in market activities (e.g., directly playing the role, or through SOEs, as a 
land developer). A similar strategy has been adopted for the organisation of the 
Shanghai Expo. Alongside the World Expo Group, the Shanghai World Expo Land 
Reserve Centre was established by the municipal government to raise funds for 
infrastructure development, relocation of residents and enterprises within the Expo Site, 
as well as being responsible for the ‘utilisation’ of the Expo Site after the event (Huang, 
2007, p.47). Through land sale, issuing bonds and loans from banks, the Land Reserve 
Centre has generated revenues to sustain infrastructure construction (inside and outside 
the Expo Site) through market activities. The state can avoid being a direct sponsor or 
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participation in urban development projects. Funds can be raised through the market 
operation of the SOEs.  
 
The start-up fund of EXPO Land came from the Shanghai World Expo Land Reserve 
Centre (3.4 billion), Shanghai Land (3 billion) and the Shanghai Chengtou Corporation 
(3 billion). Shanghai Land is the operating body of the Shanghai Land Reserve Centre, 
established in 2004. The Shanghai Chengtou Corporation was established in 1992 with 
the approval of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government and funded by the 
Shanghai Municipal State-owned Assets Administrative Office, responsible for 
fundraising and management of urban development. A total of 8 billion ‘Expo Bonds’ 
were issued by the World Expo Group and Expo Land in 2005 and 2007 respectively to 
raise capital from the market, to fund the construction and operation of the Shanghai 
Expo. EXPO Land is also responsible for the future use of the land and revitalisation of 
heritage (Huang, 2007, p.139).  
 
5.1.5  Dual Role of the State to Unify ‘Socialism’ and ‘Capitalism’ 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that State Mode of Production (SMP) as 
a ‘new state form’ should not be simply be categorised as socialist or capitalist. Given 
the fact that the tetraology De l'État was written in the 1970s and Lefebvre’s lifelong 
involvement in political commentary, Brenner and Elden argue that the sociopolitical 
environment in the 1970s should be considered so as to fully understand the meaning of 
SMP (2001, pp.763-764). Rather than merely a critique of Stalinism, they argue that 
Lefebvre’s main intention was to examine Western European countries, when a growing 
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role of the state in economic development was observed in the 1970s. There was a 
planetary phenomenon of growing similarity of the productivist states and Lefebvre 
responded, as pointed out above, to such change by proposing the term SMP. Therefore, 
his writings during this period should be ‘read as an expression of his sustained efforts 
to clarify both theoretically and practically the possibility for transformative political 
praxis under the highly fluid global, European, national, and local conditions of that 
tumultuous decade’ (ibid, p.784). 
 
Although the Reform in China is now regarded as a miracle, the transformation was not 
entirely smooth but shaped by the tumultuous local and global environments. Alongside 
the Asian Financial Tsunami, referred to above, the Russian experience of privatisation 
also alerted the Chinese government to carry out economic liberalisation measures more 
cautiously (Sheng and Zhao, 2013, p.260). In order to avoid the national assets 
becoming concentrated in oligarchs, the state tightly upheld its strategic assets through 
the SASAC, during the restructuring of the SOEs and created monopolies for the SOEs 
through legislation. However, the outcome was the dominance of the corporatised SOEs 
in the market. Some named the resurrection of the SOEs as ‘guojin mintui’ (the entry of 
the state and the withdrawal of individual investment) to describe the increasing 
involvement of the SOEs by superseding individual investment as the most significant 
market player (Hong, 2012). In other words, the economic liberalisation measures (e.g., 
marketisation and corporatisation of the SOEs) were not transitional to establish a 
well-regulated free market without state intervention, but to maintain the regulatory role 
of the state without sacrificing its economic benefit.  
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Nevertheless, the coexistence of capitalist and socialist features is not eclectic and 
transitional, and the process should not be regarded as a transitional stage from 
socialism to capitalism. The state did not retreat from market intervention and 
participation, but actively contributed to economic development (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, 
p.896). Bringing the opposites (capitalist and socialist features) into ‘unity’, the state 
strategically manipulated the advantages of both systems to achieve rapid economic 
growth. As discussed above, that state became managerial and administrative in 
facilitating economic activities under the SMP. The state of China also demonstrates 
similar features under the state-led/-participation mode of production. As illustrated 
above with the example of the Shanghai Expo, the state actively participates in a market 
that it regulates, so as to generate benefits during market liberalisation. Even though the 
market continues to liberalise, the state still retains its ultimate domination in political, 
economic and social realms. Rather than simply considering the Reform as a transition 
from socialism to capitalism, it should be regarded as a transformation of bringing the 
contradictions between socialist and capitalistic logics into ‘unity’ by the state. 
Therefore, I slightly revise the term ‘state mode of production’ to state-led/-participation 
mode of production to emphasise the dual role of the state in production, especially its 
participation in the market. By having the double roles as a regulator and a participator, 
the state has the absolute power in creating favourable conditions for its commercial 
operations. In the next section, I further decipher how the state manipulated its 
legislative power to facilitate land commodification and produced a specific spatial 
arrangement under such as mode of production.  
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5.2   Spatial Practice of Shanghai  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre regarded social space as a concrete abstraction. 
Social space is the medium where production takes place and the social relations of 
production are established and reproduced (Gottdiener, 1993, p.130; Stanek, 2008c, 
p.76). In order to fully understand social space in a city, the architecture, physical 
environment, history, daily life of inhabitants, role of state, as well as cultural 
representation needs to be considered. Therefore, Lefebvre proposed the spatial triad 
(spatial practice, representation of space and representational space) to theorise how 
space is produced by the mode of production and how the production of space 
reproduced the mode of production.  
 
I argued above that the state plays the roles of regulator and also as participant, in order 
to manipulate the market under the state-led/-participation mode of production. Under 
such a mode of production, what kind(s) of space does the state plan to produce? What 
kind(s) of new space has this mode of production produced? In this section and the next, 
I apply Lefebvre’s spatial triad to identify the spatial practice and representation of 
space of Shanghai. As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre argued that new space is 
produced upon the existing one, so that there are ‘sociological fossils’ that coexist in the 
city (2003[1966], p.113). The application of a regressive-progressive method is 
therefore needed to identify the influences of the previous mode(s) of production on the 
urban space and the urban experience of the present (Stanek, 2008c, p.113). In Chapter 
Four, I periodised Shanghai’s history of space by modes of production to address the 
vertical complexity of space of Shanghai. I argued that Shanghai during the 
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‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ served as China’s capital of modernity to introduce 
Western modernity to China, and experimented with socialism during the ‘socialist 
reform era’ as a critique of Western capitalism. Based on such a historical background, 
this chapter discusses how the history of space currently exerts influence on the spatial 
practice of Shanghai . Following this, the relationship between spatial arrangement and 
mode of production will be discussed.  
 
5.2.1  The Puxi/Pudong Divide 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre (1991[1974], pp.38-42) introduced the term 
‘spatial practice’ to summarise the spatial arrangement (including built and physical 
environments) of the city. Spatial practice is mode of production specific, because it is 
produced by and further facilitates the reproduction of that particular mode of 
production. Alongside human activities, Lefebvre also noticed the significance of the 
natural environment on the production of space because the perception of the natural 
environment would influence the way that individuals settle in and plan the city (ibid, 
pp.48-49). Geographically, Shanghai is ‘naturally’ divided by the Huangpu River into 
two regions, Puxi (west of the Huangpu River) and Pudong (east of the Huangpu River). 
Spatial practice of Shanghai under the state-led/-participation mode of production can 
be summarised by such a ‘Puxi/Pudong divide’. Puxi is where the historic walled 
‘Chinese city’ and Bund were located. The Western architecture at the Bund is typically 
regarded as the icon of ‘old Shanghai’ with a capitalistic and cosmopolitan history. 
Pudong was barren land dominated by farmland and fishing villages (Wasserstrom, 
2009, p.1). Since Shanghai began to urbanise in the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, 
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different imaginaries have been attached to both regions. Such a difference can be 
summarised by the popular Chinese saying: ‘A single room in Puxi is better than a 
whole apartment in Pudong’ (ningyao Puxi yijianfang, buyao Pudong yitaofang) (Lu, 
1999, p.359). It meant that people much preferred to live in Puxi than in Pudong, 
because the westbound was much more developed and properties were much more 
valued.34  
 
With different trajectories of urbanisation, different strategies were practised by the state 
to transform urban space during the preparatory period of the Shanghai Expo. The 
capitalist past of Puxi was imagined through the revitalisation of heritage and the 
skyline of Pudong was celebrated as the achievement of the state. Pudong was taken as 
an icon of the miraculous economic development within a short period of time. 
However, such an impression changed since the State Council announced the 
establishment of a special economic zone, the Pudong Development Zone, for foreign 
investment in 1992 (Wasserstrom, 2009, p.122). With the facilitation by state policies 
and foreign investments, Pudong rapidly urbanised with Lujiazui developed as the new 
central business district of the city. Lujiazui is concentrated with skyscrapers and two of 
the world’s top ten tallest buildings, namely the Shanghai International Financial Centre 
and the Jin Mao Tower, are located there. The Asia and the World’s second tallest 
building, the Shanghai Tower, are also expected to be completed in 2014. These 
skyscrapers produced a modernist skyline in Pudong that is a drastic contrast with the 
                                                      
34 Spatial arrangement is always an important factor in shaping the identity of the Shanghaiese. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, Shanghai was divided into the walled ‘Chinese city’ and concession areas 
during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ (Wei, 1987, p.6). The ‘Chinese city’ was further categorised 
into the ‘higher corner’ (shang zhi jiao; the city’s fine neighbours) and the ‘lower corner’ (xia zhi jiao; the 
city’s poor neighbours) to represent the differences in resident composition in both regions. However, 
such a spatial segregation is insignificant to non-locals (Lu, 1999, p.15). 
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historic buildings at the Bund across the River, and are celebrated as miracles of 
economic liberation by the state (Wu, 1998, p.140). Such a divide highlights two kinds 
of spatial practices under state-led/-participation mode of production in Shanghai. In 
this section, the spatial practices in Puxi and Pudong will be outlined as a cognitive map 
that will allow understanding of the different trends of spatial (re)construction that are 
happening in Shanghai.  
 
5.2.2  Spatial Practice in Puxi 
 
Due to its proximity to the mainland, Puxi was the administrative region of Shanghai 
when it developed as a market town in the thirteenth century. It was where the 
Concession areas, the Bund and Wu Jiao Chang was located. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, the social space of Puxi can be regarded as the showroom of modernisation during 
the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’. For examples, modern urban infrastructure, such as 
gaslighting, electricity, cafés, cinemas, dance halls and Art Deco buildings were 
introduced to China through Puxi (Lee, 1999a, p.77). The Bund exhibited the presence 
of global capitalism; and nationalist icons such as the stadium were also built in Wu Jiao 
Chang, as a national symbolic confrontation to imperialism.  
 
With a relatively longer history and the lack of comprehensive planning during the early 
phase of urbanisation, roads in Puxi are generally narrow, serving to stratify the region 
into relatively small districts. Along the Bund are the façades of the headquarters of 
banks, insurance companies, trading companies, the Customs Office and foreign 
embassies. Not far away from these western structures, located at the end of Nanjing 
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Road, is the first department store in China, and located at Fuzhou Road are the 
publishing houses. Puxi was the political, cultural, economic and social centre of the 
city, so that the built heritage of Shanghai is mainly concentrated in Puxi (Diglio, 2005, 
p.112). The spatial practice in Puxi is therefore dominated by urban renewal and 
heritage revitalisation projects. Under these projects, space is commercialised and 
gentrified with the purpose of reconnecting the city to her capitalist past and at the same 
time provide justification for economic liberalisation.  
 
Lefebvre particularly emphasised the importance of the history of space. Not only 
because it helps understand changing class relations, but also the rearrangement of 
social space could only occur on the foundation of the existing one (Shields, 1999, 
p.170). In Chapter Two, I briefly discussed that the production of new space was 
enabled by the disintegration of the old towns (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.68-69, 81). In 
this thesis, I therefore only include the ‘old districts’ in the city centre of Shanghai in 
my categorisation of Puxi to examine how new space is produced on the existing one. In 
spite of their geographical location at the west of the Huangpu River, countryside areas 
or new towns such as Jiading and Baoshan are not included in my categorisation.  
 
During urbanisation, history and nature are usually manipulated by ‘spatial experts’ (e.g., 
the state, property developers, urban planners) to promote a bourgeois lifestyle. A 
feeling of being ‘natural’ and ‘historical’ for the dominant class is constructed by 
urbanising space (e.g., constructing resorts in the country side). For the regions which 
originally experienced a certain degree of urbanisation, history was also reconstructed in 
accordance with the ideology of the mode of production. The historic buildings in Puxi 
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were usually revitalised to promote a sense of ‘Shanghai nostalgia’. For instance, 
Xintiandi, a heritage revitalisation project of linong completed in 2001, was promoted 
by the municipal government as one of the best showcases of ‘Old Shanghai’ for the 
tourists who visited the city. Revitalisation projects such as Xintiandi attempted to 
reconnect the city to the capitalist and cosmopolitan past of old Shanghai in the 1930s 
through the façades of new buildings. It was imagined as Shanghai’s cultural roots, 
which provided a historical connection to the current turn to capitalism. The daily life of 
ordinary inhabitants was also glorified as the ‘the history of the city’. Ironically, this 
representation of history became possible only because the revitalisation project forced 
the relocation of Puxi’s original residents (Wai, 2006, p.250).  
 
Alongside heritage revitalisation projects, individuals’ urban experience was also 
shaped by other initiatives of urban renewal. For instance, Wujiao Road, a vibrant street 
at Jingan District with restaurants and local food stalls on both sides, was reconstructed 
and expanded by the local district government. Under the plan, more shops opened in 
the street with more rental space available, which brought a rise in their commercial 
value. However, the distinctive features and local memories of the space were 
eradicated. The reconstruction of Wujiao Road is only one of the reconstruction projects 
in the bigger district along Nanjing Road West. Under the urban renewal vision of the 
Planning Bureau of Shanghai Jingan District (2011), Wu Jiao Road was zoned as the 
‘media and culture district’ (because the headquarters of some media organisations are 
located there), thus the street was reconstructed in order to comply with this vision. 
Before the Reform, social areas were arranged by land use (e.g., universities, factories), 
so the residents of various districts of Shanghai were relatively homogeneous. But 
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greater spatial differentiation is observed now (Wu, 2002, p.1594). By replacing ‘old’ 
districts and streets with an organised, clean and managed commercial space, a highly 
rationalised new urban experience is constructed for the consumption of the Chinese 
new rich.  
 
Although the state identified different themes for the urban renewal of Puxi, the 
imagination of Puxi is predominately connected with its history. The imagination of 
daily life in Puxi is closely linked to the ‘sociological fossils’ that are represented by 
linong. For instance, the communal experience of living in linong was regarded as 
where local Shanghaiese identity was produced (Bao, Wang, Zhu, et al., 2001, 
pp.147-148). Therefore, any change in the spatial arrangement would predictably result 
in the alteration of the inhabitants’ perception and experience of the city. In Chapter Six, 
I further discuss how the demolition of linong changed the urban experience of 
Shanghai’s inhabitants today.  
 
5.2.3  Spatial Practice in Pudong  
 
The Chinese saying shinian hedong, shinian hexi is a metaphor of cycles. It means that 
the prosperity on the eastbound will eventually vanish but the westbound will flourish 
some day. When Puxi underwent extensive spatial rearrangement during the 
‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, Pudong was dominantly agricultural. From the 1950s 
to the 1970s, when Shanghai witnessed a rapid phase of industrialisation under the 
national policy, a number of immigrants from other provinces were settled in the 
poorly-built public housing in Pudong. With the lack of efficient transportation across 
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the River, most people regarded Pudong as a ‘remote’ area from the old district. Thus, 
Pudong was also commonly referred to as a rough district with internal immigrants, 
non-Shanghai, rural, less developed or even undeveloped. However, Pudong had rapidly 
urbanised in the 1990s. The Pudong New Area was also envisioned as a ‘new 
Manhattan’ (Gamble, 2003, p.x). Lujiazui, where there are many skyscrapers now, was 
planned as the central business district (CBD) of Shanghai and presented as a landmark 
of the ‘economic miracles’ of China’s market liberalisation. Some rewrote the above 
metaphor to ‘ten years on Puxi, ten years on Pudong’ (shinian puxi, shinian pudong) to 
describe the alternation of economic centres from Puxi to Pudong.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that urbanisation enabled the survival of 
capitalism by occupying space and producing new space (1996[1968], pp.68-69). While 
the spatial practice in Puxi is linked to the occupation of an urbanised space (urban 
renewal and heritage revitalisation), the spatial practice in Pudong concerns the creation 
of new space from absolute space. With its shorter history of urbanisation and the 
urbanist vision of planning, most urban development projects in Pudong are about the 
building of new centres, the development of industrial parks, as well as the creation of 
new towns and gated communities. When the establishment of the Pudong Development 
Zone was announced, Pudong was planned with a modernist vision and became a new 
centre of Shanghai (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, p.248). Rather than the narrow roads and 
‘disorganised’ spatial arrangement of Puxi, wide and long roads were constructed in 
Pudong. For instance, Century Avenue, the main road of Pudong from Lujiazui to 
Century Park, is 5.5km long and 100m wide.35 Eight lanes were built in each direction 
                                                      
35 Before Pudong was extensively urbanised in the early 1990s, the Mayor Zhu Rongji has referenced the 
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for the inhabitants to commute by car or public transport. The eastern end of the Avenue 
is Lujiazui (Bergère, 2009, pp.418-419). Alongside the headquarters of SOEs, local and 
global banks and financial institutes, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and shopping malls 
are also located here. The western end leads to Century Park and Century Square, where 
public facilities, including the Office of Pudong New Area Government, the Shanghai 
Oriental Arts Centre, the Shanghai Pudong EXPO, the Pudong New Area Archive 
Centre are located nearby. Not only do these iconic buildings play the role of 
showcasing the achievement of the development, but also nurture the city’s new 
political, economic and cultural centres.  
 
The administration area of Shanghai is also expanding and producing new centres. As 
noted above, Puxi conventionally refers to the old districts in central Shanghai, but not 
the districts newly included in the municipality. These new districts usually have a 
lower level of urbanisation then development projects which were planned during the 
expansion of the administrative region. Similar to the urbanist planning vision of 
Lujiazui, new space is aimed to be produced. For instance, within the framework of the 
Master Plan of Shanghai (1999-2020), the Shanghai Municipal Government announced 
the ‘One City, Nine Towns Development Plan’ in 1999: nine towns with about a 
30,000-100,000 inhabitants and a major city with about 500,000 residents were to be 
built by 2020. Each small town was to be given a theme of a European and North 
American country, e.g., Thames town, Dutch town and German town. Although the plan 
was shelved during the Eleventh Five Year Plan, similar plans of creating new cities 
                                                                                                                                                               
example of the Francois Mitterrand’s Grand Projects of Paris, and later carried out an international 
competition for Lujiazui in 1993. Finally, the proposal by the Shanghai Urban Planning Institute was 
accepted. The idea of the Century Avenue was proposed by the Shanghai Urban Planning Institute, and 
the design was outsourced to the French architect Jean-Marie Charpentier, to be established as Shanghai’s 
Champs-Élysées (Arkaraprasertkul, 2010, pp.247-250).  
178 
were carried out in Jiading, Songjiang and Lingang (Hartog, 2010a, pp.30-34). As these 
areas concerned with the creation of new space, I included these areas under the Pudong 
heading when categorising the spatial practices in Shanghai (though some districts are 
on the westbound of the Huangpu River).  
 
In contrast to the high density of buildings in Puxi, skyscrapers, shopping malls and 
housing estates are scattered along Century Avenue in Pudong. As the scale increases, 
different regions in the districts are connected by public transport, including an 
underground system or buses. In Chapter Six, I illustrate how the urban experience, 
particularly the daily routine, of the inhabitants living in Pudong is shaped by the 
expansion of the city. The creation of new space also produced another kind of urban 
experience, which could be demonstrated by the differences between the gated 
communities and linong. Unlike linong, the ‘modern’ residential estates in Pudong, also 
built in Puxi but more prominent in new towns, are built as a gated community. These 
housing estates are fenced and usually monitored by property management companies 
(Wu, 2002, p.1595). Lefebvre argued that ‘new social relationships call for a new space, 
and vice versa’ (1991[1974], p.59). The emergence of the new rich in China has also 
demanded an improvement in living standards. The ‘modern’ residential estates are built 
with better facilities, thus no facilities such as toilets and kitchens are shared. However, 
interactions between neighbours become limited. In contrast to the communal bond in 
linong, social cohesion between neighbours in the gated community is almost 
non-existent. In Chapter Six, I further illustrate how such a spatial practice constructed 
the urban experience of the inhabitants.  
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5.3   The Representation of Space  
 
After sketching the spatial practice of Shanghai, this section deciphers Shanghai’s 
representations of space and its dialectical relationship with spatial practice under the 
state-led/-participation mode of production. In Chapter Two, I elaborated on the 
meanings of representations of space (‘conceived space’), which can be summarised as 
the hegemony of the dominant class to define spatial practice, so as to define the social 
relations of production (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.41). Lefebvre argued that 
representations of space ‘have at times combined ideology and knowledge’ to facilitate 
the production of space:  
 
The area where ideology and knowledge are barely distinguishable 
is subsumed under the broader notion of representation, which thus 
supplants the concept of ideology and becomes a serviceable 
(operational) tool for the analysis of space, as of those societies 
which have given rise to them and recognised themselves in them. 
(Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.45; original emphasis)  
 
In other words, representations of space can be regarded as the meaning, justification or 
rationalisation provided by the ruling class to contextualise the spatial practice of the 
city. It is a ‘conceived space’ because it represents the dominant class’s visions of the 
rearrangement of physical space (spatial changes). By manipulating the planning and 
construction of spatial arrangement in the city (through the knowledge of ‘spatial 
experts’) and supplanting ideology (to justify such a spatial arrangement), the dominant 
class shapes the urban experience of the city’s inhabitants.  
 
Under this new mode of production, the state needed to establish a new relationship 
180 
between the state and individuals. What are the representations of space that the state 
constructed? What are the new ideologies upheld by the state? What are the visions of 
‘spatial experts’ of reconfiguring the spatial arrangement of the city? Similar to the 
previous sections, I address these questions using the Shanghai Expo as an example.  
 
5.3.1  ‘The City Makes Life Better’ 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, urban areas were demonised as capitalistic, parasitic, and 
aristocratic during the ‘socialist reform era’, in particular the urbanism of Shanghai that 
flourished in the 1930s (Fung, 1981, p.280). The state therefore needed to provide 
ideological justifications for rapid urbanisation for the reversal of policy in recent 
decades. During the early phase of the Reform, urbanisation faced relatively little 
challenge as urban development after the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was generally agreed. 
But the drawbacks of urbanisation, including pollution, income disparity, uneven 
distribution and the destruction of cultural heritage, etc. were of much more concern in 
recent years. Economic expansion alone is no longer sufficient to defend urbanisation. 
The state therefore employed several ideological strategies to justify urbanisation.  
 
The first ideological strategy was rather straightforward: urbanisation was promoted by 
the state as favourable and inevitable. Such a strategy was applied during the 
preparation stage of the Shanghai Expo. While early World Expos emphasised 
technological advancement, the theme of the Shanghai Expo was ‘Better City, Better 
Life’ (Huang, 2007, p.65). There were five subthemes addressing different aspects of the 
city, which included: ‘blending of diverse cultures in the city’, ‘economic prosperity in 
the city’, ‘innovations of science and technology in the city’, ‘remodelling of 
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communities in the city’, and ‘interactions between urban and rural areas’ (Huang, 2007, 
pp.69-73)36. However, the meaning of the Chinese version of the theme, chengshi, rang 
shenghou geng meihao (literally translated as ‘City Makes Life Better’), is not exactly 
the same as the English one. The English version emphasises the solutions to improve 
the quality of life by developing a better city, but the Chinese version simply justifies 
the city as a place which improves the quality of life. In a book with the subtitle The 
Interpretation of the Theme of Shanghai World Expo that was edited by the Theme 
Development Department of Bureau of Shanghai Expo Coordination37, it is argued that 
urbanisation is a trend of history by referring to the increasing size of the global urban 
population:  
 
From the theoretical perspective, can a city make life better? 
Absolutely it can! Otherwise, why were there ten thousands of 
people rushing into the city when there were a thousand people 
complaining about city? (Editorial board of Expo Magazine, 2009, 
p.41) 
 
Urbanisation was represented as favourable because it facilitated economic, social, 
cultural, and technological progress. Even though urbanisation produced social and 
environmental problems, it was seen as an inevitable global trend that could be 
challenged. The Shanghai Expo, which speeded up urbanisation, was paradoxically 
promoted as the state’s efforts to address these problems. For example, the exhibition at 
the China Pavilion did not focus on reflection about urbanisation, but rather focused on 
confirming China’s re-entry to the world and the official ideology of building a 
                                                      
36 The theme ‘Better City, Better Life’ was originally proposed by the BIE for a then withdrawn World 
Expo in Japan. This theme was adopted up by Shanghai upon a mutual agreement (Editorial board of 
Expo Magazine, 2009).  
37 The official English title of this unit is somehow different from the Chinese version. Rather than 
‘Theme Development Department’, the Chinese title (Shanghai shibohui zhuti yanyi bu) should be 
literally translated as ‘Theme Interpretation Department’.  
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‘harmonious society’ (Nordin, 2012, pp.243-244). Under such a representation of space, 
the visitors (whom were dominantly locals) were ‘educated’ to appreciate the benefits 
that urbanisation brings about to their lives, but not to critically evaluate the impact of 
urbanisation.  
 
5.3.2  The Shanghai Expo as a Substitute for Political Campaigns 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, physical space was particularly important in establishing 
the social relations of production and restraining urban culture in China during the 
‘socialist reform era’. The state exerted its control through danwei, where ‘the state 
controls the economy and monopolises all social resources’ (Sun, 2004, p.31 cited Wu, 
2011, p.702). The urban population was also compulsorily assigned to a danwei, where 
they were employed. Housing and other social welfare were also allocated by the local 
government through the respective danwei. In other words, individuals were spatially, 
politically and socially organised by the state with danwei being positioned at the centre 
of the social relations of production. Entering the ‘post-socialist reform era’, the state 
began to restructure SOEs and employment outside danwei became possible. Together 
with the emergence of the private property market (as a direct result of land 
commodification), residential location in urban areas became no longer allocated by 
danwei. The decline of danwei entails two implications. First, there was a 
transformation of social relations of production. Danwei was no longer the physical 
space where the social relations of production were produced. The liberalisation of 
spatial arrangement in the location of residences means that the inhabitants were 
liberalised from a centrally-planned economy. The urban population was also stratified 
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into different social classes (Bian, 2002, pp.92-93). Second, the social life of urban 
inhabitants was no longer organised by the state through danwei and tied to political 
campaigns.  
 
Although an anti-urbanisation policy was carried out in the Maoist era, the socialist 
regime was always aware of the political implications of urban space. When Beijing 
was developed as a socialist capital, for instance, Tiananmen Square was purposely 
reconstructed on a grand scale. This impressive scale provided the physical space for 
political gatherings, including army parades and people gathering during National Day 
(Hung, 2001, pp.458-459). Parades were less frequently organised in recent years, and 
more importantly, political campaigns were less readily organised after the collapse of 
danwei. Therefore, mega-events like the Shanghai Expo were promoted as a national 
event. Chinese cities began to organise international events since the late 1990s. For 
instance, Kunming held the World Horticultural Expo in 2001, Beijing held the Olympic 
Games in 2008; the Asian Games 2010 and the Summer Universiade 2011 were held in 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen respectively. Similar to the Shanghai Expo, these events were 
‘place-branding spectacles’ (Dynon, 2011, p.186). More importantly, these events are 
represented as a national project for the people to participate in the country’s 
development. For example, the Shanghai Expo Bureau (expo2010.cn, 2010) emphasised 
that there were about 80,000 volunteers contributing to the event. Alongside the concern 
of recruiting people to execute the event, it also mobilised the people to take part in the 
state through a national project. With the collapse of danwei, the state re-established its 
relationship to the people through mega-events. Therefore, the Shanghai Expo, as well 
as other mega-events, served as substitutes for political campaigns as strategies for mass 
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mobilisation.  
 
5.3.3  The Realisation of a ‘Century-old Dream’ 
 
The collapse of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in the early 1990s alerted 
the leaders of the CPC to the political implications of economic reform. Li Jingjie, the 
director of the former Soviet-Eastern Europe Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), identified eight lessons for the CPC to learn. Alongside improving 
productivity, the material life of the people and incorporating capitalist features into the 
economic system, Li argued that the state should be ‘ideologically flexible and 
progressive’ because ‘there is no set model for a socialist society’ (Shambaugh, 2008, 
p.76). When idealistic socialism began to be questioned in the early 1990s, one of the 
strategies of filling such an ideological vacuum was the promotion of patriotism through 
the national education programmes in campuses and the media. By confronting national 
enemies (e.g., militarism and rightist movements in Japan), emphasising the history of 
humiliation (e.g., the invasion of colonialism since the late Qing Dynasty) and 
glorifying national achievement (e.g., achievement in the Olympic Games and space 
programme), national identity was fostered, especially among younger generations 
(Zheng, 2008, pp.791-792). Similarly, urbanisation was also glorified as a national 
achievement by the state. For instance, the urban development of Lujiazui at Pudong 
(material space) was represented as a symbol of the success of the Reform, and perhaps 
even more importantly, the achievement of the CPC in accomplishing the country’s 
dream during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’: 
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As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
envisioned a great ‘Oriental Harbor’ in Shanghai, including Pudong, 
but his vision was not realized. In the last decade of that century, 
dramatic changes took place in this area. Farmland and villages 
were turned into an export-oriented, multi-functional, modern new 
urban district. Pudong became known as a ‘symbol of Shanghai’s 
modernization’ and a ‘symbol of China’s reform and opening’. 
(Shanghai Municipality, 2011d) 
 
The visually powerful scenery of a modernist skyline at Lujiazui was manipulated to 
justify the Reform, as an effective means to revitalise the country (i.e. accomplishing 
the dream of Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China). Similarly, the 
Shanghai Expo was also represented as a symbol of patriotism by the state. In an 
opening speech to the seventh World Expo International Forum, Wen Jiabao (2009), the 
former Premier of the State Council, described the World Expo as a ‘remote dream’ of 
China:  
 
In 1910, a young man by the name of Lu Shi'e wrote a fictional 
novel A New China, envisaging how a universal exposition was held 
in Shanghai's Pudong area 100 years later. Liang Qichao, a leader of 
the Reform Movement of 1898 in China, also expressed his desire 
for Shanghai to host the World Expo so that his motherland, ‘the 
sleeping lion’, ‘can be woken up from the deep dream and cured of 
its protracted illness’. But, in those days, to host the World Expo 
was nothing but a remote dream for the Chinese nation, as it had to 
grapple with domestic problems and foreign invasion and declining 
national strength … Since the founding of New China, especially 
the introduction of the policy of reform and opening-up, China has 
seized the historic opportunities and realized a three-decade-long 
rapid growth, with remarkable achievements in its socialist 
development. China is opening wider to the outside world. It is back 
on the stage of the World Expo, and its increasingly important role 
in the Expo is widely welcomed and appreciated by the international 
community. (Wen, 2009) 
 
Since Premier Wen delivered the speech, the discourse of ‘the realisation of a 
century-old dream’ became widely circulated in the Chinese media. As it is a ‘remote 
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dream’ being aspired to when China was ‘humiliated’ by Western powers, the Shanghai 
Expo was elevated as the revitalisation of the Chinese nation. Alongside a ‘remarkable 
achievement of socialist development’, the Shanghai Expo and accompanying 
urbanisation projects were also projected as ‘the realisation of a century-old dream’. 
Such a representation of space, firstly, established the relations between the inhabitants 
and the state: the inhabitants of Shanghai should take part in the Shanghai Expo because 
it is a contribution to the modernisation of the country. It implies that the inhabitants 
should not disagree with the relocation plan of this mega-event – it is because the 
relocation was also a part of the country’s modernisation project. Secondly, this 
representation of space also established the legitimacy of the state. The time frame of 
the ‘dream’ is perhaps more important than the ‘dream’ itself. The ‘remote dream’ was 
written one hundred years ago, yet the weak empire and the Republic could not 
actualise it. As such, the Communist regime is glorified in accomplishing the dream 
after ‘a hundred year of humiliation’.  
 
Such a ‘century-old dream’ of organising a universal exposition at Pudong was, 
however, mistaken. In the novel, Lu Shi’e did not make any prediction that Shanghai 
would hold a World Expo in 2010. But he only randomly dreamt of Shanghai organising 
a large-scale national exposition in 1928. The mistake could be identified easily by 
referring to the original novel (Chen, 2010, pp.350-354). The Expo Bureau recruited a 
special team of researchers to conduct research on the World Expo especially about 
China’s participation in early World Expos. Thus, it is not unreasonable to postulate that 
such a mistake is somehow purposeful, so as to manipulate knowledge as a ‘serviceable 
tool’ to provide justification for the production of space.  
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5.3.4  Surpassing the West and the ‘China Model’ 
 
On the official website of the Shanghai Expo, the following figures were presented on 
the front page:  
 
­ Size of Expo sites: 5.28sq km  
­ Number of participants: 246 
­ Number of visitors: 73 million  
­ Number of events: 22,290 
­ Number of volunteers: 79,965 
 
These figures are ranked number one in this history of the World Expo. The 
urbanisation of Shanghai in the last decade was also promoted as the modernisation of 
city infrastructure and having surpassed that of Western cities. The assertion of ‘150 
years for London, 15 years for Shanghai’ was frequently used as propaganda, 
proclaiming that Shanghai took only 15 years to construct a comprehensive 
underground system that took London a century and a half (China News, 2010). While 
‘a hundred years of humiliation’ is self-victimisation, ‘surpassing the West’ emphasised 
the national achievement. The Shanghai Expo was regarded a milestone, which is 
visualised by the transformation of physical space.  
 
Such an ideological justification is particularly important to justify a 
state-led/-participation mode of production as a specific model of China. In 1989, there 
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were student movements across different regions of the country to protest against 
corruption, which ended in the Tiananmen Incident. The regime was challenged and 
therefore this led to the temporary suspension of economic liberalisation and the state 
took a stronger role in both economic and political realms. The reason for maintaining a 
totalitarian state was therefore both economic and political. Especially amid the global 
financial crisis, the rising economic power and political influence of China has attracted 
attention from the international media and scholars. While deregulation is generally 
regarded as the reason for the crisis (Crotty, 2009, p.564), China’s New Left 
intellectuals proclaimed that the combination of the market economy and government 
intervention is the reason for China’s economic success. As I briefly pointed out in 
Chapter One, they escalated the discussion to an ideological level by suggesting that a 
‘China Model’ or ‘Beijing Consensus’ was developed as an alternative to neo-liberalism 
and the Washington Consensus (Zheng, 2011, pp.100-103). Adopting a similar line of 
thought, the Shanghai Expo was regarded as a symbol of ‘surpassing the West’ (e.g., 
attracting the highest number of visitors). In general, the urbanisation of Shanghai also 
provided ‘proof’ that the socio-political system in China is superior to Western 
countries.  
 
5.3.5  The Reproduction of the Mode of Production  
 
When Lefebvre outlined the history of space (of Western societies), he emphasised that 
the relationship between (social) space and social relations of production is dialectical. 
Each mode of production will produce a corresponding (social) space. Dialectically, the 
(social) space itself will also reproduce the social relations and the mode of production 
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(1991[1974], p.49). For example, as a typical strategy to stimulate economic activities, 
the government attempted to attract investment by constructing an industrial estate. 
When more factories were built, more workers would be attracted to work and live 
in/around the industrial estate. This in turn created further demand for the production of 
spatial arrangement. Lefebvre then applied the spatial triad to illustrate how the 
conceived space (representation of space) shaped the material space (spatial practice) to 
facilitate the reproduction of the mode of production and shape the experience of the 
individuals (ibid, p.50). 
 
The state-led/-participation mode of production in Shanghai also reproduced itself 
through the production of new space. In this chapter, I highlighted the role of the state in 
such a mode of production, i.e. it did not transform to a pure regulatory institution for 
market competition but continued to uphold ultimate control on the pace and direction 
of liberalisation. Whenever necessary, it also played a dominating role in the market 
through legislation of market regulation and participation in market activities. As 
explained above, through its power of legislation, the state created a land market for 
fundraising capital from the market but also kept the autonomous market limited. Albeit 
the process of economic liberalisation appears to continue, a ‘natural’ monopoly has 
been created by the state through the reorganisation of SOEs. Paradoxically, the 
marketisation of SOEs has facilitated its monopolisation of the market.  
 
This process of ‘monopolisation through marketisation’ is possible only with the lack of 
a supervision system or resistance in society. When Max Weber examined the 
bureaucracy of the Chinese empire, the term ‘patrimonialism’ was applied to describe 
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that the emperor and statesmen took the state as their personal property (Ritzer, 1992, 
pp.132-133). Although government officials, at whatever level, could no longer exert 
absolute power like an emperor, the state still showed some features of patrimonialism. 
As illustrated above, strategic industries are still controlled by the state through the 
SASAC, in which the top officials of the SASAC and senior management of SOEs are 
the senior officials in the party branch or somebody with close ties to them. As SOEs 
are required to remit a limited proportion of the profit to the state, SOEs could easily 
become the tool of some senior officials to generate income for themselves. 
Consequently, vested interest lured officials to further strengthen the mode of 
production by promoting favourable policies for the SOEs.  
 
Alongside the personal interest of officials, the state and the private sector also 
established a pro-growth coalition (Zhang, 2002, p.475). As identified by Tingwei 
Zhang, after the Asian Financial Turmoil, the land commodification projects in China 
became a new investment opportunity for international financial institutes when other 
economies shrunk. Land commodification was thus speeded up since the late 1990s; a 
strategy of capital accumulation. The infrastructure and property development were 
costly, competition from individual investment was therefore prevented and the 
pro-growth coalition could sustain its monopoly (ibid, pp.487, 493). When the income 
from land commodification became increasingly significant (especially for local 
governments), the state further strengthened this mode of production and even 
participated in the market. In the late 1990s, when the vacancy rate in Shanghai 
arguably reached 40%, there was alarm that a property bubble had built up (Haila, 1999, 
p.108). However, the property market continued to expand as the local government 
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continued to implement policies favouring the development of the property market (He 
and Wu, 2005, p.10).  
 
Lefebvre predicted that new space also reproduced a mode of production (1976[1973], 
p.63). As illustrated above, the Shanghai World Expo Land Reserve Centre generated 
greater income with policy favours. When the land was commodified, the local residents 
needed to be relocated and this was usually resolved by monetary compensation. After 
receiving compensation, individuals would further invest in the property market with 
their compensation, which further strengthened this property-led development. In the 
next chapter, I further illustrate in greater detail how the property market shaped 
inhabitants’ urban experience and the resistance that emerged with relocation.  
 
5.4   Conclusion: Rebuilding Shanghai  
 
It has been argued that Shanghai experienced ‘the most dramatic spatial transformation 
of any city anywhere’ in the last two decades (Chen, 2007, p.1). The colossal scale of 
urbanisation of Shanghai in the last decade easily made people recall and compare the 
redevelopment project of Paris by Haussmann during the French Second Empire (Wong, 
2009, p.15). As introduced in Chapter Two, Haussmann was commissioned by 
Napoléon III to rebuild Paris, with measures, including the widening of streets, 
constructing boulevards, replacing old buildings by new ones with standard heights, as 
well as constructing intercity railways, etc. Similar projects were carried out in 
Shanghai during the ‘post-socialist reform era’, especially catalysed by the Shanghai 
Expo. As discussed above, examples included, linongs were demolished and replaced by 
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‘modern’ residential apartments, Century Avenue was constructed, new towns were 
developed, and infrastructure facilities, such as bridges, railways and highways were 
constructed.  
 
Under Haussmann’s plan, Paris was strategically rebuilt, with the purpose of 
ascertaining the authority of the Empire, to provide easier access for the army, as well as 
replacing the working class by the bourgeoisie (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.75-76). 
Similar to Haussmann’s plan of renovating Paris, the rapid urbanisation of Shanghai 
was also functional (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.312). In this chapter, by delineating the 
restructuring of SOEs, the spatial practices and the representations of space, I argued 
that the state-led/-participation mode of production has been developed. Through the 
double roles as a regulator and a market player, the state manipulated its power to 
closely control society and generate benefits from market liberalisation. Land 
commodification facilitated such a mode of production, and in turn resulted in the rapid 
urbanisation of Shanghai during the last decades. By ‘unifying’ the features of socialist 
and capitalist logics, the state was also able to sustain economic growth to justify the 
mode of production itself, as well as the legitimacy of single party rule. The state has 
played a heavy role in facilitating the mode of production. Under the 
state-led/-participation mode of production, land commodification played the central 
role in capital accumulation. Land commodification is the process of producing an 
abstract space from concrete space with the exchange value of the land being valued 
over use value (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.296). As revenue from land sales contributed 
significantly to the local government’s income, rural areas of Shanghai (especially in 
periphery of city the centre or satellite towns) were rapidly converted for urban 
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development (Liu, Zhan and Deng, 2005, p.453). Even though the State Council enacted 
several regulations to control urban expansion in the late 1990s, the regulations were not 
effectively implemented. Farmland continued to be converted for urban land use for 
economic purpose (ibid, pp.453-454). In the terminology of Lefebvre, urban fabrics 
spread across the country, which means ‘all manifestation of the dominance of the city 
over the country’ (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], pp.3-4). In this chapter, I identified the spatial 
practices under Puxi/Pudong divide, and the representations of space that the state 
constructed to provide ideological justifications for the emergence of new spatial 
arrangement and establishing the relations between the state and individuals.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that urbanisation is the process of 
transforming an absolute space (0% of urbanisation) to abstract space (100% of 
urbanisation) (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], p.7; 1991[1974], see Chapter 4). The urbanisation 
of Shanghai also demonstrated such a trend of complete urbanisation. As Lefebvre 
argued, abstract space is contradictory in nature (1991[1974], pp.356-357). The city is 
where the contradictory social groups established their tragic relationship, and an urban 
revolution will occur when urbanisation entered a critical phase.  
 
Both the redevelopments of Paris and Shanghai were large in scale, rapid, ambitious and 
involving large number of inhabitants and led by the state. Lefebvre argued that the 
working class was pushed away from the city centre and replaced by a bourgeoisie 
consumption space under Haussmann’s rebuilding of Paris (1971[1968], p.36). Similar 
observations can be found in Shanghai. The production of space in Shanghai has also 
produced differences – China is no longer egalitarian and inequalities become 
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increasingly visible in city. How will spatial arrangement shape the experiences of 
inhabitants living in a city under rapid transformation? How will inhabitants perceive 
such a spatial transformation and the ideological strategies of the state? Lefebvre argued 
that the modern state ‘neutralises whatever resists it by castration or crushing’ 
(1991[1974], p.23). Will the state ‘neutralise’ the resistance in Shanghai? In the next 
chapter, I further apply the third moment of the spatial triad, i.e. representational space, 
to examine the urban experience of the inhabitants of Shanghai, as well as exploring the 
possibility of civil resistance against urbanisation.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
URBAN EXPERIENCE, IMAGINATION AND RESISTANCE 
 
A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; 
indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed 
ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses. A social 
transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative 
capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space – though its impact 
need not occur at the same rate, or equal force, in each of these areas.  
- Henri Lefebvre (1991[1974), p.54) 
 
 
A number of revolutions were declared in China in the last century, e.g., Xinhai 
Revolution in 1911 against imperial rule, the Socialist Revolution against the 
Nationalist Party and capitalists, as well as the ‘Cultural Revolution’. The country’s 
political system, social stratification, economic structure, diplomatic relations, as well as 
cultural practices and familial relationship were all reshaped (Fairbank and Goldman, 
2006, pp.241-245; Spence, 1999, pp.271-273) by these upheavals. As examined in 
Chapter Four, prior to the socialist revolution, Shanghai took a leading role in 
promoting revolutions in both political actions and daily lives by introducing and 
adapting Western thought, cultural practices and an economic model (e.g., Bergère, 
2009, p.4; Yeh, 2007, p.378). Capitalism and cosmopolitanism had emerged in this 
coastal city, yet the golden period was concluded by the Second Sino-Japanese War and 
then the socialist regime. Due to the aversion of the party-state to urbanism, the 
economic composition (from a financial centre to a manufacturing one) and urban 
lifestyles were restructured. The political campaigns during the socialist construction 
period had ‘realised its full potential’ with the daily life of the inhabitants undergoing 
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drastic changes, from admiring an individualistic bourgeois way of life to an organised 
social life under close state supervision.  
 
Although it did not involve any alteration of the ruling party, the Reform in 1978 was 
regarded by Deng Xiaoping as the ‘Second Revolution’ of the socialist China that 
produced social transformations in economic life, social life and spiritual life (Xinhua 
News, 2004). Alongside the morphology of city space, the daily lives of the inhabitants 
of Shanghai also underwent drastic changes, since the state began to withdraw from 
absolute control. In what ways have this ‘Second Revolution’ manifested ‘a creative 
capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], 
p.54)? In what ways did the inhabitants experience and perceive the changes? How did 
they respond to the urban transformation of the city? In Lefebvre’s spatial triad, social 
space can be examined in three moments – the perceived space (spatial practice), the 
conceived space (representations of space) and the lived space (representational space). 
In the last chapter, I outlined the political economy of the state-led/-participation 
capitalism: how it shaped spatial practice to facilitate the perpetuation of the mode of 
production, as well as the ideological justifications (representations of space) for land 
commodification. In this chapter, I focus on describing the urban experience of the 
inhabitants (representational space) and demarcating its dialectical relationship with 
spatial practice and representations of space under the state-led/-participation 
capitalism.  
 
The inhabitants of Shanghai have different urban experiences during different periods of 
the city’s history. In recent years, there has been a wave of ‘Shanghai nostalgia’, 
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meaning that historical memory of ‘Old Shanghai’ was reconstructed to rediscover the 
past, critique the present and prepare for future development. In 2005 and 2006, the 
movie and the TV drama Everlasting Regret were broadcast, which invited another 
wave of Shanghai nostalgia. The movie and TV drama were adapted from the novel 
Song of Everlasting Sorrow (2008[1995]), written by a Shanghaiese novelist Wang Anyi 
with the subtitle A Novel of Shanghai. Setting the scene in the periods between the 
1940s and 1980s, the novel described the ‘heart of the dreams, fantasies, and everyday 
rituals of a Shanghai that ceased to exist after 1949’ (Zhang, 2000, p.369). The story 
portrayed the life of a Shanghaiese woman, Wang Qiyao. Growing up in the Republican 
era when the social atmosphere was relatively liberal, Wang built up an adventurous 
personality. She won the title of Miss Shanghai in a beauty contest, and then became a 
mistress of an influential bureaucrat of the Republican government. However, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, symbols of ‘corrupt’ Western capitalist lifestyle, such as 
Mandarin popular music (shidaiqu) and ballroom dancing were banned by the socialist 
regime, while revolutionary songs and dancing were promoted. The social life of urban 
inhabitants became organised by the danwei system, so that the bourgeois lifestyle of 
Wang Qiyao was no longer possible. Her properties were nationalised and allocated by 
the state and were shared among migrant workers during the period of state-led 
industrialisation. Since the economic reform measures were adopted in Shanghai, she 
took up her hobbies again, as quickly as the city revitalised its capitalist past. However, 
the story concluded with a sad ending: a young man whom she fell in love with 
murdered her.  
 
Though probably not as dramatic as the story of Wang Qiyao, the daily lives of the 
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inhabitants in Shanghai have been also (re)organised by the economic reform measures 
in last three decades. The Reform has manifested its ‘creative capacity’ on ‘daily life, 
language, space’. When the Reform began, new communal relationships, new lifestyles 
as well as new urban culture emerged. How did the inhabitants experience, perceive and 
respond to the production of new (social) space? As discussed in Chapter Three, in 
answering this question, Lefebvre emphasised the importance of describing the 
experience of inhabitants by referencing different sources of data and applying 
appropriate survey techniques (e.g., participant observation, interviews, etc.) 
(2003[1953], p.117). Lefebvre criticised empiricist and positivist sociologists who 
usually failed to examine, while only describing the impact of urban planning on the 
experience of urban inhabitants (2003[1966], p.121). Only through understanding the 
communal life of the inhabitants, can the ‘conditions’ of the whole community be 
evaluated. More importantly, he also argued that narrating subjective experience of 
inhabitants is an essential element in providing a holistic analysis of urban, as well as 
rural, space. Such a description of urban experience served as the first moment 
(‘descriptive’) of the regressive-progressive method, which provides the empirical 
background for further analysis of space at a theoretical level (Lefebvre, 2003[1953], 
p.117).  
 
The first aim of this chapter therefore, is to describe daily life in Shanghai under the 
state-led/-participation mode of production, based on the data collected through in-depth 
interviews and other secondary sources. When the Shanghai Expo accelerated the 
transformation of the urban landscape, in what way have people’s daily lives been 
further reshaped? In what way did such inhabitants perceive the urbanisation of 
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Shanghai? What did they feel about the rapid social transformations? These questions 
are to be approached through scrutinising the perception, experience and imagination of 
the inhabitants of Shanghai.  
 
The first part of this chapter examines how the experiences of the inhabitants of 
Shanghai were shaped by spatial practice, as well as how urbanisation further produced 
inequalities rather than providing a ‘better life’ for the people. Alongside the urban 
landscape, the Shanghai Expo had also speeded up the transformation of social relations 
of production. Some people benefited from market liberalisation, but the reform also 
produced and deepened social inequalities. This chapter will examine how the 
inequalities were produced through social space and everyday life.  
 
Following this, the relationship between representations of space and representational 
space will be examined. In Chapter Five, I introduced several strategies that have been 
applied by the state to re-establish the relationship between the state and the people, as 
well as to provide the ideological justification for the Shanghai Expo and urbanisation 
in general. Lefebvre argued that each mode of production has its space and its social 
relations of production (1976[1973], pp.43-45). When the state began to refrain from 
the allocation role in production and formulated policies favouring the private sector, 
the relationship between the state and individuals was altered. In this chapter, I will 
further elaborate the responses for the spatial arrangement by the inhabitants. Particular 
focus will be placed on how the respondents in my semi-structured interviews imagined 
their relationship with the state in their daily experience.  
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Finally, the possibilities and limits of resistance will be addressed. When reviewing 
Lefebvre’s spatial triad with reference to the discussion of Gregory (1994, p.121) in 
Chapter Two (c.f. Figure 2.1), I pointed out the coercive nature of representations of 
space (i.e. the state attempted to construct individuals’ daily life through the 
conceptualisation and rearrangement of space). Hence, resistance from the urban 
inhabitants occurred (representational space) as a response. The possibility of resistance 
is particularly relevant to Lefebvre’s periodisation of urbanisation. He foresaw an urban 
revolution to reclaim centrality when a city entered the critical phase (2003[1970], 
pp.15-17).  
 
Under the state-led/-participation mode of production, the social space of Shanghai 
became more fragmented (e.g., the production of new centres with the expansion of 
administrative areas) and contradictory (e.g., the rural-urban divide). Land 
commodification is vital to sustain the current mode of production, and relocation is 
usually involved. The urban renewal scheme also resulted in a higher cost of living. The 
Shanghai World Expo has intensified such process. Are these the signals that Shanghai 
has entered a critical phase? In recent years, ‘maintaining stability’ (weiwen) has 
become one of the major concerns of the Chinese government, in which the budget for 
internal security (US$111.4 billion) even exceeded military expense for national 
defence (US$106.4 billion) (Lawrence and Martin, 2013, p.14). In particular, the 
protests against relocation and land expropriation were regarded as one of the major 
threats to the stability of the regime (Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, pp.890-891). Has Shanghai 
entered the critical phase? Will the ‘Second Revolution’ produce an urban revolution? Is 
Lefebvre’s theory applicable to explain this Chinese city? This chapter will conclude 
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with a discussion on these questions.   
 
6.1   Spatial Arrangement and the Lived Space  
 
Even before publishing his theory on space, Lefebvre had already pointed out the close 
association between spatial arrangement and urban experience. In his book Everyday 
Life and the Modern World, Lefebvre noted that ‘the disintegration of traditional town 
and the expansion of urbanism’ have facilitated the emergence of ‘a programmed 
everyday life’ in France in the 1960s (1971[1968], p.65). Similar strategies of producing 
new (social) space can also be observed in Shanghai today. New space was created by 
new towns in the peripheries (the spatial practice of ‘Pudong’) and the urban renewal 
projects in the city centre (Puxi). In the last chapter, I described the spatial practices of 
Puxi and Pudong.  
 
Alongside producing specific spatial arrangements, Lefebvre noted that the mode of 
production also shaped our daily life through rearranging the social clock. He argued 
that our daily life in modern society can be divided into three categories: pledged time, 
free time, and compulsive time (1971[1968], p.53). Pledged time means time spent on 
production (i.e. work time), free time stands for leisure time or non-working hours, 
while compulsive time means ‘the travelling time or time for bureaucratic formalities’.38 
He argued that alienation in modern society does not only exist in production (pledged 
time), but also in everyday life (free time). Class consciousness was then obscured by 
the invasion of the capitalist logic into the everyday life (e.g., consumption, 
                                                      
38 Elden (2004c, p.115) translated the terms as ‘required time, free time and constrained time’.  
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advertisements) and produced what he called a ‘bureaucratic consumption of controlled 
society’ (1971[1968], see Chapter 2). The rearrangement of daily routine is particularly 
noticeable in post-Reform China. With the decline of the danwei, social life is no longer 
under direct control by the state, and wider choices of occupations and locations of 
residence are possible. Before examining the urban experience, therefore, the 
reorganisation of the social clock will be outlined to serve as a background to 
understanding the changes in everyday life.  
 
6.1.1  The Reorganisation of the Social Clock 
 
Urban inhabitants were organised by the danwei before the Reform, where their jobs 
and residences were allocated. Political study groups were organised after work so that 
the separation between work and social life after work was not clear (Lu, 2006, p.58). 
Danwei is primarily a socio-spatial arrangement, but it also has temporal implications 
for daily life.39 As discussed in Chapter Four, alongside being a production unit, jobs, 
housing, social activities and social welfare were planned and allocated by party 
officials through each danwei across urban China. Therefore, the danwei became ‘the 
basic unit of urban social … and urban spatial organization’ (Bray, 2005, p.124). The 
separation between workplace and social areas was also not always clear. Therefore, 
work, family and social life were ‘intermingled’ and work time and domestic time were 
also not clearly separated (Lu, 2006, p.58). In other words, the distinction between 
pledged time, free time and compulsive time was insignificant before the Reform, and 
                                                      
39 Most studies of danwei focused on its functions (e.g., Bray, 2005; Lü and Perry, 1997), historical 
origin (e.g., Perry, 1997; Yeh, 2007), as well as the impact on urban life (e.g., Tang and Parish, 2000). 
However, its implication on the daily routine was usually ignored. One exception is Lu (2006, see 
Chapter 3). For a succinct review of the some key studies on danwei, refer to Bian (2005).  
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the social relations of production were closely organised by the state. Individuals were 
organised spatially, they dwelled and worked in the same housing block or somewhere 
nearby. As housing was centrally allocated and managed under the party branch, the 
private sphere was politicised. Danwei was also where the social relations of production 
based that social statuses were defined within. Thus, when the state transformed its role 
in housing allocation, not only was new space created but also new social relations.  
 
The diminishing role of the danwei system is an immediate outcome of the changing 
role of the state in the ‘post-socialist reform era’, and produced the most significant 
change in the reorganisation of social life. Political study sessions became less common 
and choices for leisure ‘multiplied’ (Davis, 1995, p.3). As their social life and work are 
no longer attached to the danwei, the people now enjoy greater freedom in determining 
their daily schedule. Although the state still maintains its decisive role in controlling 
economic activities, there is no direct intervention on daily life. Pledged time, free time, 
and compulsive time began to be differentiated. With the emergence of personal life and 
private housing, the arrangement of life during the Maoist era was ‘repudiated’ after the 
Reform (Davis, 2003, p.27). Research showed that 51% of the inhabitants in Shanghai 
chose their own residential location (Cevero and Day 2008, p.10). In the following 
sections, I will discuss how the new spatial arrangement in the city affected the urban 
experience of the inhabitants.  
 
6.1.2  The Demolition of the Linong 
 
Lefebvre argued that the ‘disintegration of the traditional town’ has facilitated the 
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‘programming’ of everyday life in modern French society (1971[1968], p.65). While 
Shanghai has a relative short history, the linong in the city centre of Puxi could be 
regarded as the ‘traditional town’. As discussed in Chapter Four, the linong was 
introduced by French developers during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’ to meet the 
housing demand of the Chinese ‘refugees’ in the French Concession. Ironically, the 
‘poor’ living conditions of the linong are frequently narrated as the foundation of the 
local identity of Shanghaiese. In the Song of Everlasting Sorrow, Wang Anyi began the 
novel by providing a lengthy description of the linong from an aerial view of point, 
which summarised the urban morphology of Shanghai in the pre-Reform period:  
 
Looked down upon from the highest point in the city, Shanghai's 
longtang — her vast neighborhoods inside enclosed alleys — are a 
magnificent sight. The longtang are the backdrop of this city. Streets 
and buildings emerge around them in a series of dots and lines, like 
the subtle brushstrokes that bring life to the empty expanses of 
white paper in a traditional Chinese landscape painting. As day 
turns into night and the city lights up, these dots and lines begin to 
glimmer. However, underneath the glitter lies an immense blanket 
of darkness — these are the longtang of Shanghai … Countless 
reefs lurk beneath this swelling ocean of darkness, where one false 
move could capsize a ship. The darkness buoys up Shanghai's 
handful of illuminated lines and dots, supporting them decade after 
decade. Against this decades-old backdrop of darkness, the Paris of 
the Orient unfolds her splendour. (Wang, 2008[1995], p.1) 
 
Because of official suspicion towards urbanism, urban (re)development projects were 
limited so the urban morphology remained generally stable after the establishment of 
the socialist regime (Lee, 1999b, p.106). The ‘series of dots and lines’, constituted by 
narrow roads (when comparing with the Century Avenue at Pudong) and the linong, 
have constructed a ‘complicated’ network of space in Puxi that is familiar to local 
residents but unrecognisable to ‘foreigners’. After outlining the urban landscape, Wang 
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moved on to describe everyday life in this iconic residential space of Shanghai. She 
depicted that the linongs ‘exude a sensuality like the intimacy of flesh on flesh — cool 
and warm, tangible and knowable, a little self-centered’ (Wang, 2008[1995], p.6). As the 
facilities in linong were shared, it produced a lot of opportunities for the amah to gossip 
at the ‘grease-stained rear kitchen window’ (ibid, p.6). She argued that linong is the 
‘genius loci of Shanghai’s alleys’ (ibid, p.9). A respondent concurred that the unique 
characteristics of the Shanghaiese were produced by the spatial arrangement of the 
linong:  
 
‘Their social skills are acquired from the living experience of living 
in the crowded linong. Because the facilities are shared, they need 
to be calculative and astute, so will not be disadvantaged. In 
Beijing, if you try to borrow money from friends, you will find it 
very easy. However, if you borrow it from a Shanghaiese friend, 
you will not feel the same. Therefore, Shanghai people will give 
others an impression of being calculative. In addition, as they live 
very closely with neighbours, they developed interpersonal skills 
when they are very young.’  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the ‘sociological fossils’ of the communal life in linong 
was imagined by the writer and inhabitants to construct a collective identity (Bao, Wang, 
Zhu, et al., 2001, pp.147-148). For instance, there was a lot of rivalries and calculations 
during daily encounters with the neighbours because public facilities were shared in 
linong. Astuteness is hence became ‘the most distinctive characteristics’ of Shanghaiese 
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(Lu, 1999, p.15), and ironically developed a strong communal bond through the 
experience of sharing public facilities. However, the total area of linong reduced from 
35.4 million square metres in 1990 to 23.8 million square metres in 2005 (Shih, 2010, 
p.353). With the demolition of the linong, the above communal experience is no longer 
common or widely shared among the inhabitants of Shanghai. As the spatial 
arrangement of Puxi and the living experience in linong were regarded as the foundation 
of local Shanghai identity (Arkaraprasertkul, 2009, p.26), the demolition or 
revitalisation projects are eradicating or reengineering their identity and experience.  
 
Alongside the demolition, the ‘preservation’ of heritage has further restructured the 
inhabitants experience and identity. Since 2000, buildable space in the city centre 
became scarce, which speeded up the heritage revitalisation projects (Laurans, 2005, 
p.4). For instance, I have argued in the previous chapter that the developer and local 
government intended to reconnect the city’s capitalist history through the heritage 
revitalisation project of Xintiandi. Similar examples of reconnecting history for the 
purpose of tourism included the First National Meeting Site of the Communist Party of 
China, Rui Jin Hotel, Duolun Road, as well as the Ohel Rachel Synagogue (Diglio, 
2005, p.118). However, these projects usually focused on the renewal of the façades. 
The districts were gentrified with local residents becoming relocated or became socially 
excluded from the renewed district (Lu, 2008, p.156).  
 
6.1.3  Alienation in New Towns and Industrial Parks 
 
As introduced in Chapter Three, Lefebvre carried out an empirical study in Mourenx. 
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Located in the Pyrenees, Mourenx was a new town established in the 1950s next to 
Lacq, where oil wells and refineries were newly-discovered. The rapid development of 
Mourenx alerted Lefebvre to the impact of urbanisation (Elden, 2004c, p.128; Lefebvre, 
1995[1962], p.391 note 1). In Mourenx, and new towns in general, Lefebvre argued that 
(social) space is planned and arranged around production. The functions and locations 
of the facilities are clearly defined by the planners who programme the everyday life of 
the inhabitants:  
 
The new town was the typical significant phenomenon in which and 
on which this organisation could be read because it was there that it 
was written. What, apart from such features as the negation of 
traditional towns, segregation and intense police surveillance, was 
inscribed in this social text to be deciphered by those who knew the 
code, what was projected on this screen? The organisation of the 
everyday, neatly subdivided (work, private life, leisure) and 
programmed to fit a controlled, exact time-table. (Lefebvre, 
1971[1968], p.59; original emphasis) 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Soviet model of developing agglomeration and 
integration of city cluster was implemented in the 1950s. Alongside integrating counties 
in vicinity to the Shanghai Municipality (Xiong and Zhou, 2007, p.532), five satellite 
towns were developed to support industrialisation (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, 
p.327). However, in 1990, over half (58%) of the Shanghai’s industrial output was still 
produced by the factories in the inner city (McGee, Lin, Marton, et al., 2007, p.133). 
More new towns and industrial parks were therefore built in outer Shanghai in the 
post-reform period for releasing space in the city centre, as well as to attract capital for 
industrial development. The newly-developed industrial parks were scattered across 
different remote districts of Shanghai. In Chapter Five, I introduced that new towns 
were established under the revised plan of ‘One City, Nine Towns Development Plan’. A 
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similar strategy has been adopted for the development of the Shanghai Expo. The local 
residents of the Expo Site have been relocated to three newly-developed Expo Estates 
scattered around the remote areas of Pudong. Compared to the village houses (where the 
relocated households originally resided), the multi-storey residential buildings in the 
Expo Estates are better furnished than the linong in Puxi or village houses in Pudong. 
For example, organiser of the Shanghai Expo emphasised that the development of 
Sanlin Expo Homeland, located at Sanlin Town in Pudong, is well planned to suit the 
needs of the inhabitants.  
 
The basic concept for township development is to provide a 
balanced and self-contained community, including infrastructure, 
community facilities and some basic facilities for daily life. Based 
on this model, the Sanlin Expo Homeland will optimize the layout 
of the public facilities such as public transport, commercial entities, 
cultural establishments, banks and post offices. All the functional 
areas will be connected with corridors to create a human-oriented 
urban space. (Cen, 2006) 
 
Under the theme of ‘one axis, two centers, three zones and four belts’, a main road was 
built with two ‘public service centers’ located at the northern and southern sides of the 
estate. It is said that the centres will be ‘ideal grounds for living, shopping, recreation, 
entertainment and meeting’, which includes ‘a large supermarket, an indoor grocery, 
banks, a community health service center, a cultural center, a nursing home, a civic 
recreation square and some small commercial facilities’. The residential areas are 
divided into ‘three zones’ with the buildings in each zone having a similar architectural 
and aesthetic pattern (e.g., heights, colours and shapes). The ‘four belts’ refer to green 
areas (Cen, 2006). In general, these new towns in China were built with the vision of 
‘connecting with global economy’, though the construction of high-end buildings and a 
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creating a ‘global lifestyle’ there (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, p.328).  
 
Nonetheless, there are discrepancies between the vision of the ‘spatial experts’ 
(conceived space) and the lived space of the inhabitants. Although it is supposed to be 
self-sustained, public facilities in new towns are usually too small in scale (in catering 
for the needs of the whole community), mono-functional, and located inconveniently for 
the residents. During an interview with a middle aged housewife who had relocated 
from a village house at Pudong to Expo Estate, she complained that her daily necessities 
were more expensive than in the city centre, even though she agreed that the living 
quality has improved (e.g., better security as a gated community). She attributed such an 
increase in living cost to the lack of competition in the new town – there is only one wet 
market in the estate. A survey with the residents of Shanghai also found that ‘Expo will 
increase product prices and transportation fee’ was the most negative impact of the 
Shanghai Expo (Ye, Scoot and Ding, 2012, p.1101).  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, Puxi and Pudong displayed different spatial practices. 
The urban space in Puxi is dominated by narrow and crisscrossed roads. The roads in 
Pudong are generally much wider and easier to get to know (e.g., zones with different 
colours). Tourists might easily get lost in Puxi, but travelling between different areas in 
Pudong is usually beyond walking distance. Similar to Jane Jacobs (1964, see Chapter 
2), Lefebvre also reminded planners of the importance of streets:  
 
In the town, the street is not a wasteland, nor is it the only place 
where – for good or ill – things happen … Spontaneous and 
transitionary, it is not simply there so that people can get from A to 
B, nor does it lay traps for them with lighting effects and displays of 
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objects. It is a place to stroll, to chinwag, to be alive in. (Lefebvre, 
1995[1962], p.117) 
 
Lefebvre argued that alienation does not only exist in production, but also in everyday 
life. The creation of new towns has illustrated the alienation of urban society (Elden, 
2004c, p.171). With wider roads, fewer pedestrians and similar buildings, new towns 
such as the Sanlin Expo Homeland look more organised and spacious than the city 
centre of Puxi. However, if we took a photo in the new town, the photo would look 
empty because no social lives or history can be read from the streets without pedestrians 
and buildings with little difference. Similar example could be found in Anting, located 
in northwest Shanghai. The new town was built for 8,000 families, but only 200 
families actually resided there. The rest of properties were purchased for real estate 
speculation but not residence. The inadequacy of public transport further alienated the 
residents without a private vehicle. A representative from the design company of Anting 
New Town also admitted that ‘it is a dead city quarter that will collapse’ (Hartog, 2010c, 
p.90). In the new towns, streets are no longer occupied by pedestrians. Public transport, 
within the estate or between districts, has become a necessity in daily life now, and daily 
routine is then programmed by the route and schedule of the bus lane. Even though the 
public transport station is said to be ‘conveniently integrated with the supermarket, the 
civic square and other facilities’ (Cen, 2006), the inhabitants still experienced the 
inconvenience of living in new towns almost every day. One housewife in my 
semi-structured interviews complained that:  
 
‘the wet market here (the Sanlin Expo Homeland) is very small, [so] 
I need to travel to somewhere else to buy food. However, there are 
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only two bus lines around this Estate; and they are not frequent. 
Therefore, I also need to wait for a very long time for travel.’  
 
Although research has shown that the relocated residents are generally satisfied with the 
new living environment, they are usually less satisfied with the new neighbourhood (Li 
and Song, 2009, p.1104). This housewife also valued social contact with her neighbours. 
Before conducting the interview, she was chatting with her neighbours, arbitrarily 
sitting at the front exit of her building. To them, the ‘ideal grounds for living’ are not the 
planned areas in the public service centres but somewhere social lives are really lived 
out.  
 
6.1.4  Commuting as a Repetitive Experience  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the economic centre of Shanghai was relocated from the 
Bund to Lujiazui; new cultural facilities and government buildings were also built in 
Pudong. Multi-centres were produced when Shanghai expanded with the population 
continuing to grow. Residential regions were no longer concentrated in the old districts 
of Puxi but are dispersed across the city. When the facilities are not clustered within 
walking distance, travel becomes necessary. More importantly, after the withdrawal of 
the danwei system, the location of work is not always near to workers’ homes, thus 
commuting becomes a daily routine. Official statistics show that the daily commuting 
volume in Shanghai Metro has reached 17 million in 2013 (Shanghai Daily, 2013).  
 
The routine of daily life has been shaped by spatial practice, and so compulsive time 
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becoming an important common experience of living in urban China. In the late 1970s, 
public transport and private vehicles were small in number, so that cycling and walking 
were common (Lu, 2006, p.73). Under the modernist vision of the urban planning of 
Shanghai, various regions were now connected by transportation system. From 1991 to 
2002, the number of registered private automobiles increased from 200,000 to      
1.4 million (Cervero and Day, 2008, p.1). The average time for commuting among 
Shanghai inhabitants is 50.4 minutes (eChinacities, 2011). This form of tedious, 
routinised travel is, for Lefebvre, one of the primary modes of characteristic of modern 
society (Lefebvre, 1987, p.10). A respondent informed me how exhausting commuting 
could be:  
 
‘I usually spend more than half an hour. It’s relatively short, 
because I am living close to my office. But if I choose to live in flat 
with cheaper rent, then perhaps I need to spend around 1 hour or 
more than 1 hour on public transport. So I need to spend 2-3 hours 
to-and-fro, it’s actually very tiring. In other words, you have to 
spend much time on the road, so less time on making food and need 
to dine out all the time. It’s actually bad for your health.’ 
 
Urbanisation not only promoted geographical mobility within the city, but also between 
cities. Shanghai was planned as the ‘core city’ of the extended metropolitan region 
(EMR) of the lower Yangzi River delta (McGee, Lin, Marton, et al., 2007, p.121). With 
the expansion of the transportation system, mobility between cities within a ‘one-hour 
transportation circle’ was promoted. A ‘One-hour transportation circle’ means the area 
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within one-hour of driving or travel distance with public transport which covers another 
two cities, Hangzhou and Suzhou (China Daily, 2010). Amid the surge of property 
prices, the government promoted ‘regional integration of the cities’ in order that the 
inhabitants could commute between cities, i.e. work in Shanghai but live in other 
regions in the EMR (McGee, Lin, Marton, et al., 2007, see Chapter 7).  
 
One of the respondents, a young man born in Shanghai who works in an investment 
bank has tried to put this into practice. He purchased a flat with a mortgage in Kunshan, 
an industrial town located between Shanghai and Suzhou, at a much lower rate than in 
central Shanghai. He commuted between Kunshan and Pudong with his wife by driving 
every morning and evening. After half a year, he released the flat in Kunshan and 
moved back to Pudong because such a commuting experience was far too exhausting 
for them. He chose to stay in Shanghai, because this is the only city in China where he 
could find opportunities:  
 
‘It is because I’m still curious about finance, and hope to develop 
my career in finance. Shanghai is the first in the finance field, 
except going to Beijing or Shenzhen. Actually Shanghai is more 
close to my home town. It is also saying that Shanghai is going to 
develop as a financial centre, I think it’s the best choice for my 
future. So I finally chose to stay in Shanghai.’ 
 
Research about relocation behaviour in Shanghai has showed that residents have fewer 
options of employment within the ‘one-hour mobilised travel time’ after relocation. But 
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the net income increased even after deducting their extra monthly expenses on 
commuting (Cervero and Day, 2008, p.11). Even though the experience during 
compulsive time is being ‘programmed’ by commuting as a routine, the economic 
structure of Shanghai is still attractive to the people who are looking for opportunities. 
Lefebvre (1976[1973], p.70) argued that urban space facilitated the perpetuation of the 
social relations of production. This is because only in the city the subordinate and 
dominant classes can meet to establish social relations. This is confirmed by surveys on 
the reasons for migrating to Shanghai. For instance, it is found that family financial 
need is one of the main reasons for migrating to Shanghai among female rural migrants 
(Fan, 2003, p.24). There are also ‘money boys’ (male migrants who engage in same-sex 
activities for money) looking for socioeconomic rewards in Shanghai (He, Wong, 
Huang, et al., 2007, p.105).  
 
6.2   Imagination of the City and the Shanghai Expo 
 
After applying the concepts of spatial practice (perceived space) and representational 
space (lived space) to illustrate the shaping of urban experience by the spatial 
arrangement of the city, this section will continue to examine the urban experience of 
the inhabitants by identifying the dialectical relationship between representations of 
space (conceived space) and representational space. Lefebvre noted that there are 
always discrepancies between the conceived space of the dominant class and the lived 
experience of the inhabitants, but that these also overlap. Besides culture and ‘work of 
artistic creations’, Lefebvre suggested that representations of space and representational 
space overlap through ‘imagination’ – the ‘imaginations’ of the dominant class as well 
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as inhabitants (1991[1974], pp.41-42).  
 
Based on their imagination of a city, the ‘spatial experts’ (e.g., government officials, 
planners, urbanists, technicians) have tried to manipulate the spatial arrangement and 
shape the daily life of the inhabitants. Among the inhabitants, representational space is 
the ‘space that the imagination seeks to change and appropriate’ the social space 
(1991[1974], p.39). In the city, inhabitants experienced the coercion from the 
representations of space (e.g., shaping their daily routine by an expanded network of 
public transport system), and then contextualise and tried to change it. The Shanghai 
Expo has speeded up the transformation of the urban landscape of Shanghai and 
produced new daily experience of the inhabitants. In response, how do the inhabitants 
‘seek to change and appropriate’ such spatial (re)arrangement through their imagination? 
In this section, I will discuss the emergence of a new political imaginary among the 
inhabitants of Shanghai city.   
 
6.2.1  Modern Lifestyle as a Divide 
 
In the Song of Everlasting Sorrow, Shanghai was narrated as a Chinese cosmopolitan 
city with a capitalist past. Cosmopolitanism and capitalism were replaced by 
collectivism and socialism under the socialist regime. Now, the nostalgia for Old 
Shanghai is been manipulated to speed up heritage renewal projects. What the planners 
conceived was shared by a respondent who enjoyed the modern lifestyle of Shanghai:  
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‘Yes, it’s a petty bourgeoisie (xiaozi), modern feeling … Oh you said 
Puxi … Puxi gives an old street feeling. You know modern people 
are nostalgic now, unlike before, nowadays old stuffs are good, or 
the older the better. Old stuffs in Puxi are actually quite well 
preserved, they are not destroyed by modernisation. Therefore, 
when you go to Puxi, there are many Chinese parasol trees … you 
hardly find any in Pudong, but there are many in Puxi. Additionally, 
the roads are narrow, it gives you a strong feeling when walking 
under the Chinese parasol trees, like recalling the childhood 
memories, the feeling of the past.’ 
 
However, the beginning of the Reform also meant the end of egalitarianism. The 
commodification of land has stimulated economic growth but the economic return is not 
equally shared among individuals or social groups. In Pudong, for instance, the Gini 
Coefficient increased from 0.37 to 0.45 between 1994 and 2004, indicating that income 
inequality worsened during the period of most rapid urbanisation (Sassen, 2009, p.7). 
Under the socialist regime, inequality is always spatial: birthplace determined the life 
chances of people under the hukou system. Every citizen is allocated an official hukou 
account by location of residence (urban or rural) and socio-economic eligibility 
(agricultural or non- agricultural). Even after the State Council granted approval of 
policy of nonzhuangfei (i.e. the transfer of agricultural hukou to non-agricultural hukou) 
to local government in late 1990s, the policy only brought about limited impact on 
facilitating the integration of rural migrants into urban communities (Chan and 
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Buckingham, 2008, pp.595-596).40 
 
Lefebvre (1991[1974], p.86) argued that the city is where the dominant and subordinate 
classes assembled and established contradictory social relations. Shanghai, as an 
emerging economy with rapid urbanisation, has attracted migrants from other regions to 
seek job opportunities. National statistics showed that 27% of the total population of 
Shanghai is a floating population (internal migrants) (Liang and Ma, 2004, p.472, see 
Table 1). Most of them are involved in jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, 
with 80% of the ‘dirty, heavy, and dangerous jobs’ performed by rural migrants (Li and 
Wang, 1996, p.22). Urbanisation has worsened the inequality between the inhabitants 
with and without an urban hukou account. From 1994 to 2004, urban-rural income 
inequality increased from 2.3:1 to 3.3:1 (Chen and Sun, 2006, p.521). Research also 
shows that the hukou system has been considered as the one of most important factors 
constraining life chances, alongside gender, age, and income (Chan and Buckingham, 
2008, p.582).  
 
Space is social, because social space ‘permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting 
others and prohibiting yet others’ (Lefebvre, 1991[1974], p.73). Perhaps more 
importantly, inequalities are perpetuated throughout everyday life. During the Shanghai 
Expo, there were media reports of ‘uncivilised’ behaviours including littering, spitting, 
jumping the queue, shouting, sleeping on the grassland, as well as insulting policemen 
in the Expo Site. Though such behaviours can also be found around the city, a local 
Shanghaiese respondent confidently argued that they were perpetrated by visitors from 
                                                      
40 A succinct review of income inequalities and its relationship with spatial arrangement in China in the 
last twenty years can be found in Gustafsson, Shi, Sicular, et al. (2008).  
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other provinces or internal migrants:  
 
‘In this country, people’s quality (shuji) has yet reached this 
standard. Taking subway for instance, it will be very troublesome, 
there is no concept of ‘let passengers leaving the train first (xian 
shang hou xia)’ in the country. People will normally squeeze [into 
the train]. It’s the same in public buses – [people] won’t let 
passengers get off first. People are quite impatient. It might be due 
to the fact that there are many people in China, Shanghai. Because 
of urbanisation, people are rushing to the city. During office hours, 
people are rushing from different places to 2-3 [central] districts. 
They are in hurried.’ 
 
As a splendid, modern and extravagant urban culture is imagined as the manifestation of 
being ‘modernised’, the behaviour of the internal migrants from other provinces are 
regarded as ‘uncivilised’. The classifications between ‘civilised Shanghaiese/urban 
dwellers’ and ‘uncivilised internal migrants/rural farmers’ are represented as a result of 
rural/uncivilised lifestyle. The organiser of the Shanghai Expo has published a pamphlet 
titled A Handbook of a Civilised Visit to the Expo (wenmin guangbo shouce) (2010). 
The pamphlet defined the ‘appropriate’ manners in public transport, greeting visitors, 
visiting relatives’ home, etc. The inequalities are therefore perpetuated through daily 
experience, and strengthened by the state. 
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6.2.2  Redrawing the Relationship between the State and the People  
 
As illustrated above, during the ‘socialist-reform era’, the state shaped the daily life of 
the people through the danwei system (Lu, 2006, p.58). Therefore, ‘politics, society and 
ideology are highly overlapped with each other’ (Sun, 2004, p.31 cited Wu, 2011, 
p.702). Since the reform, there was a process of depoliticisation in the danwei system, 
which means ‘a process that reverses the efforts to turn a work unit into a political 
institution’ (Ji, 1998, p.19). State withdrew its direct intervention on economic activities 
and the promotion of official ideology through the danwei (ibid, pp.19-20). Therefore, 
daily life is no longer understood as a revolutionary contribution or political action. 
People enjoy a higher level of freedom in choosing their living places, occupations and 
lifestyles. However, the distance between the state and the people widened after the 
state began to withdraw its direct influence on work and everyday life:  
 
‘The distance between the ordinary people and the government 
officials becomes more far away nowadays. The officials are making 
money only. They are no longer getting together with the people.‘ 
 
This comment was made by a local resident, on the differences in the distance between 
the state and people before and after the Reform. She worked for a SOE and currently 
works in a private company since the SOE closed down in the early 1990s. She 
remembers that government officials were working together with, and working for, the 
people before market liberalisation. There were more opportunities to have direct 
communication with government officials in the workplace and the housing block, now 
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they were regarded as working for their personal fortune or career development now. 
Her comment is not unjustified. As the state maintains an ambivalent role in market 
regulation and participation, a general distrust towards the state has been established. 
Officials of the party and the government are usually regarded as making their own 
fortune (e.g., through policy formulation and corruption), but not performing the role of 
providing social security for the people. Such view was confirmed by a territory-wide 
survey being conducted in 2009. It is found that 30% of the respondents rated the 
government officials as incompetent, and 40% respondents claimed that the government 
officials are only ‘looking after their own interest’ (Saich, 2011). 
 
Since work and political contribution became separated, the official ideology in SOE 
was reduced to ‘economism’ (jingji zhuyi). The ‘belief system’ in China also went 
‘largely bankrupt’ (Ji, 1998, p.20). In Chapter Five, I argued that the state has applied 
several strategies to provide ideological justification for urbanisation. However, the 
ideological justification for the notion that the ‘City, Makes Life Better’ was not 
unquestioned by people when urban space was commodified (from absolute space to 
abstract space). In another survey about the perception of the impact of the Shanghai 
Expo, it is found that ‘increase price of real estate’ and ‘increase speculation of real 
estate’ were ranked as most negative outcomes (Yang, Zeng and Gu, 2010, p.169). In 
the last chapter, I have illustrated that the pro-growth coalition between the government 
and private sector heavily invested on property development, even without sufficient 
housing demand (He and Wu, 2005, p.10). However, with only a few properties were 
sold in the property development projects, this produced an empty new town, which is 
referred to by the media as the ‘ghost city’ (BBC, 2012). For example, under the plan of 
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‘One City, Nine Towns’, Thames Town was built with ‘mock-Tudor buildings and red 
phone boxes’. But it is reported that the city is ‘a virtual ghost town, with empty shops 
and unused roads’ (ibid). Similar examples were found across the country.  
 
The distrust towards the state has been further developed by scandals that arose by land 
commodification. For instance, Hu Jing, the former deputy director of the Shanghai 
Planning, Land and Resources Administrative Bureau and the director of the Planning 
Bureau in Shanghai's Jingan District, was imprisoned in 2012. He was prosecuted for 
the briberies at RMB5.04 million for providing favourable land sale price to developers 
and intervening planning project competition, etc. Two other deputy directors of the 
Land Bureau of Shanghai were also prosecuted for corruption (Zhao, 2012). A survey 
also found that corruption is perceived as the most serious problem to governance. 
People generally found the performance of local government less satisfactory than the 
Central Government (Saich, 2011).  
 
Lefebvre argued that urbanisation is the process of turning absolute space to abstract 
space (1991[1974], see Chapter 4). The relationship between the state and the people 
was redefined after the social space in Shanghai was commodified. During the 
interviews, one of the most frequently discussed issues was the property market. 
Questions about the property market were not originally included in the interview guide, 
but the topic usually emerged ‘naturally’ when the respondents were asked about their 
experience of living in Shanghai. Since the state withdrew its role in housing allocation, 
the direct intervention in everyday life became less observable to people. The property 
market has therefore replaced the danwei as the main ‘connection’ or ‘intersection’ 
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between the state and the people as politics, society and ideology are no longer overlap 
in daily life. During Twelfth Five Year Plan, the government is going to build one 
million ‘indemnificatory apartments’ for lower and middle income families (Xinhua, 
2011). But official statistics showed that over 80% of people cannot afford private 
housing across the country (Hartog, 2010b, p.69). Research on property prices also 
shows that housing in Shanghai has become increasingly unaffordable (Chen, Hao and 
Stephens, 2010, p.890). The real estate speculation market has widened the income gap, 
producing wealth only for a small group of people. Therefore, it has produced an 
ambivalent attitude towards of the property market and public housing reform among 
the public.  
 
6.2.3  The Shanghai Expo as the Participation in the Country’s Development  
 
In modern society, Lefebvre argued that monumental space will be produced to offer 
‘each member of a society an image of that membership, an image of his or her social 
visage’ (1991[1974], p.220). His observation could also be applied in analysing the 
production of space in Shanghai. With the disintegration of the danwei system, work is 
no longer revolutionary or a participation in the development of the state. The state 
needs a monumental space to establish ‘a consensus’ among everyone in society (ibid, 
p.220). As discussed in the last chapter, mega-events such as the Shanghai Expo and the 
Olympic Games were regarded as a substitute for political campaigns to foster national 
identity during a period of acute social, political, and economic dislocation. These 
mega-events were carried out to establish national pride within the country and 
showcase its return to world affairs in the international community (Callahan, 2012, 
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p.254).  
 
Alongside being a mass mobilisation campaign, the Shanghai Expo differs from the 
Olympic Games that it was also a construction project. Exhibition centres and museums 
such as the China Pavilion (‘Crown of the Orient’) were built. As the distance between 
the state and the people widened, the landmarks of Shanghai Expo such as the China 
Pavilion have served as monuments connecting the state and the people, i.e. to confirm 
the sense of belonging to the Chinese nation state. For instance, the China Pavilion is 
even imagined to be comparable to the other iconic buildings of World Expos such as 
the Eiffel Tower (Theme Development Department Bureau of Shanghai Expo 
Coordination, 2009). As William Callahan (2012, p.254) noted, the gigantic 
architectural design of The China Pavilion was visually striking, so as to establish a 
‘centre of nationalist pride’ to foreign and local visitors. Inside the Pavilion, the 
exhibitions also projected the images of ‘Confucian aphorisms’ and a dream to ‘urban 
modernity’:  
 
Through films and exhibits, the pavilion celebrates China’s past, 
present, and future – especially the achievements of Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform and opening campaign since 1978. It explains 
that China has developed so quickly because Chinese people engage 
in a fruitful dialogue between the old and the young, the past and 
the future, traditional wisdom and scientific innovation, and the 
countryside and the city. The result of this conversation, the pavilion 
tells us, is the all-around development of a harmonious society that 
values tradition and the family. (Callahan, 2012, p.254) 
 
As I argued in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo substituted political campaigns to 
provide a means for the people to participate in the development of the country, and 
thereby reconnect the state to individuals and to obscure the contradictions of the mode 
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of production. The organiser of Shanghai Expo emphasised the participation of 
volunteers. This was not only because of the need to reduce the cost of the operation, 
but as an engagement of the people with the state through a national project. The 
Shanghai Expo was an ephemeral event, but the long process of organisation has 
provided a meaning within the banality of everyday life.  
 
6.3   Resistance: The Possibilities and Limits  
 
As indicated in Chapter Five, the scale of urban development in Shanghai should 
remind us of the period of rebuilding Paris in the nineteenth century. Lefebvre noted 
that Paris experienced the following changes in urban landscape and social relations 
before it reached its ‘greatest intensity’:  
 
A number of magnificent houses disappear, workshops and shops 
occupy others, tenements, stores, depots and warehouses, firms 
replace parks and gardens. Bourgeois ugliness, the greed for gain 
visible and legible in the streets take the place of somewhat cold 
beauty and aristocratic luxury. (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.75) 
 
In analysing the Paris Commune in 1871, as well as the upheaval in 1968, Lefebvre 
argued that both revolutions are urban in nature. The outcome of urban renewal is 
pushing the working class away from the city centre and replacing them with the 
bourgeoisie. The nature of the contradiction is therefore spatial, so that the purpose of 
the urban upheavals was regaining the centrality of the city (Merrifield, 2002, p.85). 
Lefebvre’s observation on Haussmann’s Paris is pertinent to describe Shanghai today. 
As illustrated in Chapter Five, a state-led/-participation mode of production has 
reshaped the urban landscape of Shanghai. Urban renewal projects have been carried 
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out in the city centre which gentrified the districts (e.g., the revitalisation of the Jingan 
District). Residents have been relocated to new towns, so as to vacate the space in the 
city centre for more profitable property development and landmark constructions. So, if 
the spatial practice and urban experience of Shanghai today can be comparable to 
nineteenth century Paris, we might ask whether a similar urban revolution take place in 
‘the Paris of the Orient’? If yes, when and how will it happen? If not, what are the 
concerns of the affected residents? This section will address the above questions by 
using Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the Right to the City’. With specific reference to the 
relocation of the Expo Site, I will discuss the civil society movement that resulted from 
land politics, and evaluate how such contradictions were obscured such notions as ‘the 
rationalisation of social inequalities’ and ‘the individualisation of social problems’.  
 
6.3.1  Relocating Residents away from the City Centre  
 
As discussed above, the China Pavilion was constructed as a monument space to 
establish ‘nationalist pride’. As Lefebvre argued, monument space is repressive in 
nature. It is ‘a seat of institution’ where ‘conquerors and the powerful’ were glorified 
(2003[1970], p.21). In the China Pavilion and the Shanghai Expo in general was 
manipulated as a ‘propaganda media’ (Dynon, 2011, p.194) to sustain the legitimacy of 
the CPC (ibid, p.185). Only official ideology of ‘harmonious society’ was promoted. 
The repressive nature of the Shanghai Expo was also demonstrated through the 
relocation of residents. For the construction of landmarks at the Shanghai Expo, the 
relocation of the Expo site involved one of the biggest developments of urbanisation in 
the history of Shanghai. Official figures show that there were ‘10,420 households and 
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28,000 people in the three neighbourhoods of Zhoujiadu, Shanggang and Nanmatoulu’, 
as well as 272 enterprises being relocated (Cen, 2006)41.  
 
The Shanghai Expo is only one example of the recent history of relocation in Shanghai. 
Between 1991 and 2002, the city authorities have demolished 38 million square metres 
of old buildings for infrastructural and property development projects, etc. Over 2.7 
million residents in Shanghai, or over 800,000 families, have been relocated (Laurans, 
2005, p.4). Under the so-called ‘Double Increase and Double Decrease’ policy in around 
2000, the municipal government forced the developers to release land in the city centre 
and develop the suburb that further speeded up the trend (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, 
pp.327-328). In other words, the urbanisation of Shanghai is a process of pushing 
residents away from city centre.  
 
In 1991, the Shanghai Municipal Government enacted the ‘Shanghai City Housing 
Demolition and Relocation Administration Implementation Detailed Regulation’ to 
protect the rights of residents in negotiation and compensation (The World Bank, 1993, 
p.195). The rights of individual and collective ownership of land were further protected 
after the amendment of the Constitution in 2004 and the new Property Law in 2007 
period. However, land politics is still central to politics in urban China and relocation 
often produces conflicts (Laurans, 2005, p.3; Xu, Yeh and Wu, 2009, pp.890-891). As 
illustrated in Chapter Five, the state-led/-participation mode of production retained 
some socialist features of economic production and incorporated some capitalist 
features. The state continues to uphold its ultimate control in market regulation, 
                                                      
41 Another source reported that a total of 18,452 households and 272 enterprises were relocated (Xinhua 
News, 2010). 
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participates in market activities through SOEs, but withdrew from comprehensive 
planning. Land appropriation therefore operates in a capitalist logic, so that the state is 
not involved in on a daily basis. Typically, New Town Development Corporation, as a 
semi-public developer, will be established for each new town development project 
(Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, p.328). The negotiation between the developer (either 
from the public or the private sector) and displaced residents is also mediated through 
relocation companies (Laurans, 2005, p.6). Even for national projects such as the 
Shanghai Expo, the state shouldered the responsibility of land appropriation for these 
private companies to liaising with residents on the compensation claims. Since these 
semi-public developers dominated the public resources (Wang, Kundu and Chen, 2010, 
p.328), the rights of affected residents were therefore not well protected. The process of 
land appropriation sometimes produced conflicts (because of an insufficient amount of 
compensation and procedural injustice). It is also reported that some relocation 
companies treated the displaced residents with violence (Laurans, 2005, p.9).  
 
As most new communities were not located in the city centre or somewhere close to the 
original site, relocation meant the removal of the inhabitants from the centre to the 
peripheries, from a place with memory to a place without history. Lefebvre proposed the 
term ‘The Right to the City’ to demand a return to the centre of the city by the 
proletariat. In other words, the right to the city is the right to centrality (Harvey, 2012, 
p.xvii). Referring to his experience of living in Paris, Lefebvre argued that city centre 
has been ‘museumfied’ for the gaze of the tourist by pushing the residents to the 
peripheries:  
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… left behind for peripheries which have been places of production, 
business and residence … But it is lively in this liveliness is due 
mostly to passers-by who are in transit. (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], 
p.209) 
 
Similar trends have been observed in Shanghai. However, where is the city centre of 
Shanghai? In the Twelfth Five Year Plan of the Shanghai Municipality, it is planned that 
the city will be clustered into four centres between 2010 and 2012, so as to thematise 
the roles in economic development. In New Pudong, as the flagship plan of the 
‘Post-World Expo construction’, an ‘Expo New Town’ will be constructed with the 
Sanlin Expo Estate as the focal point (expo2010.cn, 2009). The contradictions between 
the conceived space of the planner and the lived space of the displaced residents is 
therefore also about temporality. For the current residents, the Sanlin Expo Estate is a 
new town at the periphery of Shanghai today. They are experiencing the problems 
brought about by the production of a new space (e.g., alienation in everyday life when 
the town was empty). In the vision of the planner, the Sanlin Expo Estate will be the 
centre of a new centre of Shanghai in the future. During this early phase of the 
development, not all facilities in the new town are ready (e.g., the lack of a 
comprehensive public transport system). The lived experiences of these newly-relocated 
residents were often ignored in the plan (Hartog, 2010c, p.90).  
 
6.3.2  Resistance from the Civil Society  
 
Lefebvre argued that ‘[t]here is a politics of space because space is political’ 
(1991[1974], p.192). Resistance is produced because the conceived space and lived 
space are contradictory in nature – the conceived space of the dominant class attempts 
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to shape the lived space, but the subordinate class will defend their daily life. During the 
process of urbanisation, Lefebvre argued that space would become contradictory:  
 
Cities are transformed into a collection of ghettos where individuals 
are at once ‘socialised’, integrated, submitted to artificial pressures 
and constraints … and separated, isolated, disintegrated. A 
contradiction which is translated into anguish, frustration and revolt. 
(Lefebvre, 1972, p.168 cited Shields, 1999, p.178) 
 
Lefebvre (2009[1979], p.124) argued that state and civil society are two fundamental 
features of modern society. He was optimistic that the resistance of the people will be 
mediated through civil society. In the history of China, civil resistances were mainly 
organised through kinship and village rather than social groups such as class, ethnicity 
and gender. However, the disputes emerging from land expropriation have become one 
of the key reasons for social movements in recent years. Even for the people who are 
not residing in the regions of the relocation plans, they are still influenced by spatial and 
social changes brought about by state policy.  
 
There are two main reasons for the displaced residents to resist the relocation of. Firstly, 
they hoped to defend their homes. Dongqian is the Chinese term for relocation. 
However, another term, chaiqian, is also frequently used to mean that the home is ‘torn 
down’ during relocation (Westendorff, 2008, p.512). Although Pudong is usually 
regarded as lagging behind in its development, there are villages scattered across the 
regions. Some traditional houses have more than 100 years of history and the residents 
have lived there for several generations. The civil society movement fundamentally 
challenged relocation, as their home, memory and history are eradicated. A second 
reason is that some households are dissatisfied with their compensation. They found the 
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relocation compensation not sufficient enough to afford another property in Shanghai.  
 
When civil society began to develop in the post-Reform period, it acted as a stabiliser 
rather than a contender for the government legitimacy. Non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in China are usually organised or closely monitored by the government. 
According to the civil administration law, all NGOs are required to be ‘sponsored’ by a 
party-state organisation. In recent years, there is a trend of an alternative civil society 
movement (Callahan, 2012, pp.252-253). Resistance against land appropriation 
(especially in rural area) is also getting more common. Although the primary purpose of 
the civil society movements against relocation was to safeguard their property rights, it 
received brutal suppression from the state, often involving prosecution and violence. It 
is because these movements were regarded by the government as a potential threat to 
the social stability of society (Shi and Cai, 2006, p.315).  
 
6.3.3  The Individualisation of Social Problems  
 
Although the civil society movement against relocation for the construction of the Expo 
site has received international attention, not all inhabitants are supportive of civil 
resistance. On the contrary, some residents and owners of enterprises are in favour of 
relocation, for the compensation provided by the relocation company, has improved 
their financial situation. As discussed in the last section, the relationship between the 
state and the people has been drawn under the state-led/-participation mode of 
production, and the property market has become the new ‘connection’. Alongside the 
improvement in the quality of living in the gated communities, some displaced residents 
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have also further invested the relocation compensation in the stock market or property 
market. Average land prices have increased by over 20% since the Reform, because of 
real estate speculation (Diglio, 2005, p.1). Some displaced residents welcomed the 
compensation and re-invested it in the property and stock markets.  
 
Since the late 1980s, the municipal government launched the plan to privatise the work 
unit houses and allow private sector to carry out property development projects. By 
2006, it is estimated that about 80% of Shanghai families owned private residential 
properties (Forrest and Izuhara, 2012, p.30). Housing is no longer a in the post-reform 
era. However, with the state and pro-growth coalition generating revenue through land 
commodification, property prices have surged to an unaffordable level in recent years 
(Chen, Hao and Stephens, 2010, p.890). According to a report by the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences in 2009, 85% of families in the country cannot afford an apartment. 
A survey by the People’s Bank of China also found that 67.2% of respondents were 
‘dissatisfied with housing prices’ (People’s Daily Online, 2009) 
 
However, the ‘social problem’ about housing policy during the market transition period 
was then ‘transformed’ into a ‘personal issue’. This process of ‘the individualisation of 
social problems’ has obscured the unequal nature of the state-led/-participation mode of 
production, because the people agreed with this dominant ideology. Thus, problems are 
personal rather than collective and so are solutions. As social problems are regarded as 
personal problems, individuals need to rely on their personal strategies to deal with 
them. Rather than carrying out collective actions, such as bargaining for better policy 
formulation (or compensation in the case of relocation), individuals normally seek 
232 
personal strategies to handle the social problems that they faced. When the respondents 
were asked about their views on the civil resistance movement in Shanghai against 
relocation and the surge of property price, the movement was usually regarded as a 
means to defend personal interest but not societal goods. One respondent argued that:  
 
‘They [the protestors] are facing some problems, so they will resist. 
They have their own reasons, but it is only something that 
concerned them only. There are many problems in this country, we 
cannot deal with all.’ 
 
‘The individualisation of social problems’ also concerned the social relations of 
production. The withdrawal of job allocation means that individuals need to find jobs 
for themselves but not relying on the allocation by the state. For instance, although the 
official rate of unemployment is comparatively low (around 5%), the number of jobs 
created cannot significantly reduce the unemployment rate (Chen, 2007, p.5). 
Unemployment is not regarded as a social or economic problem, but a personal issue of 
individuals who cannot compete in the labour market. Despite the unfair nature of 
competition and state intervention promoting the idea of competition and growth, the 
responsibility is shouldered by individual citizens.  
 
When Tang and Parish (2000, p.51) conducted fieldwork in urban China, they applied 
the concept of social contract in theorising the change of urban living during the 
transition from socialism to capitalism. Under the socialist social contract, the role of 
the state was to ensure full employment and comprehensive social welfare. Under the 
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capitalist social contract, individuals have free choices to pursue their personal life, but 
security is sacrificed. The role of the state is to provide a fair environment for 
competition by regulating market activities. By applying this concept, they outlined the 
change from an organised urban life to a more diverse one with the withdrawal of the 
state from daily life.  
 
As discussed above, the civilised/uncivilised divide is produced by policy and everyday 
life. Policies have helped to create social inequalities rather than a fair social 
environment. The disadvantaged social groups should only blame themselves for their 
situation under such competition. Even among those who recognised the unequal nature 
of urbanisation, there was little will to challenge the state, as they are benefiting from 
the inequalities. Therefore, the policy-originated problems are personalised and 
rationalised, and the reproduction of the exploitative social relations is justified. The 
Chinese saying ‘the pitiful people must have some aspects hateful’ (ke lin ren zi you qi 
kelin zhi chu) accurately described the view toward the exploitative and unequal nature 
of urbanisation.  
 
6.3.4  The Rationalisation of Social Inequalities  
 
Another mystification is the ‘rationalisation of social inequalities’. The exploitative and 
unequal nature of urbanisation is visible in Shanghai. When wandering around Nanjing 
Road, one of the busiest pedestrian streets in China (Yang and Xu, 2009, p.89), one can 
find beggars, very often being controlled by underground society, sitting in front of the 
chain fashion boutiques waiting for good fortune. One night during my fieldwork period, 
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I saw a blind old man playing a harmonica when I left The Paramount, the dance hall 
symbolising the ‘despotic’ night life of old Shanghai. The neon light of the newly 
revamped historic buildings and the despairing face of old man, produced a sharp 
contrast.   
 
One can see social inequalities virtually everywhere in Shanghai. As a researcher and 
tourist, I found the above scenes made a big impact and reminded me of the coexistence 
of extravagant urban lifestyle and the plight of the disadvantaged – both of which can be 
regarded as an outcome of the Reform. However, the respondents, who witness such 
social inequalities in everyday life held a different view, which I have termed ‘the 
rationalisation of social inequalities’. Rather than defending the rights of the 
disadvantaged, and demanding better social welfare and challenging the unequal nature 
of economic growth, the presence of social inequalities is rationalised by the 
respondents. Some respondents regarded inequality as a necessary evil of economic 
growth and urbanisation, that would require the efforts of several generations to solve. 
Some argued that it is natural outcome in any competitive city like Shanghai. Some 
defended social inequality by claiming that ‘Western societies also cannot solve the 
problem’. The short quote below from a respondent might best summarise the above 
views:  
 
‘I won’t feel sorry for them, because I am not the poor one.’ 
 
Similar to ‘the personalisation of social problems’, the seemingly unsympathetic view 
of social inequalities originates from the dual roles that the state plays under the 
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state-led/state-participating mode of production. Although the life chances of 
individuals in China are still heavily influenced by policies, the withdrawal of the 
absolute control of the state has indisputably produced opportunities and mobility 
(geographically and socially). As discussed above, it has created a more open social 
structure with some individuals experiencing upward mobility and better material 
standard of living. Despite its unfair nature, openness and competition are promoted as a 
beneficial outcome of the Reform, so disadvantaged groups are themselves to blame for 
their inability to compete.  
 
6.3.5  Depoliticisation and the Politicised Everyday Life  
 
As referred to earlier, Lefebvre distinguishes everyday life from daily life by pointing 
out the importance of free time and compulsive time in modern society. The capitalist 
logic is not only restricted to the workplace, but also permeates everyday life (free time). 
The dominant class has managed to mystify the exploitative nature of production 
through consumerism and the promotion of ‘lifestyle’ (1971[1968], p.53).  
 
Since the Reform, the state has retreated from authoritarian control in China. The 
diminishing role of the danwei has begun to depoliticise the daily life of the people. 
Wang Hui described this as a ‘de-revolutionary process’ (2009, p.29). There is less 
direct control from the state under economic liberalisation, but the daily routine is 
programmed by spatial practice. In this chapter, I have examined how the experience of 
the people was shaped by the spatial arrangement of the city. Surveillance and control in 
everyday life is still noticeable through the management of space. Since 1996, some of 
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the power in operating community services, education, sanitation and social security has 
been passed on to the governance of the local district. The establishment of the gated 
community is closely related to the conception of xiaoqu (small district). Within each 
xiaoqu, there is a neighbourhood committee, ‘street offices’ (jiedao banshichu), which 
performs the role of fostering cooperation among residents, as well as surveillance (Wu, 
2002, p.1595). Such system of streets office originated in the 1950s as a means for 
bureaucratic control. For instance, visitors needed to report to police station for 
‘temporary household registration’ (Whyte and Parish, 1984, pp.18, 22-23). The people 
enjoy a better-protected private sphere today, but the inhabitants also experienced 
surveillance in their daily experience. During the period of organising the Beijing 
Olympics and the Shanghai Expo, the street offices became the basic unit of monitoring 
migrant residents. A similar strategy was practised today. Sometimes, street offices even 
manipulated their administrative power to facilitate the relocation company (Zhang, 
2002, p.489). 
 
Though political participation is no longer compulsory, everyday life is permeated by 
politics. The entertainment industry, for instance, is very closely ‘supervised’ by the 
propaganda department. Deviations from the dominant ideology would be banned. For 
example, the English rock band Oasis planned to perform in Shanghai and Beijing in 
2009, but forced to cancel. The official statement of the band proclaimed that the tour 
was cancelled by the Chinese Ministry of Culture after they found that the lead singer 
Noel Gallagher had appeared at a Free Tibet concert in New York in 1997. The 
organizer denied this and argued that the reason was purely commercial (Ransom and 
Graham-Harrison, 2009). Another example is the concert of Jay Z, an American rapper, 
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was banned from performing in Shanghai because of ‘profane references’ in his song 
(BBC, 2006). During the Shanghai Expo, a Japanese music group, SMAP, planned to 
hold a concert, but the concert was cancelled because of the Chinese government’s 
conflict with Japan over the sovereignty of Daioyu Island (Senkaku Islands). Hence, 
everyday life is still highly politicised.  
 
The ‘Second Revolution’ has transformed the daily life of people. Lefebvre urged for a 
critique of everyday life because everyday life is revolutionary (Merrifield, 2006, p.12). 
The study of the everyday is undertaken in order to actualize the ‘the total man’ – 
liberation from alienation and economic fetishism (Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxii). However, 
most people would not form a collective force to launch an urban revolution against the 
state. Not only because they are wary of the brutal suppression, but also because of their 
worries about losing material benefit if the state does not sustain rapid economic 
growth.  
 
6.4   Conclusion: The Possibility of an Urban Revolution  
 
As quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Lefebvre asserted that a ‘revolution that does 
not produce a new space has not realized its full potential, and a truly revolutionary 
social transformation ‘must manifest a creative capacity in its effects on daily life, on 
language and on space’ (1991[1974], p.54). Regarding the impact on the daily life of the 
people, the ‘Second Revolution’ in China has not been unsuccessful. In Chapter Five, I 
outlined how the state-led/–participation mode of production produced new spatial 
arrangements to facilitate its development with the Shanghai Expo as a case study. This 
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chapter described the urban experience of the inhabitants in Shanghai (representational 
space; lived space), as well as explaining how their experiences were shaped by spatial 
practice (perceived space) and representations of space (conceived space). The 
contradictions produced by the differences in the representations of space and 
representational space were also evaluated. By applying Lefebvre’s conceptual 
apparatus, my thesis examined the dialectical relationship between spatial arrangement, 
social relations of production, representations, governmental structure and everyday life. 
I hope to deepen the understanding of the urbanisation of China with a social-historical, 
empirical-theoretical approach, in which the application of Lefebvrian analysis in the 
field of Shanghai studies is used.42  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Bourdieu called for the reflexivity of disciplines, as the 
‘intellectual bias’ of the discipline might produce bias in data collection and 
interpretation (Wacquant, 1989, p.32). By reviewing Chinese and English books and 
journal articles on the urbanisation of Shanghai, Jackie Kwok, a scholar based in Hong 
Kong, pointed out that two different trends in the observation and analysis of Shanghai’s 
urbanisation can be identified. Among the English articles, the discourse of 
‘globalisation’ and the ‘global city’ were commonly applied, implying that Shanghai has 
been excluded from the list of a successful the neoliberal economy. The articles in 
Chinese were generally more critical of the impact of globalisation on the developing 
countries, but showed a more affirmative stance towards the drastic spatial 
transformation of the city (Kwok, 2011, p.309).  
 
                                                      
42 Exceptions included the study by Bao (2005) and Lu (2006).  
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Alongside academic writing, the government also maintains a cautious stance towards 
the application of western model(s) in a Chinese context, but were more positive to the 
outcome urbanisation and the Reform. The ‘China versus the West’ debate will further 
be discussed in Chapter Seven. In the ceremony commemorating the thirtieth 
anniversary of the third plenary session of the eleventh Central Committee of the CPC 
(i.e. the meeting announcing the Reform), the former President, Hu Jingtao argued that 
‘[t]he significant changes prove that the direction and path of reform and opening-up are 
completely correct … standing still and regressing will lead only to a dead end.’ In 
confirming the direction of the Reform, he also proclaimed that the Reform should 
apply the principle of ‘bu zheteng’, so as to ‘achieve our grand blueprint and ambitious 
objectives (on realising modernisation in the middle of the twenty-first century)’.  
 
China Daily translated ‘bu zheteng’ as ‘we don't sway back and forth, relax our efforts 
or get sidetracked’ (China Daily, 2008). While there is a debate on the possibility of 
translating the term, it is generally believed that ‘zheteng’ means the political campaigns 
during the period of socialist construction and in particular the Cultural Revolution 
(Xinhua, 2009). Thus, ‘bu zheng’ could mean that the country should not engage in 
‘senseless/pointless endeavours’ (Li, 2010, p.14). The positive outcomes of the Reform 
(e.g., the modernist skyline at Lujiazui that was discussed in Chapter Five) were 
manipulated to justify the perpetuation of the mode of production and disprove any 
resistance against the Reform. Although the Reform was regarded as a ‘Second 
Revolution’, and reshaped people’s daily life, it is indeed a social engineering 
programme that is in opposition to any revolutionary spirit. It is because any questions 
against the Reform could be considered as ‘getting sidetracked’. Land commodification 
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is an unequal process. However, the outcome of land commodification is the generation 
of a significant amount of revenue for the government and profit for the private sector. 
Such economic success then legitimised further expansion of urbanisation and land 
commodification.  
 
‘To criticise everyday life is to begin with to theorise the complaint that “life is boring”’ 
(Shields, 1999, p.66), however, what if the people do not consider their lives as boring? 
In this chapter, I have described the experience of the inhabitants of Shanghai, most of 
them are not uncritical of the impact of the Reform on the landscape thus on their daily 
life. Most of them are not uncritical of the slogan, ‘Better City, Better Life’, but the 
Shanghai Expo is not a ‘drastic and disruptive’ moment. For a country and a city having 
‘too many’ revolutions in last decades, the revolutionary spirit is not difficult to 
undermine – especially when people generally experience an improvement in material 
life. Even if they recognised that the everyday is revolutionary, where and how should 
the revolution begin? Ubiquitous social control is no longer practical after the collapse 
of the danwei, but everyday life is not depoliticised. Any contradiction of the dominant 
ideology of the ruling class will be immediately challenged. The cancellation of the 
concerts by Oasis, Jay Z and SMAP has well illustrated this. It is therefore beyond the 
‘radical imagination’ of ‘ordinary people’ to participate in any kind of resistance amid 
close state monitoring. 
 
In the song Don’t Look Back in Anger, Oasis suggested that we should begin a 
revolution from our beds (‘so I start a revolution from my bed’). However, the song 
could not be performed in Shanghai as the concert was banned. Noel Gallagher admitted 
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that the lyrics were ‘taken from’ John Lennon (BBC, 2005). In 1969 during Vietnam 
War, Lennon and Yoko Ono launched a ‘bed-in’ campaign. They sat on their hotel bed 
for two weeks to call for world peace during this media event (Archer, 2009). The 
non-violent nature of the ‘revolution in the bed’ reminds us of the Occupy Movement 
across more than 100 cities in the world – including Hong Kong and Taipei, but none of 
the cities in the Chinese Mainland. Both are non-violent protests against the 
establishment, taking place outside the establishment, by disrupting the daily routine to 
demand a response from the establishment. Although the outcome is still unknown, the 
Occupy Movement is argued to have opened up our ‘radical imagination’ (Graeber, 
2011). Three decades earlier, Lefebvre has also called for a critique of everyday life, 
precisely because the acceptance of our daily routine means the rejection of the 
imagination of a new life:  
 
Acceptance involves much more than consenting to trivial acts: 
buying and selling, consumption, various activities. It implies a 
‘consensus’: acceptance of society, the mode of production – in a 
word, a (the) totality. In this way, people (who? Each and every one 
of us) condemn themselves to not desiring, conceiving, or even 
imagining possibilities beyond this mode of production! (Lefebvre, 
2005[1981], p.1)  
 
A revolution from the bed sounds somehow hedonist (Archer, 2009), but it is a 
significant moment of breaking the daily routine. As Lefebvre argued, social clock is 
arranged by the capitalist logic (1971[1968], p.53). Our bedtime, i.e. when we sleep and 
when we get up, is determined by our work, thus the mode of production. The 
inhabitants of Shanghai found their daily life very exhausting. But the social clock is 
determined by the market position under capitalistic logic; the social clock is 
manipulated by working hours in offices and factories. Sitting on your bed for two 
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weeks is therefore more difficult and revolutionary than imagined.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the saying ‘A single room in Puxi is better than a whole 
apartment in Pudong’ was popular before the 1990s to summarise the differences in 
spatial arrangement and perception between Pudong and Puxi. Twenty years after the 
announcement of the New Pudong Development Plan, village houses were replaced by 
highrise buildings, but the rent in Pudong has increased to an unaffordable level (Chen, 
Hao and Stephens, p.890). It is not easy to secure a bed even in Pudong nowadays. Even 
if the inhabitants of Shanghai acknowledged the inequalities being brought about by 
urbanisation, it is beyond their imagination to envision Shanghai as fairer city. It is the 
acceptance of life that limits their imagination, but the previous experiences of 
revolution and political campaigns keep alerting them to the cost of resistance.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WORLD EXPO AND CHINESE MODERNITY  
 
Welcome, Europe … What is a World's Fair? The world as neighbours. We talk a bit 
together. We come to compare ideals. An apparent confrontation of products, in reality 
a confrontation of utopias.  
‐ Victor Hugo (1867)43 
 
 
In 1867, Paris hosted the Exposition Universelles (World Expo)44 for a second time. 
The government of the French Second Empire commissioned famous French writers 
and artists to contribute original work to a guidebook, Paris Guide, for overseas tourists 
(The New York Times, 1867). The excerpt above is quoted from the introductory 
chapter that Victor Hugo contributed (1867). As he accurately suggested, the World 
Expo in the nineteenth century was ‘a confrontation of products and utopias’. It was a 
confrontation of products because industrial products were displayed and competed for 
awards. Companies were eager to promote their products to the public and potential 
business partners through the World Expo (Tamilia, 2007, p.230). As an international 
exhibition, the ‘utopias’ of various participating countries were also displayed through 
manufactured products, art pieces, and temporarily-built pavilions with different 
architectural styles, sometimes as well as human beings, etc. (Parezo and Fowler, 2007, 
see Chapter 8). For instance, Eugène Rimmel, the Assistant Commissioner of the 1867 
Exposition Universelles, argued that ‘every-day life in its most minute details’ of foreign 
countries was showcased in the World Expo (1868, p.1). ‘[W]ithout undertaking long 
                                                      
43 The original text is in French, see Hugo (1867). This translation was edited based on West (n.d.). 
44 Exposition Universelles (The Universal Exposition) is the French title of the World Expo. The World 
Expo is also referred to as the ‘Great Exhibition’ in Britain, and the ‘World’s Fair’ in the United States. 
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and perilous journeys, without running the risk of being frozen in the North, or melted 
in the South’, visitors could see the ‘utopias’ of different countries in the 
purposefully-built expo site (ibid, p.1).  
 
However, Paris in the nineteenth century was not a utopia to every Parisian. As 
suggested in Chapter Six, by replacing ‘winding but lively streets’ with long avenues, 
Haussmann transformed Paris for bourgeois consumption and more convenient access 
for the army (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], pp.75-76). Between the two Exposition 
Universelles in 1855 and 1867, land prices on the Left Bank doubled. The property 
price in old Paris also increased about three-fold (Harvey, 2003, p.134). The outcome 
was that the bourgeoisie ‘conquered the capital’ (Lefebvre, 1996[1968], p.74) and 
‘much of the working population was dispersed to the periphery’ (Harvey, 2003, p.136). 
Four years after the 1867 Exposition Universelles, the upheaval of the Paris Commune 
took place. The Commune occupied Champ de Mars (Fetridge, 1995[1871], p.287), 
where the 1867 Exposition Universelles and most other international exhibitions in Paris 
were held (Barth, 2008, p.23). In the book The Right to the City, Lefebvre argued that 
the Paris Commune demonstrated the strength of reclaiming the city centre (1996[1968], 
p.76).  
 
The World Expo is a project of modernity. More specifically, it is the symbol of ‘a 
dawning modernity’ (Barth, 2008, p.33). For instance, the 1867 Exposition Universelles 
was regarded as a ‘pathway to modernity’, which ‘accelerated technological 
modernisation and modernism’ (Plessen, 1990). Around the same period, China began 
to explore the route to modernity. Similar to other East Asian countries, the pursuit of 
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Chinese modernity originated as a reaction to the challenges from Western civilisations 
(King, 2002, p.139). The ‘spiritual and material manifestations’ of Western civilisations 
were therefore regarded as the yardstick of such a modernity project, during this 
‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period (Lee, 1999b, p.45). Since the traditional economy, 
cultures, and values were destroyed, the search for modernity was not limited to 
economic growth and military strength, but included the re-establishment of its 
‘civilisation order’ (King, 2013, p.ix).  
  
In this final chapter, with reference to the Shanghai Expo, I will discuss Chinese 
modernity by applying a Lefebvrian framework. In the book Introduction to Modernity, 
Lefebvre made a distinction between ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’. He argued that 
‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’ should be established as antitheses, so as to understand the 
nature of modern society (1995[1962], p.1). To him, the ‘maieutic of modernity is not 
without a certain utopianism’ (ibid, p.45). Modernity involved a utopian vision of the 
future. Modernism represented the ‘triumphalist images and projections’ of such a 
utopian vision of modernity. Lefebvre’s conception of modernity is ‘a reflective process, 
a more-or-less advanced attempt at critique and auto-critique’ of modernism (ibid, p.1). 
In this chapter, I will begin by elaborating Lefebvre’s argument on modernity, and its 
relations to his studies on social space and everyday life in modern society.  
 
In that the second section of this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the 
World Expo and modernity. The World Expo provided an arena for the confrontation of 
products and utopias, as indicated above. The 1867 Exposition Universelles, for 
example, displayed ‘an exemplary product of art, trade, and industry … the newest 
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technologies and the most advanced methods of production’ (Plessen, 1990). More 
importantly, the World Expo also presented a utopian future of modern society to the 
public. ‘Progress’ is the theme of the first World Expo, the 1851 Great Exhibition in 
London, which summarised the primary goal of the event (Opie, 2008, p.83). As Robert 
Rydell noted: 
 
Progress is a positive value linked to change … the exposition 
builders promised that continued growth would result in eventual 
utopia. Therein lay the mythopoeic grandeur of the fairs: an 
ideology of economic development, labelled ‘progress’, was 
translated into a utopian statement about future. An ideology, a 
complex idea tied to socioeconomic cleavages in a particular 
historical era (Rydell, 1992, pp.4-5). 
 
In other words, the World Expo can be regarded as an event showcasing the triumphalist 
nature of modernism. The second objective of this chapter is therefore to apply 
Lefebvre’s conception of modernity to the relationship between the World Expo and 
modernity, in particular in nineteenth century Europe. I will also evaluate the 
sociological meanings of the World Expo on urban development and everyday life.  
 
The third section will address the debate on Chinese modernity will be addressed. The 
pursuit of Chinese modernity is also about progress, which is the process of ‘marking a 
rupture with the past and forming a progressive continuum toward a glorious future’ 
(Lee, 1990, p.111). Beginning with the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period, the weak 
Chinese Empire began to be confronted by the products (‘the material manifestations’) 
and the utopias (‘the spiritual manifestations’) of Western civilisations. Western 
civilisation was the yardstick of the Chinese modernisation project. A key issue of 
Chinese modernisation is therefore whether to replace its traditional worldview and 
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cultural practices with those of Western civilisation, or adapt the technological 
advancement of the West for practical use (Spence, 1990, p.225). As discussed in 
Chapter Four, many ideas, lifestyles, technologies, social institutions, as well as urban 
infrastructure, were first introduced from the West to China through Shanghai. Hence, it 
was where Chinese modernity emerged (Bergère, 2009, p.2; Lee, 1999b, p.1; Yeh, 2007, 
p.377). Therefore, Shanghai can be regarded as China’s capital of modernity. Chapter 
Four periodised the spatial history of Shanghai by modes of production, and examined 
the vertical complexity of that space. By delineating the political economy of the 
Shanghai Expo in Chapter Five, I argued that Shanghai in the ‘post-socialist reform era’ 
transformed to a ‘state-led/-participation’ mode of production. The everyday experience 
of the inhabitants of Shanghai during the current phase of rapid urbanisation was 
described and explained in Chapter Six. In this final chapter, I will present a theoretical 
discussion of Chinese modernity with reference to the empirical data mentioned above. 
So, if the World Expo is a ‘pathway to modernity’, does the Shanghai Expo symbolise 
the completion of the modernity project of China? What is the role of Shanghai in the 
pursuit of Chinese modernity today? If Shanghai today resembles nineteenth century 
Paris, is it a utopia for all inhabitants of the city? Do we need an antithesis of the World 
Expo? If it is so, what is the antithesis of the Shanghai Expo? I will conclude this thesis 
by responding to these questions.  
 
7.1   Modernity and Modernism  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, when Lefebvre identified the manipulation of capitalist 
logics with everyday life in the late 1940s, his project of examining the conditions of 
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life in modern society was overlooked and criticised by his comrades in the PCF 
(Lefebvre, 1991[1958], p.6). After his membership was taken away in 1958, Lefebvre 
began to carry out a theoretical project to situate ‘daily life in a fresh social theory of 
modernity’ (Poster, 1975, p.243). His books Introduction to Modernity (1995[1962]) 
and the second volume of Critique of Everyday Life (2002[1961]) can be regarded as an 
announcement of his project (Shields, 1999, p.90).  
 
Even though expelled from the PCF, Lefebvre still regarded himself as a Marxist (Elden, 
2004c, p.3), and applied a dialectical approach in his analysis of modernity. He 
established modernity and modernism as antitheses in order to scrutinise the nature of 
modern society (1995[1962], p.1). His interest in the theoretical discussion of modernity 
persisted over the rest of his career – with the third volume of Critique of Everyday Life 
given a subtitle ‘From Modernity to Modernism (Towards a Metaphilosophy of Daily 
Life)’. Alongside everydayness, his discussion of modernity was also ‘scattered through’ 
The Production of Space (Thacker, 2003, p.21). As a concluding comment on 
Lefebvre’s theoretical explorations, this section will discuss his concept of modernity 
and its relevance to the production of space and everyday life.  
 
7.1.1  Modernity and Modernism as Antitheses  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Lefebvre criticised the inadequacy of formal logics in 
researching the social world. For him, the weakness of applying a positivist approach in 
social research is that ‘sciences are external to philosophy … and their methods of 
discovery have nothing to do with rigorous logic’ (2009[1940], p.12). The ‘movement 
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of thought’ (i.e. the reasoning process) and ‘the content’ (i.e. social reality) are therefore 
separated (ibid, p.9). He argued that a dialectical approach should be applied in social 
studies, so that the ‘movement of thought’ could relate to the content under investigation. 
The dialectical movement of thought is therefore an essential step of producing new 
ideas:  
 
The dialectical movement (the duplication of every thought into two 
contradictory thoughts, positive and negative, yes and no, and the 
fusion of these thoughts) gives rise to groups or series of thoughts. 
(Lefebvre, 2009[1940], p.68) 
 
Lefebvre applied such a dialectical approach in examining modernity. In Introduction to 
Modernity, he began his analysis by challenging the view that ‘modernity should require 
no theory’ (1995[1962], p.1). He established modernity and modernism as antitheses, 
and argued that modernity and modernism should be understood as two ‘contradictory 
thoughts’ in examining the nature of modern society: 
 
Modernism is a sociology and ideology fact. Its pretentions and 
fanciful projects can be seen in the press in statu nascendi. 
Exhibitions are mounted to reconstruct it. 
 
By modernity, however we understand the beginnings of a reflective 
process, or a more-or-less advanced attempt at critique, a bid for 
knowledge … Modernity differs from modernism just as a concept 
which is being formulated in society differs from social phenomena 
themselves, just as a thought differs from actual events. (Lefebvre, 
1995[1962], pp.1-2) 
 
As a conceptual apparatus, Lefebvre argued that modernism stands for ‘certainty and 
arrogance’ (1995[1962], pp.2-3). Modernism represented the promising aspect of 
modernity. With the advancement of science and technology, everything in nature 
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appears to become controllable. Modern society is an obsession with controlling nature 
and the outside world (ibid, p.192). However, there is a strong sense of social progress. 
Everyday life becomes predictable. This strength, creativity and innovation of human 
beings made the uncertain certain. Modernism as a concept therefore represented a 
triumphal view of conquering nature through science and technology (ibid, p.183).  
 
Lefebvre’s conception of modernity is a ‘historical category’. It can be dated, or at least 
‘located at a moment of fundamental historical trauma’ (Trebitsch, 1991, p.xxvii). He 
argued that modernity began with the emergence of industrial society. There was an 
enthusiasm for modernity, i.e. scientific revolution transformed daily life and envisioned 
a future of as the end of dehumanising work (2005[1981], pp.91-92). His view is similar 
to Marshall Berman’s understanding of the impact of technology on modern experience 
in nineteenth century modernism in Europe (Berman, 1982, pp.18-20). Berman argued 
that modernists in the nineteenth century conceived the modernity project in Europe to 
be ‘capable of everything except solidity and stability’ (ibid, p.19). People were fully 
aware of the drastic impact on their daily lives being brought by new technologies like 
stream engines, railways, telegraphs and telephones. Lefebvre shared the view that the 
technological progress in Europe had impacted on everyday life (Trebitsch, 1991, 
pp.xxvi-xxvii). He also emphasised that ‘the State, and everything that it concerns and 
implies, is to be found at the heart of modernity and the so-called modern world’ 
(Lefebvre 2003[1986], p.61 cited Brenner and Elden, 2009, p.2). However, there was a 
‘relative stagnation for everyday relations’ between people and institutions, such as, the 
state and bureaucracy (1995[1962], p.230). In De l'État, Lefebvre examined the role of 
the modern state in the development of capitalism on a world scale, through the process 
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of what he called mondalisation (Brenner and Elden, 2009, pp.2-3).  
 
On the other hand, Lefebvre considered modernity as an antithesis to modernism. In his 
typology, modernity stands for the scepticism and critical review of what modernism 
stands for (1995[1962], p.2). Upon reflection, the uncertainties of nature have not yet 
been controlled by science and technology. For instance, the impact of human activities 
on nature is unknown; the great transformations of social structure and living conditions 
have caused psychological distress to individuals. Modern society is neither completely 
predictable nor following a known and favourable destiny. Such a strong sense of 
uncertainty is contradictory to the premise of modernism as progress (ibid, p.189).  
 
Lefebvre’s discussion of modernity as an antithesis is similar to Giddens’ reflexivity of 
modernity (Giddens, 1990, pp.36-44). By the late twentieth century, people began to be 
sceptical of most aspects of social activity and material relations with nature, as well as 
questioning the application of knowledge, especially the intervention of technology into 
daily life (ibid, p.38). Giddens referred to this as reflexivity and argued that it is the 
reflexivity and uncertainty of the consequences of modernity that led to the sense of 
mortality and the existential anxiety of individuals. Lefebvre argued that such 
scepticism towards modernity (which he called ‘modernism’) emerged in the early 
1900s. During this period, ‘a silent catastrophe’ took place in Europe as the ‘main 
reference systems of social practice … disintegrated and even collapsed’ (Lefebvre, 
2005[1981], p.46). Euclidean and Newtonian space was replaced by Einsteinian 
relativity; Cezanne’s impressionism was replaced by Picasso’s cubism. More 
importantly, the first Russian Revolution took place to offer an alternative to capitalism. 
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The original worldview of modernism began to disintegrate, and modernity, as an 
antithesis of modernism, emerged ‘from the mists of history’ (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], 
p.178). 
 
7.1.2  Modernity and Abstract Space  
 
Lefebvre’s understanding of modernity is closely related to space. He argued that 
modernity is the abstract space where ‘spatial experts’ tried to ‘homogenise social 
space’. The modernist view of urban planning helped to shape everyday life (Thacker, 
2003, p.21). In The Production of Space, Lefebvre illustrated the relationship between 
modernity and spatial practice by referring to the Bauhaus Group and Le Corbusier 
(1991[1974], pp.124-128, 146). Since the 1920s, architecture and urban planning 
became increasingly related to urbanist and industrial research. The relationship 
between the functions and the aesthetics of buildings, or even furniture, was emphasised. 
The Bauhaus group and modernist architects, such as Le Corbusier purposely created a 
specific type of space for their imagination of a specific mode of life. They contributed 
to the emergence of a new modern life (ibid, pp.124-125). Lefebvre even proclaimed 
that the ‘historian of space who is concerned with modernity may quite confidently 
affirm the historic role of the Bauhaus’ (ibid, p.125). 
 
Lefebvre was also commissioned by the French government to carry out a series of 
empirical research projects when working at the Institut de Sociologie Urbaine in the 
1950s. He pointed out that functionalist urbanism was a means for the Fordist 
reorganisation of society (Stanek, 2008b, p.60). In particular, such a modernist view of 
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urban planning was comprehensively implemented in new towns. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, Lefebvre identified the impact of urbanisation in Mourenx, a new town in 
southern France (Elden, 2004c, p.128). He also argued that ‘modernity opens its pages 
to me’ in Mourenx, where he ‘cannot read the centuries, not time, nor the past, nor what 
is possible’ (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.119). Even though new towns promised an 
improvement in quality of life (i.e. a triumphal aspect of modernity), Lefebvre 
maintained that modernism in urban planning will only programme the everyday life of 
inhabitants:  
 
Whenever I step foot in Mourenx I am filled with dread. Yet the 
new town has a lot going for it. The overall plan (the master 
blueprint) has a certain attractiveness: the lines of the tower blocks 
alternate horizontals and verticals. The break between the landscape 
- wooded hills, moorland, vineyards - and the city may be rather 
abrupt, but it is bearable; it is relatively easy on the eye. The blocks 
of flats look well planned and properly built; we know that they are 
very inexpensive, and offer their residents bathrooms or showers, 
drying rooms, well-lit accommodation where they can sit with their 
radios and television sets and contemplate the world from the 
comfort of their own homes … Over here, state capitalism does 
things rather well. (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.118) 
 
Alongside planning with function, these architectural avant-gardes also emphasised the 
importance of the new procedures of planning. Lefebvre argued that they facilitated the 
perpetuation of state capitalism in postwar France as both shared similar ‘logics of 
bureaucracy and productivity’ (Stanek, 2011, p.148). ‘Are we entering the city of joy or 
the world of unredeemable boredom?’, Lefebvre asked when visiting Mourenx 
(1995[1962], p.119). His view is obviously pessimistic but he argued that ‘the sociology 
of boredom could well disclose an important aspect of modernity’ (ibid, p,195).  
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7.1.3  Modernity and Everyday Life in the Modern World  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre periodised the development of everyday life into 
three stages. At the beginning, capitalist logic had yet to dominate everyday life. After 
the Second World War, capitalism began to exert its influence beyond workplace and 
shape everyday life (Lefebvre, 1988, p.79). Lefebvre’s purpose in scrutinising 
modernity is therefore to examine individuals’ living conditions in the twentieth century, 
when capitalism extended its influence to everyday life (Butler, 2012, p.109). By 
examining the nature of modernity, such ‘movement of thought’ can uncover the urban 
experience in the modern world:  
 
The everyday is covered by a surface: that of modernity. News 
stories and the turbulent affectations of art, fashion and event veil 
without ever eradicating the everyday blahs. Images, the cinema and 
television divert the everyday by at times offering up to it its own 
spectacle, or sometimes the spectacle of the distinctly noneveryday; 
violence, death, catastrophe, the lives of kings and stars those who 
we are led to believe defy everydayness. Modernity and 
everydayness constitute a deep structure that a critical analysis can 
work to uncover. (Lefebvre, 1987, p.10)  
 
In modern society, or what Lefebvre called the bureaucratic society of controlled 
consumption, alienation is no longer restricted to the workplace but permeates everyday 
life. ‘Modernity is triumphalist’ (Lefebvre 1995[1962], p.183) but everyday life is 
boring. Especially in new towns, life is ‘just boring’ and occupied by ‘the pure essence 
of boredom’ (ibid, p.118). Therefore, modernity produced a contradictory feeling of 
happiness and fear, banality and spectacles: ‘the contradiction between individual 
loneliness and the bringing-together of crowds or masses in gigantic cities’ (ibid, p.189). 
Urban experience in modernity is about loneliness, banality and repetition, but such a 
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feeling of banality and repetition is masked by spectacles in the cities (e.g., images, 
cinema, television) (Poster, 1975, p.246). 
 
Lefebvre’s discussion of everyday life was particularly shaped by the political 
atmosphere of postwar France and his political affiliation. Shortly after the Second 
World War, the PCF received strong public support and became the second largest party. 
Such public support however declined gradually with the emergence of consumer 
society. Class-based Marxist analysis and a teleological view of proletariat revolution 
were in crisis. By the late 1960s, Lefebvre ‘was no longer convinced about an absolute 
end to alienation’ (Poster, 1975, p.244). Alongside the production of space, the 
theorisation of everyday life is therefore another effort by Lefebvre to reconstruct 
Marxism.  
 
After leaving the PCF, Lefebvre began to have a closer association with the 
Situationalists, the Maoist left and other leftist groups (Elden, 2004c, p.3). As discussed 
above, Lefebvre argued that modernity is promissory: it promised happiness and the 
satisfaction of every need of the people (Lefebvre, 2005[1981], pp.49-50). But everyday 
life in modern society is characterised by boredom and repetition. Such a contradiction 
between technological progress and alienation made the need for disalienation the most 
urgent question to be addressed. Rather than class-based revolution, Lefebvre urged a 
creative rupture from the routine of everyday life (2005[1981], pp.49-50; 1995[1962], 
pp.230-231).  
 
Lefebvre’s intellectual interaction with Guy Debord on the discussion of moments and 
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spectacles ‘helped shaped one another’ (Merrifield, 2008, p.176). As discussed in 
Chapter Two, Lefebvre proposed the necessity of breaking with routine satisfactions of 
everyday life, and illustrated it with examples from the Paris Commune and the 
upheaval in May 1968 (Merrifield, 2006, p.27). Lefebvre disregarded a class-based 
analysis of the May 1968 movement, arguing that an urban revolution could only be 
understood through the concept of everyday life (Poster, 1975, p.388). In other words, 
moments/events replaced class-based revolution as the mode in which individuals are 
liberated from alienation and economic fetishism, so that they can become a ‘total man’ 
in Lefebvre’s imagination (Poster, 1975, p.56; Trebitsch, 2005, p.xxii). When 
modernity’s promise of happiness is in crisis, spectacles can no longer cover the 
invasion of capitalist logic into everyday life. Lefebvre argued that ‘the career of 
modernity as ideology is over’, and a transformation will happen with a break of 
everyday life (Lefebvre, 2005[1981], p.50).  
 
7.2   The World Expo and Modernity  
 
As indicated above, Hugo (1867) accurately described the World Expo as a 
confrontation of products and utopias. Industrial exhibitions originated in Europe as an 
arena for displaying industrial advancement and national strength. The earliest industrial 
exhibitions in Europe can be dated back to 1683 in Paris or 1754 in Vienna. But these 
early exhibitions were small in scale, drew limited attention and did not provide any 
‘sense of progress which so excited the 19th century’ (Carpenter, 1972, p.466). In 1798, 
the First French Republic organised the Exposition Publique des Produits de l’industrie 
Française at Champ de Mars, which is generally regarded as the first modern exhibition. 
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Although only 110 exhibitors participated in this three-day long national event, it 
successfully attracted public attention and demonstrated the industrial achievement of 
the Republic in less than a decade after the French Revolution (ibid). The Exposition not 
only displayed ‘a mix of the martial and manufactures’, but also promoted ‘progress’ as 
a ‘universal aspiration’ (Rosendorf, 2009, pp.1-2). From the mid-nineteenth century to 
the First World War was the ‘golden age of exhibition’, when more than 50 World 
Expos were organised (Greenhalgh, 2012, p.13). Even though the World Expo received 
less attention after the Second World War, it is still one of the biggest international 
events today.  
 
Industrial exhibitions, particularly the World Expo, are a widely researched topic. Areas 
of interest include history of early exhibitions, architectural design of pavilions, cultural 
representation of the exhibits, its relations to urban development, capitalism, 
nationalism and colonialism, as well as tourism and mega-event studies, etc.45 In recent 
years, there has also been a growing number of studies in Chinese, Japanese and Korean 
(Lu, 2005, p.38-43)46. This section does not attempt to provide a complete review of all 
studies about the World Expo, but focuses on the relationship between the World Expo 
and modernity by applying a Lefebvrian framework.  
 
7.2.1  Exhibiting Progress and Prosperity  
 
Lefebvre argued that the ‘maieutic of modernity is not without a certain utopianism’ 
                                                      
45 For a resourceful list of studies about the World Expo, see Geppert, Coffey and Lau (2006). A general 
review of all registered World Expos can be found in Findling and Pelle (eds.) (2008). For a 
bibliographical review of industrial exhibitions in Europe before 1851, see Carpenter (1972). 
46 For a review of Chinese and Japanese literatures, see Lu (2005) and Yoshimi (2010[1992]) 
respectively.  
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(1995[1962], p.45). Such a utopianism was made possible by technology, which ‘makes 
the end of work possible (in the long run)’ and ‘what seemed abstractly utopian 
yesterday is now taking shape’ (Lefebvre, 2005[1982], p.91). By displaying machinery 
and manufactured products, the World Expo provided opportunities for the country to 
display its utopian vision of the future to the public. In 1851, London organised the 
Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, which is the first official 
World Expo registered under the International Exhibitions Bureau (BIE). Historians 
generally regard it as a symbol of ‘peace, progress and prosperity’ (Auerbach, 2008, 
p.ix). Queen Victoria noted such a utopian vision after visiting the machinery section of 
the 1851 Exhibition: 
 
… we [The Royal Family] remained 2 hours, & which is 
excessively interesting & instructive, & fills one with admiration for 
the greatness of man’s mind, which can devise & carry out such 
wonderful inventions, contributing to the welfare & comfort of the 
whole world. What used to be done by hand, & used to take months 
doing is now accomplished in a few instants by the most beautiful 
machinery … But, it would take too long to explain all the pieces of 
machinery we were shown. (Royal Archives, 2012) 
 
The World Expo was usually organised during the phase towards high capitalism 
(hochkapitalismus) of the host countries (Yoshimi, (2010[1992], p.247). Benjamin 
commented that World Expos ‘are places of pilgrimage to the commodity fetish’ 
(Benjamin, 1999[1935], p.7). Different from the 1798 Exposition in Paris, the Great 
Exhibition was an international event with exhibitors from foreign countries and British 
colonies. Even though it was later regarded as ‘the first great utopia of global capital’ 
(Sorkin, 1992, p.209), many British industrialists originally had reservations in spite of 
the Royal family’s support for the event. Protectionism was pervasive in the 
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mid-nineteenth century and their interest was local. Alongside the worries about free 
trade, they preferred fostering local business networks around their production and 
consumption centres than expanding to a national or even a regional network. However, 
the event’s economic success swept away reservations over free trade within Britain 
(Young, 2008, p.7).  
 
Lefebvre argued that capitalism managed to ‘attenuate (if not resolve) its internal 
contradictions’ for a century since the writing of Capital … by occupying space, by 
producing a space’ (1976[1973], p.21; original emphasis). Before the first volume of 
Capital was published in 1867, the organisation of the World Expo and similar 
exhibitions already displayed prosperity and facilitated the development of capitalism 
on a world scale. The commercial network between various colonisers in Europe and 
colonies were strengthened through exhibitions. For instance, London organised the 
Colonial and Indian Exhibition in 1866 to display the economic value of the colonies 
(Douglas, 2008, p.17). The French Third Republic organised an exhibition in Hanoi in 
1902 (Exposition de Hanoi) to attract investment in Annam (Lu, 2004, p.11). The 
outcome of these exhibitions was also political. By applying Benedict Anderson’s 
concept of imagined community, Peter Hoffenberg (2001, pp.2-3) argued that the 1851 
Exhibition provided Britain with the first occasion to showcase all its colonies at once. 
With the visual impact of the exhibits from the country and the colonies, it symbolised 
the sovereign and included colonies in the imagination of the community and national 
identity of the British Empire.  
 
The World Expo displayed a sense of progress – the possibility of creating a modern life 
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through science and technology. Especially after the First World War when the 
legitimacy of imperialism was questioned, ‘progress’, ‘modern’ and ‘tomorrow’ were 
emphasised ‘at the height of modernism’. Some examples of the themes included ‘A 
Century of Progress’ (Chicago, 1933-1934), ‘Peace and Progress’ (Paris, 1937) and ‘The 
World of Tomorrow’ (New York, 1939-1940) (Winter, 2013, pp.33, 43). However, the 
themes of ‘progress and future’ were brought to ‘logical conclusions’ after the Second 
World War (Greenhalgh, 2012, p.13). The ‘confidence of conquering nature’ of the 
World Expo was replaced by the care and respect to the environment, such as ‘Oceans: a 
heritage for the future’ (Lisbon, 1998), ‘Humankind – nature – technology, a new world 
arising’ (Hanover, 2000) and ‘Nature’s Wisdom’ (Aichi, 2005) (Winter, 2013, p.34), as 
well as, the Shanghai Expo’s ‘Better City, Better Life’.  
 
7.2.2  Exhibiting a Modern Life  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that the history of everyday life could be 
periodised into three phases. The first period lasted until the mid-twentieth century, 
which roughly corresponded to the ‘golden age of exhibition’. Lefebvre argued that 
capitalism during this phase ‘was busy constructing locomotives, ships, cannons, and so 
on’ (1988, p.79). Capitalist logics had extended to everyday life, yet daily routine was 
still dominated by nature (linear time). However, technology (e.g., electricity, the 
internal combustion engine and other transport technologies) began to modify people’s 
daily life at about the turn of the twentieth century (Lefebvre, 1995[1962], p.178). Such 
a modern life was popularised through the World Expo. Many new inventions, including 
the telephone, photography, telegraphy, television and the steam engine, were for the 
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first time widely exhibited to the public at the World Expo. The application of these new 
inventions to daily life was demonstrated to the public at the expo venue. For instance, 
the electric bulb was widely used in the 1889 Exposition Universelle in Paris, with the 
availability of the industrial use of electricity. There were 5,700 coloured light bulbs 
illuminating Champ de Mars, so that the expo venue became an ‘Electrical Palace’. The 
availability of the electricity-powered train in Champ de Mars also shortened travel time. 
Electricity was seen as ‘the regenerative goddess of the modern’ that transformed 
Victorian people’s daily routine (Blyth, 2009, p.34). In other words, this early World 
Expo provided a specific social space during a particular period of time for exhibiting 
modern life. It is therefore not surprising that the organiser of the 1889 Exposition 
Universelle even proclaimed the expo venue as ‘a temple of modern life’ (Mitchell, 
1989, p.220). In the United States, the World Expo was also regarded as a ‘rites of 
passage’, in which ‘the full acceptance of a new way of life, new values, and a new 
social organization’ were made possible (Susman, 1983, p.7).  
 
The World Expo is an exhibitionary event: it provides a social space for exhibiting 
industrial products to the people. The preface to the guide book of the 1934 World’s Fair 
in Chicago clearly stated its spectacular nature that ‘[a]ll the world has been drawn upon 
to contribute to the spectacle … No amount of money or the travel of a lifetime could 
give you the opportunity of seeing all these things brought together, except at an 
International Exposition’ (A Century of Progress International Exposition Chicago, 
1934, p.15). However, with the growing popularity of international communications, 
tourism and theme parks, such as Disneyland, the World Expo began to lose its 
attractiveness in displaying foreign cultures and products after the Second World War 
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(Rosendorf, 2009, p.6). The World Expo was regarded as ‘the most direct ancestor’ of 
Disneyland (Sorkin, 1992, p.208), but the opening of theme parks such as Disneyland in 
the 1960s replaced the World Expo as a more spectacular tourist attraction (Rosendorf, 
2009, p.6). Moreover, the development of mass media further reduced the World Expo’s 
role as a spectacle and exhibition of modern life. As Lefebvre argued:  
 
Is it correct to say that television gives the everyday a world-wide 
dimension? Yes it is. Television allows every household to look at 
the spectacle of the world, but it is precisely this mode of looking at 
the world as spectacle which introduces non-participation and 
receptive passivity. (Lefebvre, 2002[1961], p.76) 
 
There are now publications and information which ensure that 
everyone is aware of all that is to be done … everyone knows how 
to live in 1981 … Magazines and weeklies, particularly those 
directed at women and even those that defended the ‘cause of 
women’, work out complete daily schedules – buying and selling, 
shopping, menus, clothing. From morning to evening and evening 
to morning, everyday time is full to bursting: fulfilment, plenitude. 
(Lefebvre, 2005[1981], p.81) 
 
Lefebvre argued that everyday life entered the second and then the third phase after the 
Second World War, in which everyday life is programmed and mass-mediated by a 
capitalist logic (1988, p.79). Mass media became a more convenient and powerful 
channel in exhibiting modern life. Therefore, the World Expo could no longer be 
projected as ‘a temple of modern life’. However, the spectacle nature of the World Expo 
continues to be significant. For instance, the 1986 World Exposition on Transportation 
and Communication in Vancouver was originally not widely supported due to its huge 
cost of investment, which resulted in a low level of support to the provincial 
government by the general public (Ley and Olds, 1988, pp.209-210). However, the 
Exposition produced a ‘lingering memory of a spectacle’ among the public. Such a 
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‘vivid and positive’ personal experience then converted the 1986 Expo from a political 
debate to a personal event (ibid, pp.209-210). As reflected in an opinion poll, public 
support to the government reversed since the Exposition began.  
 
7.2.3  Exhibiting a Modern City  
 
As I discussed in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo is an urban development project that 
facilitated land commodification. Other World Expos were also closely related to urban 
development. In the United States, some host cities applied the European model of 
urban planning when drafting the plan for the construction of the expo venue. Since the 
Festival of Britain in London in 1951, urban planners also realised the potential of 
promoting urban regeneration by organising mega-events (Geppert, 2010, p.145). 
Alongside the development of the built environment, the World Expo also shaped the 
representation of a modern city. As discussed in Chapter Two, Lefebvre argued that 
‘industrialisation and urbanisation’ are a double process. Both processes must take place 
together, because ‘urban existence gives significance to industrialization’ (1971[1968], 
pp.47-48). As illustrated above, the World Expo exhibited modern life; it also exhibited 
a modern city to the public:   
 
The fairs also became models, adopted visionary urbanism as an 
aspect of their agendas, both offering themselves as models of urban 
organization and providing within their pavilions, panoramic visions 
of even more advanced cities to come. (Sorkin, 1992, p.210) 
 
By applying Lefebvre’s spatial triad, Alexander Geppert (2010, pp.4-6) examined the 
relationship between early international exhibitions (from the late nineteenth century to 
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the 1930s) and the representation of a modern city. He argued that international 
exhibitions, such as the World Expo, is an ‘exhibition city’ within the ‘real’ exhibiting 
city. The World Expo is a confined physical space within the host city, where urbanism 
was represented in the expo venue. Exhibitions are therefore spaces of representation 
for displaying urbanism. For instance, the 1851 Exhibition was held in a 
purposefully-built modernist steel structure, Crystal Palace at Hyde Park, and became a 
national icon (Hobhouse, 2002, p.xix). The ‘Electrical Palace’ of the 1889 Exposition 
also demonstrated modern nightlife.  
 
However, most built structures in the expo site were planned to be demolished after the 
events; Geppert also termed the World Expo as a ‘fleeting city’ (Geppert, 2010, p.5). 
The 1851 London Exhibition lasted for six months, and most pavilions except Crystal 
Palace were demolished. The Shanghai Expo followed this tradition; the exhibition was 
held from May to October and most pavilions were temporary in nature. Lefebvre 
argued ‘the tendency of modernity toward the ephemeral’ (2009[1975], p.116). In The 
Urban Revolution, Lefebvre commented on the ephemeral nature of space in modern 
society by referring to the 1967 International and Universal Exposition in Montreal:  
 
An admirable example of such a conjuncturally modeled space, 
modified by group action, is the large exhibition space, especially 
the one in Montreal. An ephemeral city rose up from a transformed 
site, a magnificent city, where everydayness was absorbed in 
festival, where the urban was transparent in its splendour. (Lefebvre, 
2003[1970], p.130)  
 
Early World Expos celebrated the progress that resulted from industrial and 
technological advancement. More often, the host city organised this mega-event for the 
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branding of the city (Monclús, 2009, p.2) and justifying urban development (Ley and 
Olds, 1988, p.199). Therefore, the World Expo no longer played the important role of 
exhibiting progress, prosperity and a modern life, but transformed to become a ‘space of 
consumption’ or even a ‘consumption of space’ dominated by the bourgeoisie. Even 
though the 1967 Montreal Expo showcased such complex buildings as ‘Habitat 67’ to 
envision the future of the city, the utopianism of the World Expo was questioned 
(McDonough, 2010, pp.88-96).  
 
7.2.4  World Fair is Unfair  
 
In the United States, the World Expo is referred to as ‘World’s Fair’. World’s Fair is 
however not fair: it exhibited the ‘dark sides’ of modernity (Rosendorf, 2009, p.3). First 
of all, the World Expo facilitated the growth of capitalism on a world scale. Marx and 
Engels argued that the 1851 Exhibition is ‘a striking proof of the concentrated power 
with which modern large-scale industry’ is invested (Marx and Engels, 1850 cited 
Young, 2008 p.21):  
 
By putting on show the massed resources of modern industry in a 
small concentrated space, just at a time when modern bourgeois 
society is being undermined from all sides, it is also displaying 
materials which have been produced, and are still being produced 
day after day in these turbulent times, for the construction of a new 
society. With this exhibition, the bourgeoisie of the world has 
erected in the modern Rome its Pantheon, where, with self-satisfied 
pride, it exhibits the gods which it has made for itself. (Marx and 
Engels, 1850 cited Young, 2008 p.21) 
  
Alongside promoting capitalism on a world scale, the dark side of the World Expo also 
included ‘justifying colonialism’ and ‘codifying and encouraging racism’ (Rosendorf, 
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2009, p.3). For instance, even though the French tradition of expositions put much 
heavier emphasis on craftsmanship and artistic objects (like the sculptures of Rodin), 
the 1867 Exposition Universelles was the first exposition that included human mankind 
as an exhibit. A large-scale temple replica ‘complete with a row of skulls hanging from 
the cornice and a cast of mother of the gods, Coatlicue, standing in the central portal’ 
were imported from Mexico as a display of foreign cultures (Honour, 1975, p.185 cited 
Parezo and Fowler, 2007, p.23). The French Third Republic then organised the Paris 
Exposition Coloniale Internationale (Paris International Colonial Exhibition) in 1931 
(Blake, 2002, p.35). Similarly, various colonial exhibitions were held in Belgium, 
Britain, France and Germany to demonstrate their triumphs of conquering foreign lands 
(Douglas, 2008, p.18). In the 1904 St. Louisiana Purchase Exposition, ‘Anthropology 
Villages’ and ‘Indian Villages’ were even built to display native people from foreign 
societies (Parezo and Fowler, 2007, see Chapter 3). The 1904 Exposition was the first 
World Expo with the participation of the Chinese government (Huang, 2007, pp.19-20). 
Alongside wooden architecture, silk and porcelain, the Chinese Village also displayed a 
woman with bound feet, a Buddhist monk and carved wooden figures of prostitutes, 
beggars, prisoners and drug addicts (Zhang, 2010[1904], pp.124-126). In other early 
World Expos, the images of Australia, imperial China, Egypt, Meiji Japan, Middle East 
India and Muslim civilisations were all distorted in accordance with the dominant 
representations of the European and American organisers.47 
 
Lefebvre argued that modernity is ‘an endeavour’ of ‘the discovery and appropriation of 
                                                      
47 For a discussion on the representation of Australia and India in the exhibitions in Britain, see 
Hoffenberg (2001). For a discussion of the representation of imperial China, Egypt, Meji Japan and the 
Middle East in World Expos, see Lu (2005), Çelik (1992), Yoshimi (2010[1992] ) and Davis (2002) 
respectively.  
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desire’ (1995[1962], p.191). The World Expo provided the social space for displaying 
‘the discovery and appropriation of desire’ of European countries. Amid the Industrial 
Revolution and colonial expansion, manufactured products and colonies were the new 
‘discoveries’. Hence, it is not surprising that subjects from their colonies were included 
as an ‘exhibit’ alongside industrial products. Timothy Mitchell described it as a 
‘world-as-exhibition’; that Europe’s worldview was displayed through World Expos 
(1988, p.13). By engaging with Michel Foucault’s discussion on disciplinary power, 
Tony Bennett argued modern society developed an ‘exhibitionary complex’. The 
industrial exhibitions ‘completed the evolutionary picture in representing the history of 
industry and manufacture as a series of progressive innovations leading up to the 
contemporary triumphs of industrial capitalism’ (1988, p.90).  
 
The World Expo is an exhibition of a modern country. While countries such as Britain 
and France organised World Expos to demonstrate their success in industrial 
development, urban infrastructure and colonial expansion, other European countries and 
the United States organised expositions to demonstrate that they have accomplished the 
required level of modernisation. Regardless of its dark side, the World Expo still 
became the parameter for comparatively less developed countries to present their 
achievement of modernity.  
 
7.3   Shanghai, China’s Capital of Modernity  
 
Chinese modernity is an outcome of western confrontation. In Europe, modernity 
emerged during the Enlightenment and peaked during the Industrial Revolution. The 
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advancement of knowledge (science) and its application (technology) ontologically 
challenged the traditional worldview and daily lives of individuals. It resulted in 
institutional changes in society, the questioning of tradition, and a transformation of 
individual experience of space and time. The driver of modernisation in China was 
however external. Though modernisation was a pragmatic project to strengthen the 
nation against foreign invasion, it had to respond to Western confrontation. Chinese 
modernity went beyond the challenge of tradition, with the whole ‘structure’ of China 
been re-evaluated.  
 
As I argued above, Western modernisation is typically considered as the yardstick or 
even the goal for Chinese modernisation. The key issue therefore was whether to 
replace its traditional worldview and cultural practices with Western those of civilisation, 
or to adapt the technological advancement of the West for purely practical use (Spence, 
1990, p.225). Thus, a series of Lefebvrian questions arise: Can China modernise 
adopting her own route? Has China accomplished its search for modernity? How can 
Chinese modernity be examined within a Lefebvrian framework? What is the role of 
Shanghai in relation to Chinese modernity? In this final section, I will address these 
questions making reference to the World Expo.  
 
7.3.1  Chinese Modernity as a Western Confrontation  
 
The debate on the modernisation of China can be summarised in the ideas of ‘ti-yong’. 
Ti (literally translated as ‘structure’) means the traditional Chinese worldview and ethics 
of societal relationships; while yong (’function’) means ‘practical use’ (e.g., the 
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application of science and technology). The focus of the Chinese modernisation debate 
is whether to completely substitute Chinese traditions with Western ones (i.e. regarding 
Western ideas as ti), or to restrict the imitation of the western model to technological 
advancement (i.e. regarding Western products as yong) (Spence, 1990, p.225). 
 
The ‘structure versus function’ debate is the ‘China versus the West’ debate operating 
within academia and elite circles. Some senior officials of the empire (the 
Westernisationists) support the former worldview and the pursuit of military and 
economic industrialisation (Western Learning for practical use) without involving 
institutional reform (Chinese Learning as the fundamental structure). The Jiang Nan 
Machinery Manufacture Arsenal was established in Shanghai against this historical 
backdrop. On the other hand, the revolutionists, such as Sun Yat-sen, fundamentally 
question the ‘structure’ of the empire and call for modernisation to encompass the 
cultural and political organisation of the Chinese nation state (Spence, 1990, 
pp.197-198).  
 
However, whether or not China’s modernity project is merely a response to Western 
Confrontation is an ontological question that needs to be carefully examined. Around 
the same time that China faced colonial invasion, Japan, the neighbouring empire which 
shared many of Chinese cultural traditions, also experienced Western coercion. By 
comparing the different views towards modernisation and institutional changes of Japan 
and China, a simplistic account of China’s modernisation as merely a response to 
Western modernity is disproved. By comparing the respective attitudes of Japan and 
China towards modernisation, I will show in this section that the latter’s route to 
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modernisation was not simply a response to Western expansionism.  
 
Toshimi Takeuchi (2005[1948], pp.56-57) argued that the modernisation of China and 
Japan resulted from Western coercion. Both countries showed similar ‘Oriental 
Resistance’; but it is the difference in their approaches that has resulted in their different 
versions of modernity. He demonstrated the difference by referring to the argument of 
Lu Xun, a leftist writer arguably the founder of modern Chinese literature, on slave and 
master. The ‘slave and master’ relationship is the analogy of the relationship between 
Asia and Europe in the nineteenth Century. In the interpretation of Takeuchi 
(2005[1948], p.72), Lu Xun called for an awareness of the violent nature of the struggle 
to become the master, and suggested that the liberation of China could not be pursued 
by becoming European. Lu Xun clearly disagreed with the direct duplication of the 
colonial expansion model of Western powers, even though he is also well known for 
critiquing the corrupting aspects of Chinese tradition. Japanese intellectuals, argued 
Takeuchi, had failed to problematise the response to Western modernity. Even though 
the total abandonment of tradition was not advocated, the proposal of a comprehensive 
replication of a Western model overwhelmed Japanese culture.  
 
Takeuchi attributed such a difference to structural differences between Chinese and 
Japanese histories (2005[1948], pp.76-78). In the long history of China, there were 
always alternations of dynasty. The ‘old’ dynasty was replaced by a ‘new’ one, then ‘the 
new’ would become the ‘old’, and would be replaced by another ‘new’ dynasty. This 
cycle repeats and is viewed as a law of nature. ‘The new’ will not be better than ‘the 
old’, as it will eventually be overthrown by another dynasty. This explained why Lu 
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Xun has excluded the possibility of liberation from Western coercion through becoming 
master/Europe, as this will just be the beginning of another cycle of the alternation. On 
the other hand, despite the wars between the emperor and the hans (the feudal lords) and 
among the hans, Japan has no history of alternation in dynasties in the past 2,600 years.  
 
The Chinese view of ‘new versus old’ did not exist in Japan as the dominant dynasty 
persisted despite internal and external challenges. Because of this, Japan was not wary 
of foreign cultures but quite dynamically integrated them into her own. Seemingly 
antagonistic, the tradition of Japan would not be fundamentally shaken by foreign 
cultures because of the emphasis on continuity. Faced with Western confrontation, Japan 
responded in the same way: by imitating the Western model and by absorbing it into its 
own system. However, as Lu Xun predicted, becoming European (the master) did not 
help Japan (the slave) resolve the problem arising from modernity, as it inherited the 
violent nature of the master. Japan’s colonial and imperial war can be viewed as a 
response to Western modernity and a search for her own modernity, but it only resulted 
in what Takeuchi called ‘Japanism’ (2005[1948], p,142).  
 
Takeuchi’s thesis has drawn considerable attention from academic communities in Asia 
because of the importance he attributed to cultural factors. The modernisation of China 
began with scepticism towards tradition, but the cultural and institutional aspects should 
not be confused. Culturally, modernity is opposite to tradition; but institutionally 
modernity can also be opposite to feudalism. Unlike modernity in Western civilisation, 
the purpose of China’s modernisation is not solely for progress – if the ‘new’ and the 
‘old’ appeared and disappeared in a cycle, what is the meaning of ‘progress’? 
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Modernisation means technological progress, but more importantly China’s 
modernisation is also liberation from feudalism, liberation from the alternation of 
dynasties, as well as liberation from the ‘slave and master’ relationship. Hence, the 
relationship between Chinese tradition and Western coercion is dialectical. The military 
strength and the advancement in science and technology of colonial powers have 
exposed China’s backwardness in science and technology. Something traditionally 
regarded as ‘clever but useless tricks’ is now regarded as the goal.  
 
7.3.2  Encountering Modernity at World Expos 
 
In the opening speech to the seventh World Expo International Forum that I referred to 
in Chapter Five, Premier Wen Jiabao (2009) summarised the involvement of China in 
the history of the World Expo and argued that the organisation of the Shanghai Expo 
‘brought into reality the century-old dream of the Chinese nation’. Such a ‘century-old 
dream’ emerged when China was still under feudalism and Western societies began to 
industrialise: 
 
The first World Expo was held in London in 1851 at a time when 
China's feudal rulers were totally unaware of the rapid development 
of science and technology or the historical changes to the political 
and economic patterns of the outside world. They regarded Western 
science and technology as ‘clever but useless tricks’ and called the 
World Expo a ‘competition of strange things’ … China’s later 
involvement with the World Expo was eye-opening to many 
Chinese. It exposed them to modern civilization and aroused in 
them a strong sense of mission to learn from and catch up with the 
West. (Wen, 2009) 
 
The early World Expos displayed the wealth and strength of the host countries. China’s 
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early encounters with the World Expo emphasised technological inventions, urban 
development of the host city, as well as the economic contribution of the World Expo. 
For instance, Guo Songtu, the ambassador to France, found the invention of the 
telephone by Thomas Edison ‘magical’ (2010[1876], p.81). Zhang Deyi, (2010[1866]) 
visited the Crystal Palace and was astonished by the sophisticated architectural design 
and the urban development of London:  
 
Being commissioned by the government, this Palace was built 
thirteen years ago by Sir Paxton. The column is made of iron, the 
roof and walls of four sides are inlaid with glass. It looks 
magnificent and breathtaking when viewing from a distance, it is 
therefore named as Crystal Palace.48 (Zhang, 2010[1866], p.6) 
 
London covers over 100 miles of surrounding areas, with two 
millions of residents, roads are plain, gardens are luxuriant, streets 
are tidy, markets are prosperous. All buildings are six to seven 
storeys high, with different colours in white or red.49 (Zhang, 
2010[1866], p.4) 
 
The World Expos provided occasions for the Chinese to have firsthand experience of 
Western technologies and urban development. However, such encounters were mainly 
restricted to government officials, businessmen and overseas students. The experience 
of visiting the World Expo was distributed through the printed media in Shanghai. For 
instance, Wang Tao, a reformist from Shanghai, visited Champ de Mars and the Crystal 
Palace. Based on Wang’s notes on his visit, Dianshizhai Pictorial, an illustrated 
newspaper published in Shanghai, drafted illustrations of these two expo venues to 
showcase their imagination of sophisticated architectural design and urban development 
                                                      
48 The original text reads as: 此宮係在十三年前，官派伯爵柏四屯所建，以鐵為樑柱，上下四旁鑲
嵌玻璃，遙望之金碧輝煌，悅人心目，故名為水晶宮。 
49 The original text reads as: 倫敦周可百里，居民二百萬，道路平坦，園林茂盛，街巷整齊，市廛
繁盛。樓高皆六七層，其色紅白各異。 
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in Western cities (Chen, 2010, pp.16-17). These overseas experiences of visiting the 
World Expo also attracted further responses in the country. Alongside intellectuals, the 
feudal ruler also began to realise the ‘rapid change of the outside world’ and the need 
for modernisation. In order to demonstrate its determination and capability in industrial 
modernity and encouraging industrialism, the Qing Government organised various 
domestic agricultural and industrial exhibitions across the country (e.g., Sichuan in 1905, 
Tianjian in 1907 and Wuhan in 1906) (Fernsebner, 2006, p.100). In 1910, the year 
before the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the Nanyang Encouraging Industry Exposition 
(Nanyang quanye hui; or the Nanking South Sea Exhibition) was held in Jiangning 
under state sponsorship and with donations from the private sector.  
 
Lefebvre argued that modernity is two sided: the speeding up of technological progress 
and the transformation of everyday life (1995[1962], p.230). Even though similar 
exhibitions were organised in China at the turn of the last century, these events focused 
only on industrialism but not the vision of a modern life. These industrial and 
agricultural exhibitions did not display any vision of the modern city and modern life to 
the public. However, Shanghai during the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period provided 
a more ‘vernacular landscape’ (Lee, 1999b, p.37). Since Shanghai emerged as a 
capitalist cosmopolitan city, the concession areas, and Shanghai in general, became 
China’s ‘exhibition city’: it exhibited a modern city and modern life to the country. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, Western architecture and ‘modern facilities’ were imported 
to the concession areas of Shanghai since the mid-nineteenth century. The Bund is even 
regarded as the ‘World Expo of Architectures’ (wangguo jianzhu bolang) (Xiong and 
Zhou, 2007, p.197). Shanghai therefore provided the physical space for implementing a 
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Western urban development plan. However, Shanghai also provided the social space for 
experimenting with new modern life. Shanghai displayed ‘the imagination of an 
emerging urban constituency’ and displayed a new kind of ‘norms and practices of 
everyday existence in a widening circle of Chinese society’ (Yeh, 1997, p.394). 
Therefore, Shanghai could be regarded as the ‘temple of modern life’ for the 
transformation of everyday life within a Chinese context.  
 
7.3.3  Chinese Modernity as an Antithesis  
 
As I indicated in Chapter Six, Mao (1937) argued that the laws of ‘contradiction in 
things’ and the ‘unity of opposites’ are fundamental to nature and society, i.e. things 
must come in pairs and produce a unity. Even though Lefebvre pointed out the lack of 
philosophical vigour in Mao’s application of dialectics (1988[1976], p.243), the latter’s 
discussion on the ‘law of unity’ can help understand the nature of Chinese modernity 
that emerged in Shanghai. Shanghai is the capital of Chinese modernity; it is also the 
home of the antithesis of modernity. Lefebvre (1995[1962], p.178) argued that ‘the 
contours of modernism and modernity begin to emerge from the mists of history’ at 
around 1905 – the first Russian revolution took place as resistance against feudalism 
and capitalism. The contours of the antithesis of modernism also emerged in Shanghai 
when it was entering the phase of the golden period of capitalism. In July 1921, the 
Communist Party of China was officially established in Shanghai with the assistance of 
the Communist International (Comintern). Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, leading scholars 
of the May Fourth Movement, took key leadership roles (Spence, 1990, pp.303-307).  
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Wang and Karl (1998, pp.13-14) argued that socialism in China is an anti-modern 
theory of modernisation. Mao strongly supported the search for modernisation by 
overthrowing Chinese tradition, but disagreed that capitalism was the synonym of 
modernity. The destruction of Shanghai’s urban culture during the revolutionary era was 
carried out under the direct domination of this view of socialism. It is this third Chinese 
version of socialism which is important in complicating Chinese modernity.  
 
As Lefebvre pointed out, Western modernity is constituted by triumph and fear 
(1995[1962], pp.1-3), but, as we have seen in the venue of the World Expo, only the 
positive side was valued. However, when China was confronted by (Western) modernity, 
the bright and dark sides of modernity were introduced, though at different speeds. 
Therefore, Shanghai modernity is complicated. For instance, the infrastructure 
development and urban culture of the French concession areas in Shanghai were 
celebrated by Shanghaiese writers, as the pre-eminent aspect of modernity (i.e. 
Lefebvre’s concept of modernism). Nonetheless, with diverse western theories being 
brought into China (with Shanghai as the publishing centre), critiques of the exploitative 
nature of capitalism and the theory of class struggle were also imported into China (Lee, 
1999b, p.322). Thus, Western experience provided Chinese scholars with an immediate 
critique of the pursuit of modernism in China.  
 
Therefore, the Chinese version of socialism is neither about ‘structure versus function’ 
nor ‘China versus the West’. It neither supports the preservation of Chinese tradition nor 
a complete replication of the Western model. Socialist revolution provided a possibility 
of liberating the nation from both feudalism and Western coercion, as well as avoiding 
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the internal contradiction of capitalism in western societies. It is also an intellectual 
critique of capitalism and class domination, as well as a political campaign offering the 
old civilisation an alternative route to modernisation. Rather than just the dialectical 
relationship between ‘the weak and traditional imperial China’ and ‘the strong and 
industrial modern West’, Chinese modernity is an antithesis of Western capitalism. 
Chinese socialism, as a ‘critique of (Western) modernity’, is another antithesis that 
further complicates the modernisation of China. Only through this ‘trialectical’ 
relationship can we understand the modernisation of contemporary China.  
 
7.3.4  The City Spirits  
 
Similar to the 1867 Exposition Universelles, the organisation of the Shanghai Expo also 
published a Shanghai City Guide as a ‘tourist guide’ and a ‘pocket encyclopaedia’ for all 
‘new Shanghaiese’ (Wang, 2007, front flap). Unlike the Paris Guide, Shanghaiese 
writers and artists were not commissioned to contribute to the guidebook. But it was 
written by the vice Chairperson of the Shanghai Committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Wang Ronghua, who was also the 
president of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and delegate of the 15th and 16th 
CPC National Congress. The author argued that Shanghai showed an ‘enterprising city 
spirit’:  
 
The spirit of a city is cultivated over time. Therefore, it varies from 
city to city. Before Shanghai opened to the outside world as a 
commercial port in the late mid-19th century, the city was 
characterized by mercantilism, affluence, and tolerance. After 1949, 
however, the spirit of Shanghai gradually changed to patriotism, 
conformity and national pride.  
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Since the central government kick started the opening-up of Pudong 
in 1990, the city of Shanghai has stayed at the forefront of China’s 
reform and opening up. A new city spirit has been nurtured as 
Shanghai grows into an international metropolis. The new spirit can 
be summarized as a broad mind like the vast ocean that takes in all 
rivers, the readiness to serve the entire nation, and the dedication to 
working hard and pursuing excellence. (Wang, 2007, pp.80-81) 
 
The ‘enterprising city spirit’ was essential to the development of Shanghai as a capitalist 
cosmopolitan city. As Yeh concurred, Shanghai’s modernity emerged with ‘the workings 
of commercial interest through the city's cultural industries’ (1997, p.393). However, 
Shanghai also demonstrated a ‘revolutionary city spirit’. As Bergère noted, during the 
‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ period, Shanghai was ‘the most “foreign” of all Chinese 
towns, and was also one where nationalist awareness and the revolutionary mobilization 
of the masses first developed’ (2009, p.5). It was the official birthplace of the CPC with 
many industrial strikes being organised (Perry, 1994, p.1), as well as the cultural centre 
promoting different ideas (Lee, 1999b, pp.42-42). Such a ‘revolutionary city spirit’, 
which could be regarded as the antithesis of modernism in Lefebvre’s terminology, is 
implicit to Shanghai modernity.  
 
Therefore, ‘enterprising spirit’ and ‘revolutionary spirit’ are the antitheses of the 
modernity of Shanghai, in which ‘enterprising spirit’ means the spirit of situating the 
Western in a Chinese context and ‘revolutionary spirit’ means the critique of such a 
pursuit. Both city spirits constituted Shanghai modernity. In Chapter Four, I showed that 
Shanghai served as the capital of Chinese modernity from the late Qing to the 
Republican era because it also mediated foreign ideas in China. Without the 
‘revolutionary spirit’, Shanghai would have functioned merely as a treaty port for 
economic benefit but not cultural encounters with foreign countries (similar to 
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Guangzhou in the early nineteenth century). During the socialist construction period, the 
spirit of ‘patriotism, conformity and national pride’ was brutally enforced in Shanghai 
by the socialist regime at the expense of the ‘enterprising spirit’. Shanghai then retreated 
from its role as Asia’s financial centre and the centre of Chinese intellectual life.  
 
When the Shanghai Expo was organised in 2010, Shanghai revived its ‘enterprising 
spirit’. The pursuit of capitalism was symbolised by the revitalisation of the First 
National Meeting Site of the CPC in Shanghai as a tourist spot (Diglio, 2005, p.118). As 
I illustrated in Chapter Five, the Shanghai Expo was a land commodification project that 
speeded up urbanisation and generated economic benefits to the state. The venue of the 
Shanghai Expo is also planned to be developed to become a new business centre for 
state-owned enterprises (Xinhua, 2011). A state-led/-participation mode of production 
will persist with such a land commodification model. However, Shanghai has not 
revived its ‘revolutionary spirit’ yet. Rather than being a ‘vast ocean that takes in all 
rivers’ (Huang, 2007, p.81), as discussed in Chapter Six resistance from civil society 
will be suppressed. In Chapter Five, I also discussed that the Shanghai Expo did not 
focus on the reflection of the impact of urbanisation on the environment and urban 
experience. But it manipulated the Chinese theme ‘City, Makes Life Better’ to justify 
urbanisation by such an international event. Lefebvre envisioned the ‘Chinese road to 
socialism’ as an experiment of ‘building a different society’ (1991[1974], p.421) but he 
would be disappointed by the Chinese modernity - ‘Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ in China today is no longer an antithesis of Western capitalism.  
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7.4   Conclusion: Shanghai as an Antithesis of Chinese Modernity  
 
In the translator preface of the Chinese version of De l'État (Volume II), Lefebvre was 
regarded as ‘one of the most famous philosophers and social theorists in French 
Marxism’. But the translator immediately noted Lefebvre’s marginal position as a 
‘non-dogmatic and non-official’ interpreter of Marx (Li, 1988, p.2). To summarise, 
Lefebvre extended Marxist theory by emphasising the importance of ‘the urban, the 
everyday, social space and social time’ (1988, p.7). He argued that capitalism managed 
to survive through its internal contradictions ‘by occupying space’ and ‘by producing 
space’ (1976[1973], p.21). Proposing the spatial triad as a conceptual tool and applying 
a ‘regressive-progressive method’ as his methodology, Lefebvre theorised the dialectical 
relationship between physical environment, mental space and cultural representation 
under different modes of production. He was also concerned with how the logic of the 
capitalist mode of production was extended to everyday life in post-war Europe, i.e. 
alienation is no longer limited to production but to everyday life.  
 
Since the Reform was announced in 1978, China has been undergoing a ‘Second 
Revolution’ that set out to transform economic, social and spiritual life (Xinhua News, 
2004). This thesis applied a Lefebvrian framework in investigating the production of 
space and urban experience in Shanghai during such a transformation. Various methods 
of data collection were employed to address my research questions, which included: (1) 
What is the mode of production in Shanghai now? (2) What are the urban experiences 
of the inhabitants of Shanghai during the organisation of the World Expo? (3) How can 
we characterise Chinese modernity today? I argued that Shanghai entered the phase of a 
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‘state-led/-participation mode of production’, in which the state plays a dual role in 
market regulation and market activities. The organisation of the Shanghai Expo 
exemplified the role of the state and the importance of land commodification, as a 
production of new space, in sustaining such a mode of production. Upon the withdrawal 
of state control in the workplace and residential allocation, the daily routine and social 
clock of the inhabitants were also reorganised. I also periodised Shanghai’s history of 
space and argued that its past as a capitalist cosmopolitan city was reconstructed to 
connect the socialist regime to capitalism.  
 
Alongside facilitating the production of space, the Shanghai Expo also exhibited 
China’s achievement in pursuing modernisation. As the Chinese road to modernisation 
originated as a reaction to Western civilisations, the latter were regarded as the yardstick 
of such a modernity project (Lee, 1999b, p.45). It is therefore not surprising that the 
organisation of the Shanghai Expo was projected as a ‘century-old dream’ (Wen, 2009) 
and glorified as a ‘nationwide jubilation’ (Huang, 2007, p.35). Together with the 2008 
Beijing Olympics and the military parade on National Day in 2009, the Shanghai Expo 
exhibited ‘a rejuvenated and unified nation that returned to its rightful place at the 
centre of world affairs’ in the world (Callahan, 2012, p.254). Similar to the Exposition 
Publique des Produits de l’industrie Française, the Shanghai Expo demonstrated 
China’s achievement of three decades after the ‘Second Revolution’.  
 
As a modernity project, is there any antithesis of the World Expo? Yes, at least one. In 
1931, the French Third Republic organised the Paris Exposition Coloniale 
Internationale (Paris International Colonial Exhibition) to display the colonies and 
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national superiority of the participating countries through ‘crude caricatures of the art of 
colonized people’s ancestors’ (Saumane [Narcisse Danaé], 1931, p.1 cited Blake, 2002, 
p.35). Some members of the PCF and others organised a counter exhibition ‘The Truth 
about the Colonies’ (La Verite sur les Colonies). The purpose of the exhibition was to 
counter ‘the French government's use of the arts in support its civilising mission’ (ibid, 
p.38). However, the dark side of World Expos (e.g., justifying exploitation under 
capitalism, colonialism and racism) were ignored by the official publication Shanghai 
EXPO (2007). The author argued that the buildings at the Chinese Village and the 
Chinese exhibition hall at the 1904 St. Louis Exposition were ‘both rich in Chinese 
traditional characteristics and style’ (Huang, 2007, p.19), but distorted images of the 
Chinese were not mentioned. This book is referred to as ‘the only book on the 2010 
World Expo endorsed by the Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination’ (ibid, front 
flap), in which the nature of the World Expo was described as shown below without 
critical evaluation: 
 
The World Expo is a gathering of nations from all over the world to 
showcase their products and craftsmanship, to share with pride 
information about their hometowns and motherlands. It is an 
epitome of the great achievements of human civilization, possessing 
unparalleled appeal. (Huang, 2007, p.3) 
 
The Shanghai Expo is an exhibition for the achievement of Chinese modernisation. 
Lefebvre argued that modernity ‘promised happiness, the satisfaction of all needs’ 
(2005[1981], p.49), and that such a concept of happiness was new to France and the 
world after the French Revolution (1971[1968], p.206). After decades of revolutions, 
‘the concept of happiness’ is also new to China now. Before the opening of the Shanghai 
Expo, a series of books were published to popularise the event. One of the books has a 
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title A Grand Banquet of World Civilisations (2009), with a promotional movie released 
at the same time. Similar to all banquets, all worries, fears and problems were 
temporarily disregarded. The Shanghai Expo focused on the host country’s achievement 
in promoting economic progress, technological innovations and urbanisation. As 
described in Chapter Six, although not without complaints about land appropriation, 
Shanghai’s inhabitants are generally happy with the improvement in their quality of life 
in the post-Reform period. However, Lefebvre also reminded us: ‘to be aware of being 
unhappy presupposes that something else is possible, a different condition from the 
unhappy one’ (1971[1968], p.206). Similar to Paris when it organised the 1867 
Exposition, Shanghai is not a utopia for every Shanghaiese. This thesis also examined 
the social inequalities and the exhausting urban experience that the Shanghai Expo 
produced and worsened.  
 
As pointed out above, Lefebvre argued that urban experience in modernity is about 
loneliness, banality and repetition. Such an everydayness is ‘absorbed’ by spectacles, so 
that people will not reflect on their lives and social inequalities (Lefebvre, 2003[1970], 
p.130). A similar trend is taking place in China now. About half a year before the 
Shanghai Expo opened, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
approved the project of the Shanghai Disney Resort, at a suburban area in Chuansha 
Town in Pudong. The investment of US$ 3.5 billion arguably exceeded that of the 
Shanghai Expo (The Economic Observer, 2009), which reconfirmed the 
state-led/-participation mode of production being perpetuated by the production of space, 
and China’s need of spectacles in exhibiting its achievement in modernity and absorbing 
everydayness. By establishing modernity and modernism as antitheses, Lefebvre 
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examined how capitalist logic is shaping our everyday life, and called for a 
transformation of the world with a break from everyday life (2005[1981], p.50). China 
also needs an antithesis today. Can Shanghai, as China’s capital of modernity, play such 
a role in mediating a critique of modernism? It does not seem likely, when most people 
are satisfied with an improvement in material enjoyment and justified social inequalities. 
Rather than an ‘enterprising spirit’, this city needs to revive its ‘revolutionary spirit’ – a 
critique of the search for modernity. 
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APPENDIX I 
DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS OF THE RESPONDENTS 
 
No. Name Sex Age Educational Level Occupation  Residence in Shanghai 
Place of 
Birth 
1. Ms. Song F 26 Masters Accountant Pudong Wuxi 
2. Ms. Ting  F 28 Masters Financial Controller Pudong Shanghai 
3. Mr. Yin M 30 Masters Fund manager Pudong Shanghai 
4. Mr. Tian M 64 Secondary school Retired engineer Baoshan Shanghai 
5. Mr. Akbulut M 36 Masters Architect and lecturer Puxi Istanbul 
6. Mr. Shang M 33 Undergraduate Civil servant Pudong Shanghai 
7. Mr. Pan M 57 Secondary school Owner of a food manufacturing company Kunshan Shanghai 
8. Mr. Shen M 50 Secondary school Factory worker Puxi Shanghai   
9. Mr. Zhi M 56 Secondary school A member of Shanghai Committee of CPPCC N/A Shanghai 
10. Mr. Wang  M 32 Masters Computer engineer in finance industry Puxi Shanghai 
11. Ms. Huang F About 30 Undergraduate Magazine editor Puxi Shanghai 
12. Ms. Wei  F 28 Undergraduate Magazine editor Puxi Shanghai 
13. Mrs. Fang  F Above 50 Secondary school Housewife Sanlin Expo Homeland Shanghai 
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APPENDIX II 
INTERVIEW GUIDE   
 
 
Name:  ____________________ Age:    ____________________ 
Sex:   ____________________ Occupation: ____________________ 
Education:  ____________________ Place of birth: ____________________ 
District of Residence: ____________  
 
 
Part 1: Experience  
 
1. How do you travel to work? What do you usually do during your leisure time?  
你怎樣工作？你在閒暇時通常會做甚麼？ 
 
2. How often do you visit ‘linong’ (traditional Shanghaiese residential cluster)? How 
often do you visit the tourist sites?  
你有否到過里弄？你有多經常到遊客區？ 
 
3. Has your daily life changed in recent years? [For migrants] Is there any change in 
your daily life after moving to Shanghai?  
你覺得你近幾年的生活有沒有改變？[只向移民提問] 你在搬到上海後，生活上
有甚麼改變？ 
 
4. Has the Shanghai Expo made any changes to your daily life? Why?  
你覺得上海世博有沒有改變你的生活？為甚麼？ 
 
 
Part 2: Perception  
 
5. How do you feel about living in Shanghai?  
住在上海給你甚麼感覺？  
 
6. How would you compare Shanghai and other cities?  
住在上海，與住在其他城市有沒有分別？ 
 
7. Are you aware of the urban development projects in Shanghai? What do they mean 
to you?  
你有沒有注意到上海有不少大型的城市發展工程在進行中？你有甚麼感覺？ 
 
8. What does the ‘Old Shanghai’ sentiment mean to you?  
你對「老上海」有甚麼感覺？ 
 
9. What does the Shanghai Expo mean to you?  
對你來說，上海世博有甚麼意義？ 
287 
 
 
Part 3: Imagination  
 
10. Why do you live in Shanghai? What are your expectations of living in Shanghai? 
Have your expectations been realised? 
你為甚麼住在上海？你對住在上海有甚麼期望？你所期望的有沒有實現？ 
 
11. How would you define ‘modern city life’? What does ‘modern city life’ mean to 
you?  
你會怎樣定義「現代都市生活」？對你來說，甚麼才是「現代都市生活」？ 
 
12. Do you agree with the Shanghai Expo’s slogan ‘Better City, Better Life’? Why?  
你是否同意上海世博的口號「城市，讓生活更美好」？為甚麼？ 
 
13. What changes do you hope to see in Shanghai?  
你希望上海將來會有甚麼改變？  
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